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4Prologue 
Summers with Sedgwick 2006:2011:2015  
Time Code: 2007
Driving home from the beach, on the coastal highway which links the 
Southern port town of Sour (Tyre) with Beirut, Lebanon, our drive 
was constantly interrupted by one destroyed bridge after the other. 
Together with hoards of other cars we had to take detours and to pass 
over crackling, temporary constructions replacing the usual bridges. 
One bridge had a hole in it through which I could see the clear blue 
sky. The steel wires, which used to reinforce the concrete, hung 
in the air like a threadbare carpet. The encounter with the bridge 
produced a visceral affect on me, which called on me to ask: 
How to create reparative critical practices in response to this 
immense destruction?1
1  This anecdote is from 2007. See Dirckinck-Holmfeld, “‘We Shall Overcome’: Notes for a Reparative Critical  
  Practice.”
5+
TC: 2011:2015
What is the desirability for reparative critical practices?
Is it still the bombed bridges?
Gaza, Syria, Iraq, Yemen…?
 
Is it the financial crisis? 
Is it love?
Is it the “Arab Spr…?”
Is it the emergence of fundamentalism and right-wing populism? 
Is it the environmental crisis and global warming? 
Is it the refugee disaster in the Mediterranean Sea? 
Palestine? 
Is it a matter of scale?
 
 As the debris 
     piles up 
  the image 
      pixilates 
   the program 
       sets a limit
    the bridge 
        obstructs theory. 
cannot zoom in more
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On Snowflakes & Other Assemblages
Trajectory: Coming to theory …
I came to theory because I was hurting – the pain within me was so intense that I could not go on living. I 
came to theory desperate, wanting to comprehend – to grasp what was happening around and within me. 
Most importantly, I wanted the hurt to go away. I saw in theory then a location for healing.2
I came to theory because I was broken. Being in the proximity of or rather being far away from a 
war waged on friends and loved ones brought about a rupture in my previously acquired knowledge 
and practice. 
It was an encounter with Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s essay “Reparative Reading and Paranoid Reading, 
Or, You’re So Paranoid That You Probably Think This Essay Is About You”3 that mapped out the focal 
points or emergences for a practice to enable me to continue working. In the essay, Sedgwick coins 
the reparative practice or reading as an epistemological response to what she, following Paul Ricoeur, 
calls critical theory’s “hermeneutics of suspicion”, which has become preoccupied with revealing of 
oppressive mechanisms in society as a default strategy rather than one among many other possible 
affective theoretical practices. The AIDS crisis in the US in the 1980s and 1990s and her own diagnosis 
with terminal breast cancer made Sedgwick ponder on her own practice as a literary, queer-feminist 
theorist and asking: How are our energies used in response to such urgencies and contingencies? What 
does knowledge do? How is knowledge performative? And how do we create other affective responses 
through the fragments we gather and create?
Instead of providing me with a clear-cut prescription of how to go out and engage in reparative 
practice, Sedgwick spends the entire essay enacting the same paranoid hermeneutics of “unearthing”, 
“revealing” and “track-and-tracing”, which she accuses critical theory of employing. This double 
practice in which she enacts the same mechanisms that she criticises in order to arrive at the concept 
of the reparative, conceives of the reparative practice not as in opposition to or fundamental different 
from the paranoid position, but as a mutation of some of the same methods and practices4. As Sedgwick 
notes, it is “sometimes the most paranoid-tending people who are able to, and need to, develop and 
disseminate the richest reparative practices”.5 Sedgwick’s understanding of paranoia and the reparative 
is based on the work of the psychologist Melanie Klein. In Klein, paranoia is understood, not as a 
mental health condition, but as a mutable position. It is not people who are paranoid, paranoia is a 
developmental phase that the subject undergoes as one among many other developmental positions, 
which can either lead to more schizoid-destructive impulses and/or creative-reparative impulses. 
The reparative, as a creative, enabling, depressive position, cannot be decisively distinguished from 
the paranoid, but is in constant negotiation with the paranoid position. Here, as well, the depressive 
position is not understood in the sense of the clinical diagnosis “depression”, but as a creative phase 
in which the subject juxtaposes, structures and assembles the partial objects, affects and percepts she 
encounters and creates.6
Intrigued by the tantalising effect the essay had left on me, I was bursting with expectations 
2  hooks, Teaching to Transgress, 59.
3  Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 123–151. First published in 1997 as introduction to Sedgwick, Novel Gazing.
4  In “Affect as Critical Inquiry” I return to discuss why Sedgwick might enact such an overtly paranoid practice, 
  the very same she is out to criticise, to arrive at a reparative practice. 
5  Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 150.
6  See also Hinshelwood, A Dictionary of Kleinian Thought.
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when I went to see a talk by Sedgwick at the Frieze Art Fair in London 2006. But again, instead of 
delivering a prescription of how to do such reparative practices, she kept derailing and sidestepping 
the questions of Gavin Butt, with whom she was in conversation. Using fragments, anecdotes and 
personal recollections, Sedgwick gave a touching account of how the AIDS crisis in the US was like a 
civil war, where the bodies were piling up and only those directly affected seemed to care. Her account 
resonated with my own experience from that summer, and the timbre of her fragile voice pierced the 
stuffy tent of Frieze crammed with art worlders, and it soothed me. 
As always with Sedgwick’s work, I am not quite sure whether she deliberately refused to answer 
Butt’s questions. As Roby Wiegman shows, such instances in Sedgwick’s work are indicative of 
Sedgwick’s ongoing project of keeping queer theory and the making of theory in a “double bind”, in 
which identity is always volatile; destabilising itself even as it makes it. Rather than claiming a world 
building authority or fixed identity of what the reparative might be, Sedgwick keeps the concept in the 
making by enacting a certain performative way of doing critique, or what we might call a Foucaultian 
Tease. As Judith Butler have shown, Michel Foucault style his critical inquiry in such a way, that he 
suggests a value which he does not know secure its ground – he suggests it anyways and by doing so 
he exposes the limits of the epistemological field in question.7 In a similar fashion, Sedgwick’s double 
practice of, on the one hand, gesturing towards a reparative practice, while, on the other, refusing 
to provide an answer to what the reparative critical practice might be, can be seen as an attempt at 
not trying to secure its grounds or governing the field or territory. Sedgwick’s gesture of leaving the 
reparative practice open, contingent – for we the audience to go out and pursue our own trajectory 
of what the reparative critical practice might be – points to some of the paradoxes and contradictions 
that have led this research project: 
If my main research question is “How to create reparative critical practices? and how to transport 
the reparative practice from a reading or hermeneutics to artistic practices and an image in itself, then 
how should I attend to my desire for the development of the conceptual and practical framework, 
while at the same time keeping the concept open or weak – in the making? 
This question has a mirror question: 
How to style the (critical) inquiry in such a way that allows for the practical and theoretical 
endeavours to develop concomitantly while at the same time keeping it open to contingency?
Back in 2006, it was the work of British queer performance artist David Hoyle and Lebanese 
performance artist Rabih Mroué who first alerted me to a possibility of transposing Sedgwick’s 
reparative reading from a hermeneutic reading practice into a performative practice. Under the 
supervision of Gavin Butt, who was working on the concept of the reparative and the stylisation of new 
forms of doing critique in performance studies8, I started unpacking the complexities of expanding the 
reparative practice in relation to performative practices. On a weekly basis we would go down to South 
London pub and LGBTQ cabaret venue The Royal Vauxhall Tavern where Hoyle, with his Magazine 
Series, would (and continues to) discuss hot political topics such as HIV/AIDS, war, dogging, and 
migration in a burlesque style9. Hoyle’s energy animates the crammed Tavern at sometimes soothing 
and humorous, at other times vile and abusive ways. The conflicting emotions that Hoyles performances 
evoke, testify to that the reparative is not necessarily a good affective practice vs. bad one, but rather 
produces inextricable and ambivalent emotions. In a similar way but completely different context, 
my encounter with the work of Mroué Who’s Afraid of Representation10 and How Nancy Wished that 
7  Butler, “What Is Critique? An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue,” 319.
8  See also Butt, After Criticism; Butt, “Scholarly Flirtations”; Rogoff and Butt, Visual Cultures as Seriousness.
9  Hoyle, Magazine.
10  Mroué and Saneh, Who’s Afraid of Representation.
8Everything Was an April Fool’s Joke11 contributed to the further development of my thinking about 
the reparative practice. Mroué’s performances interweave episodes from the Lebanese wars (1975 – 
1991)12 and their repercussions in the present, with fragments from the history of live art (Who is 
Afraid of Representation), and competing narratives from the war get caught up and change position 
(How Nancy…). Keeping these two different practices and contexts in play pushed the preliminary 
work undertaken during my MA thesis, “We Shall Overcum: Notes for a Reparative Critical Practice” 
and led me to the following composite sketch of the reparative practice:
Reparative is attuning to the “Heartbeat of  Contingency!” 
 Reparative is a great Laugh
  Reparative is Flirtatious
  Reparative doesn’t have time for bullshit! 
 Reparative is Critical - in the dialectics between paranoid and reparative 
 Reparative is Liminoid
Reparative is Stylish 
Reparative is Incongruous Fiction 
Reparative is Community: We Shall Overcome! 
Reparative is a Practice of  Love
  Reparative is Hope 
  Reparative is Agency 
  Reparative is [k]not a theory but a braiding practice
Reparative is Open Ended13
It occurred to me that while my aim was to transport the reparative from being understood primarily 
as a hermeneutic reading practice, and although I emphasised on the “style” in which the inquiry is 
put, I kept rehearsing a notion of the reparative as a performative, gestural and discursive practice 
without being fully able to attune to the materiality of those practices. Sedgwick precisely relaunches 
the call for the reparative practice in the book Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity14 in 
which she takes “a step to the side of the deconstructive project of analyzing apparently non-linguistic 
phenomena in rigorously linguistic terms”.15 Towards the end of the essay, Sedgwick approaches 
something of a description of what the reparative practice might be through the queer-identified 
practice of camp:
The desire of a reparative impulse, on the one hand, is additive and accretive. Its fear, a realistic one, is 
that the culture surrounding it is inadequate or inimical to its nurture; it wants to assemble and confer 
plentitude on an object that will then have resources to offer to an inchoate self. To view camp as, among 
other things, the communal, historically dense exploration of a variety of reparative practices is to do 
better justice to many of its defining elements of classic camp performance: the startling, juicy displays of 
excess erudition, for example; the passionate, often hilarious antiquarianism, the prodigal production of 
alternative historiographies; the ‘over’–attachment to fragmentary, marginal, waste or leftover products; the 
rich highly interruptive affective variety; the irrepressible fascination with ventriloquistic experimentation; 
the disorienting juxtaposition of present with past, and popular with high culture.16 
The abundant use of adjectives and textural descriptions in the quote testifies to the point that 
camp is not a purely performative mimicry of gender constructs in society, but also entertains a rich 
textural and material engagement with the texture and objects which the practitioner encounters and 
11  Mroué, How Nancy Wished That Everything Was an April Fool’s Joke.
12  I refer to the Lebanese wars (1975-1991), which is often mentioned as the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1991),   
  since it had many stages, fronts and facets and included various other nations and world powers. 
13  Dirckinck-Holmfeld, “‘We Shall Overcome’: Notes for a Reparative Critical Practice.”
14  The essay was firstly published in Sedgwick, Novel Gazing.
15  Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 6.
16  Ibid., 149–150. I return to discuss this paragraph at length in “Affect’s Materiality: Not Tonight Dears, I have  
 a Headache!”
8 9
creates. This engagement with materiality does not, however, mean that Sedgwick value or fetishises 
the materiality over discursive and post-structuralist practices, but shows how the line between non-
discursive and discursive is endlessly changing and permeable.17  
And then I found myself working with video installations. How does the materiality of video, digital 
image processing and multi-channel video installation resonate with my desire to create reparative 
critical practices? 
It occurred to me that in my works, Djisr (The Bridge) (2008)18 and Time: Aalborg | Space: 2033 
(2010)19, I intuitively internalised a great deal of inspiration from camp practices, even though the 
works themselves do not qualify as camp: I like to get my fingers into as much tangible material as 
possible; I gather bits and pieces; use archival material with restaged footage; I turn to historical sites 
and borrow inspiration from a wealth of practices. It seemed productively contradictory that I was 
focusing on the reparative practice as a performative and discursive act or style, but practicing this 
through the production of video installations. I thought that if the video installations held any reparative 
potential at all, it would be in the relation and interaction with the audience and the participants, the 
site-specificity and the narrative plot etc. Was I unable to attend to the materiality of the reparative 
critical practice as images? Were the parts of me occupied with the lush image, the beauty shots – a 
mere aesthetic tic – a painterly spasm that I could not rid myself off? Or could that very materiality of 
the images – their textural affordances – contain a reparative potential in itself? 
The material engagement with images also carried with it an unresolved relationship with time: 
I returned to sites of memory: I gathered scraps of archival footage and sampled it with restaged 
footage, jumping in time but without fully being able to articulate the reparative critical practices’ 
complex relationship to temporality.
Sedgwick passed away in 2009, and with her slipping into the bardo – the state between life and 
death in Tibetan Buddhism20 – a lot of work on the reparative reading and practice has taken place 
and continues to take place in the academy.21 Robyn Wiegman coins what she calls a “reparative 
turn” in queer feminist scholarship by “tracking its twin interest in the study of affect and time”22. 
According to Wiegman, Ann Cvetkovich, Heather Love, and Elizabeth Freeman “take up the call for 
the reparative reading, by using the temporal frameworks of the everyday, backward feeling, and queer 
time to reparative ends”23. Time in the Making builds on the work of Sedgwick, Wiegman, Freeman 
and Berlant24 – and braids those theoretical endeavours together with my desire to move the reparative 
– from a reading – to an image in itself. Time in the Making explores the reparative practice not only as 
a twin interest in affect and time but also as an assemblage between affect, materiality and time. 
17  It has been a concern in the discussions on New Materialism that some seem to value materialism over post  
  structuralist thinking. See also Ahmed, “Imaginary Prohibitions.”
18  Dirckinck-Holmfeld, Djisr (The Bridge).
19  Dirckinck-Holmfeld, TIME.
20 Cohen, “The Courage of Curiosity, or the Heart of Truth (A Mash-Up),” 201 Cohen notes how Cathy Davidson 
had annuced Sedgwick’s death “saying that eve had slipped into the bardo (itself a curios idiom for announcing  
a death in academe).”
21 See “PLMA”; Murphy and Vincent, Criticism: Honering Eve A Special Issue on the Work of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick; 
Sedgwick and Goldberg, The Weather in Proust published posthumous; Wiegman, “The Times We’re in”; Boston 
University, The Honoring Eve Symposium: Feminism and Queer Theory -; “Annual Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick 
Memorial Lecture in Gender and Sexuality Studies.”
22  Wiegman, “The Times We’re in,” 4.
23  Ibid.
24  Wiegman, “The Times We’re in.”
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Returning to the encounter with the bridge, in as much as it was affect I was hit 
with - it was an image. 
The affect enfolded the context: 
  The landscape of the South 
  The sun setting over the Mediterranean Sea. 
The image was set in motion by the slow movement of the car; 
  or rather the interruption of movement; 
The image was ripped from the usual movement of which it should form part 
  and opened up direct to time; 
Returning to theory, embarking on this PhD project, the slow rumination involved in reading Gilles 
Deleuze cinema books became a prolonged epiphany25. Reading Sedgwick together with Deleuze and 
Felix Guattari has allowed me to expand on Sedgwick’s work on affect, time and materiality and to 
transform the reparative from a hermeneutics and reading to consider it as artistic practices and as an 
image in itself. Affect seems often to be the great battleground between a Baruch Spinoza-informed 
understanding of affect through Deleuze and Guattari as a pre-personal intensity, between an affecting 
body and an affected body and a Silvan Tomkins-inspired understanding of affect as neural firing as 
opted for by Sedgwick and Adam Frank26. By bringing different positions in affect theory together I 
propose that affect as intensity enfolds materiality, which fold back on a material body (with bodies 
being understood in the widest possible sense to include non-organic bodies). By enfolding the 
materiality in the affect, the affect is able to rip itself from the movement and materiality of which it 
should form part and open up directly to time – or to what I call affect’s time. 27 
Initially, I wanted to focus this research project only on visual image practices – understood here 
as pure video installation or cinematic practices. However, it became apparent that different material 
practices did not necessarily have to exclude one another but rather since I was working with digital 
image production and multi-channel video installation, image-text, discursive/non-discursive are 
not something which can be sidestepped in favour of one or the other, but intrinsically related and 
enfolded in the materiality of the images. With the move from analogue to digital, consciousness 
is no longer stringing images one after the other on a film spool in the back of our mind. Rather it 
becomes an interface, an aggregate of images, of poor digital versions, compressed, ripped, uploaded 
and downloaded – re-territorialised in new formats and codecs. What becomes pertinent is the way 
in which these different formats constitute collective and affective assemblages of enunciation – which 
conflate the signifying semiotic production (language) and a-signifying semiotic production (capital, 
machines, diagrams, images, sounds, textures) that capture and activate pre-subjective and pre-
individual affect, emotions and percepts.28
If we read this operation with regard to Sedgwick’s notion of the reparative reader, who gathers all 
the fragments she encounters and creates, it becomes possible to think of the reparative practice not 
only as a textual practice, but as a textural image practice, in which we string, amass, aggregate matter 
and movement into new assemblages, as though the reparative practice always was a digital image 
practice “without realising it.”29 
Here I have found Guattari’s project for a new ethico-aesthetic paradigm30, of creating assemblages 
25  Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image; Deleuze, Cinema 2.
26  Sedgwick, Frank, and Alexander, Shame and Its Sisters.
27  I continue to develop this argument throughout the following chapters.
28 See also Lazzarato, “Machines to Crystallize Time”; “Maurizio Lazzarato: ‘Semiotic Pluralism’ and the New 
Government of Signs | Eipcp.net.”
29 Here I refrain Deleuze “as though we had always had cinema witihout realising it”, which I return to discuss in 
Affect Image Touch Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 2.
30  Guattari, Chaosmosis.
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of enunciation which establish transversal relationships between multiple fields and territories, across 
signifying and asignifying semiotics in the production of new subjectivities, useful to further develop 
the conceptual framework of the reparative critical practices to artistic practices and an image in itself. 
This ethico-aesthetic paradigm resonates with Foucault’s project of the art of existence or care of 
the self. At the end of Foucault’s work on the History of Sexuality31, he leaves his original project of 
tracing a genealogy of the construction of sexuality and proposes an ethico-aesthetic project of the 
care of the self, as an art of existence in which the subject refines his or her life into a work of art. 
While previously I considered this practice as a purely performative speech act or discursive practice, 
it becomes apparent that the techniques of the self, which Foucault suggests have a dense material 
engagement with different mediums and technologies. One example is the Hupomnemata, a memory 
aid – in the form of a diary, a notebook, account register or other technical media, in which one jots 
down “material records of things read, heard or seen, thus offering them up as a kind of accumulated 
treasure for subsequent rereading and meditation”32. The Hupomnemata, or the notebook, is deployed 
in Time in the Making not only as a method for a reparative practice, but also as the very way in which 
my research project has been styled. The notebook has allowed me to aggregate and accumulate the 
thoughts, reflections, images, anecdotes and practices as I have encountered and created them along 
the way.
 Raymond Bellour’s concept of the Image Dispositif has also been further useful in considering the 
complex assemblages that make up video installations.33 Bellour’s notion of the image dispositif draws 
on Michel Foucault’s concept of the dipositif as a “heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourse, 
institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific 
statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions”34. In Deleuze’s reading of Foucault 
in “What is a dispositive?” – the dispositif is not only the distribution between different concrete and 
pre-existing objects, institutions and practices, but is also a distribution of light that cannot be traced 
back to one single source of light – an intentional and unidirectional projector behind the beam – but 
rather diffuses, blurs and disperses what comes into contact with35. Thinking of the image as dispositif 
allows us to open the image, from the flat attributes, which are commonly ascribed to it – as two-
dimensional representation – and to consider all the different elements that make up an assemblage or 
video installation. At the same time, the image dispositif operates on different scales: From the close-up 
to the full frame and to the larger picture – the context that the video installation ties into, which itself 
ties into the production of other collectivities which are themselves comprised of different technical 
milieus and space-times. The image dispositif draws a diagram ---
Out of the contours a snowflake appears…
31  Foucault, The Care of the Self.
32  Foucault and Rabinow, Ethics, 209.
33  Bellour, La querelle des dispositifs.
34  Foucault and Gordon, Power/knowledge, 194.
35  Deleuze, “What Is a Dispositif?,” 160.
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Interlude: The Quarrel of the Reparative
Rrrrrr 
[my manic defensive delusional audience grinds]
Are you sure you mean reparative? Would that be the right word?
The word “reparative” seems to provoke a general choke in the audience. People seem to be 
discontented with the word itself, since it brings back associations with reconciliation; reparative 
justice; moral repair; messianic and religious repair, which seeks to repair a (morally) defect world; 
and even branches of the so-called “reparative therapy”, which seeks to “repair” homosexuals, and 
turn them into heterosexuals.  To an extent, I share the first this objection to the reparative; however, 
I have not been able to come up with a more suitable term. This might be a feeble excuse, but I insist 
on “reparative” as an adjective rather than the root of the verb as in “repair” even though I am not 
sure I quite perceive the difference. I learn from the dictionary that the role of the adjective is to give 
more information or properties about the object, which in this case would be practice. The reparative 
cannot stand alone, but is linked to the noun “practice”. The reparative is immediately followed by its 
twin adjective “critical”. 
What is the oxymoronic relationship between the reparative and critical?
This question is immediately followed by another comment: 
The call for the reparative is always already part of the neoliberal project itself. 
The reparative is partial, weak, affect-driven, micropolitical, ameliorative, 
reformist and is thus unable to account for and undermine the abstract system 
– capitalism - which we are up against. It is the false consciousness of the 
feminist, queer, post-colonial critic, who is eventually doing the system a favour 
by not using grand narratives to effectively derail the system and as such she has 
undermined the critical figure and critical theory in general.
Up until now, those in the audience familiar with Sedgwick’s work seems perfectly fine – maybe 
even pleased that somebody brought Eve into the discussion. But as I have reached the part of my 
project concerned with trying to transport the reparative reading into artistic practices or an image in 
itself their eyebrows rise to unexplored heights: 
If I understand you right, Sedgwick places a lot of emphasis on the work of the 
reparative reader, whereas what it seems you are attempting to do is not to limit 
the reparative to the privilege of the reader – but rather to analyze whether 
there is a possibility that the work of art or image, in itself, is reparative. 
What kinds of shifts would need to take place to theorize a reparative as image/
art-practice, or spectator versus a reader? And if it is no longer privileged to 
the position of the reader, then where does the reparative work take place? Which 
requires a more careful parsing and location of the reparative: Where does it take 
place, and where does the “practice” of reparation happen, or between what/whom?36 
36  I am grateful to Eliza Steinbock for raising this question during the European Summer School in Cultural
 Studies: Structures of Feelings 2012.
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And then when the blood sugar drops and just before we break for coffee and stale pound cake the 
most popular question is raised: 
What is it exactly that it should repair?
I return to these questions throughout the entire PhD-thesis and explore each of them in detail in 
the subsequent chapters37. I will now return to describe how this project has been devised which might 
help to shed light on some of the objections above.
Snowflake Morphology 
A snowflake is a plate, which is almost two dimensional, flat, but it is slightly extruded, which 
gives it a shallow depth. A snowflake is not a stable structure but always in the process of morphing, 
transforming, melting, and recrystallising into something else. 
Time in the Making has been devised through a snowflake diagram. Fractal in its structure, the 
snowflake diagram is an aggregate of images. The elements that make up the different strata of the 
snowflake can split into new images, each of which is a reduced-size copy of the whole. The snowflake 
undergoes iteration/ repetition, and thus creates a circuit in which each element contains part of the 
other in each other while existing independently….
Is it a diagram for analysis or a diagram for production?
[My manic defensive audience comes back in and punctuates the air of carefree optimism]
Let me rewind the tape: The snowflake diagram came about from the contingent practice of 
reading Orhan Pamuk’s novel Snow38 and Deleuze’s cinema books, while undertaking the preliminary 
37  For questions 1 and 4 see “Affect’s Materiality”; For Questions 2 & 3 see “Affect as Critical Inquiry”; and for 5  
  see below. 
38  Pamuk, Snow.
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preparations for the video installations movement (2012)39 and Leap into Colour (2012-2015).40 
What constitutes the crystal-image is the most fundamental operation of time: since the past is constituted 
not after the present that it was but at the same time, time has to split itself in two at each moment as 
present and past, which differ from each other in nature, or, what amounts to the same thing, it has to split 
the present in two heterogeneous directions, one of which is launched towards the future while the other 
falls into the past. Time has to split at the same time as it sets itself out or unrolls itself: it splits in two 
dissymmetrical jets, one of which makes all the present pass on, while the other preserves all the past. Time 
consists of this split, and it is this, it is time, that we see in the crystal.41 
What Deleuze calls the “time image” occurs when we are able to see in the image the fundamental 
operation of time itself. Past, present and future do not exist in different, separate instants or [time 
frames] organised neatly on a linear sequence; rather time splits itself into different directions, one 
that launches into the future while the other falls into the past. The time image opens up to non-
chronological time in which past, present and future exist at the same time. This is what we see in the 
crystal – an infinite splitting of time.42 
I like to think of snowflakes rather than crystals. Snowflakes become the poor-(wo)man’s crystal 
– or a poor time image43: Snowflakes are transient, permeable, fluffy, compounds of dust and vapour 
– they take different forms depending on the weather and context. While the paranoia hardens what 
it touches, the reparative practice like snowfloakes bounces off its partial objects. Snowflakes stick to 
the objects and bodies they encounter, they flock, whirl, melt; in this morphology the properties of the 
crystal change form, while the snowflake retains its original properties in its newfound form.
Kar means “snow” in Turkish, and Parmuk’s book Snow recounts the story of the main protagonist-
cum-poet Ka and his trip to the Eastern Anatolian town of Kars. Upon his arrival, Kars is cut-off from 
connecting towns because of heavy snow (Kar) and the main character Ka is trapped within it: Kars-
kar-ka. The closed maze created by the snow is not only used to reflect each character of the book, the 
cut-off town comes to reflect the larger society. The snow also creates a meta-reflection on the literary 
form through which the novel is produced. Upon his return from Kars to Frankfurt, Ka traces his daily 
walks in Kars, which come to form a snowflake map. He arranges all the poems around the different 
locations where he produced them. We never get to see the actual poems but only their crystalline 
description or virtual reflection – the novel. This comes to create a third text or indeed a crystalline 
image hovering in a zone of undecidability between prose and poetry, between actual text and mental 
image produced in the reader.
How can this crystalline description serve to illustrate the diachronic or triple function of the 
snowflake diagram? How can we understand the snowflake diagram both as a model for analysis and 
a model for production? 
The snowflake is strung out between diachronic lines or strata one of which is actual and one of 
which is virtual. Initially, I thought the actual was the actual production of a work or image while 
the other - the virtual reflection - was the analytical text that came along with the production of a 
work. The two have, however, become forever inextricable. And to call one or the other actual or 
virtual seems rather flat. The snowflake has been strung out between two strata or axes, one which is 
materiality and one which is time and the different strata are set in motion through affect.
39  Dirckinck-Holmfeld, Movement.
40  Dirckinck-Holmfeld, Leap into Colour.
41  Deleuze, Cinema 2, 78–79.
42  I return to discuss Deleuze’s concept of the time image in ”Affect’s Time”
43  Here I borrow Hito Steyerl’s concept of the poor image – which she describes as the low resolution, the debris  
  of audio-visual capitalism. I return to discuss this in ”Affect Image Touch” and ”Rematerialisation”
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In each circuit of the snowflake, the structure morphs and takes on different forms. “No two 
snowflakes are alike” – but snowflakes are also not neatly organised hexagonal shapes as Wilson 
Bentley, the first to photograph a single snowflake crystal through a microscope attached to his camera 
in 1885, liked us to believe44. Like snowflakes, which morph and take on different shapes depending 
on temperature and context, each circuit or part of this project morphs and takes on different shapes, 
while enfolding aspects from the previous parts: 
In the first chapter “Affect’s Materiality, Or, Not tonight Dears, I have a Headache!” I think through 
the concepts of affect and materiality, to construct a concept of affect between somatic, performative 
and technical assemblage. Unfolding the way in which affect enfolds materiality and how matter is 
enfolded in the affect, the snowflake takes the shape of a triangle between Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari 
and Sedgwick in this chapter. By bringing them alongside one another I attempt to open the concept of 
reparative practices to the technicity and texture of affect as an assemblage of heterogeneous elements.
In the subsequent two chapters the snowflake morphs into a discussion on the materiality of affect 
in relation to digital image production. In “Affect Image Touch” the diagram morphs and becomes a 
pixel. The visceral encounter with the pixelated images, which emerged during the early stages of the 
uprising in Syria 2011, which the Lebanese performance artist Rabih Mroué has worked extensively 
on in his performance The Pixelated Revolution (2013) and the close up of the encrusted face of 
Marlene Dietrich, in Josef von Sternberg’s film The Scarlet Empress (1934), allow me to discuss the 
affect and materiality of the digital image.  Despite that the two snippets are radically different in their 
materiality, texture and context, they both tear themselves from the totality of which it should form 
part and are raised into a state of entity. 
In the essay-documentation of the video-installation movement, which I made in the cabaret, 
performance and club venue Metro al Madina in Beirut in 2012, the snowflake morphs into raindrops 
pressed against the windowpane – or holes in the bus-map along the lines of which the footage was 
recorded. Here I explore how the movement image can move, not only technically and mechanically 
but also spatially and socially: What happens to the movement image in times of progressive filming 
and multichannel video installation? 
In “Affect’s Time: On the Temporality of the Reparative Critical Practice” the snowflake morphs and 
becomes time itself. Here I discuss the reparative critical practice’s complex relationship to temporality 
pushed by my encounter with the optimistic clocks, which the artist Felix Gonzalez-Torres’ collected 
shortly before his too premature death in 1996. In 2011 the artist Julie Ault reassembled about a dozen 
of the clocks, which had been dispersed to the community around Gonzalez-Torres. 
Sedgwick’s call for the reparative practice has often been criticised for undermining critical 
theory’s ability to reveal power structures in society in favour of more affect-oriented and ameliorative 
practices. In “Affect as Critical Inquiry”, I discuss how the reparative is not anti-critical, but critical 
in its courtship with or by enacting the very same paranoia it sets out to criticise. To do so, I draw on 
Judith Butler’s essay “What is Critique? An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue”45 and Irit Rogoff ’s concept of 
criticality46. Inviting Butler and Rogoff into the ménage à trois, is an attempt to reconcile the reparative 
critical practice with Butler’s work47 to think affect “not just the basis but the very stuff of ideation and 
critique”48 and how affect not only forces a response from the affected body but also eventually style 
44  Bentely, “Snowflakebentley.com.”
45  Butler, “What Is Critique? An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue.”
46  Rogoff, “What Is a Theorist?”.
47  Hemmings, “Invoking Affect: Cultural Theory and the Ontological Turn,” 556; Wiegman, “The Times We’re in,” 
  16.
48  Butler, Frames of War, 34.
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this response in new forms. 
In the subsequent intermezzo I develop affect as critical inquiry through a case-study in (para)
paranoia. Here, I update paranoia, from an analogue, Cold-War paranoia in Sedgwick to a digital 
(para)paranoia of (late)late capitalism through a reading of Sianne Ngai’s version of paranoia in Ugly 
Feelings49 and the performance and multi-format project My Neck is Thinner Than a Hair by the Atlas 
Group.50 While paranoia grows like a crystal snowflake, (para)paranoia becomes a self-reflexive 
practice that knows that it is paranoid, but that it is through enacting this paranoia that it is able to 
morph into a creative practice. 
The snowflake morphs and forms the map of Talaat Harb, a square in Downtown Cairo, where the 
Armenian Egyptian photographer Armand (Armenak Arzrouni, 1901 Erzurum – 1963 Cairo) used 
to have his studio in the 1950s. In the video installation Leap into Colour, I explore the reparative in 
relation to memory as a process of migrations and rematerialisation, which enables different space-
times and geographies to exist within the same page, sentence and frame. 
1930-1950 Cairo is a vibrant cosmopolitan centre for art, cinema, music, cabarets and political 
ferment. Armand captures the artists and politicians frequenting his studio in Downtown, Cairo. 2012. 
Philippe Arzrouni, the son of Armand who has lived in Denmark since the 1960s, returns to Cairo for 
the first time in 30 years to find out what has happened to his father’s photographs. Memories from 
the past interfere with the present and fragments of archival material interweave in the current and 
become inextricable.
My work with Leap into Colour led to a reflection on the reparative critical practice as a process 
of rematerialisation, which I discuss in the subsequent essay of the same title. Here I weave my 
experience of watching Harun Farocki’s films during a workshop with Farocki and Antje Ehmann in 
Cairo and Alexandria, Egypt 2012 together with my own work with Leap into Colour. The snowflake 
morphs and becomes the silver halide in the glass-negatives of Armand – which undergoes a process 
of rematerialisation.
The process of rematerialisation opens up to a temporality in which the past is not a re-enactment 
of the past in the present, but the past itself becomes reconstituted in the present. In dialogue with 
Lebanese filmmakers Rania and Raed Rafei’s films Prologue and 74 (The reconstitution of a struggle), 
in which they re-enact the student uprisings in Lebanon in 1974 with current activists, I explore how 
this reconstitution becomes possible in their films by sharing the similar urgent and contingent factors 
as the situation it was to re-enact.
The heterogeneous parts that make up the entire research project are brought together in the 
final part “Collectivities of the Disco-Stretch, Or, Propositions for a Future Practice”. Here I discuss 
what kind of collectivity the reparative critical practice fosters by taking my point of departure in the 
collectivities that Metro al Madina is forging in Beirut and beyond. The tethering of practices in the 
Metro morphs the snowflake, which eventually vaporise from the bodies crammed in the two-floor 
underground cabaret venue. 
The snowflake diagram, through which this project has been created, melts away and what is left 
behind is that which it has come to give form to in its making; it is not the actual works but their virtual 
double. The snowflake morphology has served as a superimposition of various diagrams – as such 
the snowflake diagram has both been a model for production and for analysis… but also eventually 
sketches the contours of a future practice. It is Time (in the making) we see in the snowflake, or rather 
the snowflake gives way to Time in the Making.
49  Ngai, Ugly Feelings.
50  Raad et al., My Neck Is Thinner Than a Hair.
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The tethering of images 
[…] enter into realization as into a complex practice. Rather it can’t stop claiming mastery of reality as the 
flat propositional object of a single verb, shivering in its threadbare near-transparency: the almost fatally 
thin ‘to know’.51
Returning to the image of the bridge, the bridges were repaired a long time ago, 
the wound stiffened with concrete. The threadbare, fatally thin, steel wires hanging in the air – left me 
“without”52, without my surest ways of practising. But as they have been hanging there in the back of 
my mind, I have strung images, snapshots, anecdotes, theories, notebook jottings and encounters I 
had over the years – to construct a trajectory from which to proceed. 
I give this account of coming to theory to show that the desire for reparative critical practices is 
not something which we sit and wait for, or something which we do because we find it “sexy”53 – even 
though there is nothing wrong with being motivated by sex – but precisely because we have run 
up against the limits of the onto-epistemological fields that govern our surest ways of knowing. The 
affective encounter forces a reaction, but a reaction that does not have a pre-existing mould to be fitted 
back into. Rather the affective encounter calls upon us to style this reaction in new ways which cannot 
be anticipated, planned or designed – but are contingent and open to the future. 
Time in the Making suggests that the reparative critical practice enfolds the materiality of the past 
sensation / experience. This opens up to a what I call affect’s time – when affect collides with matter and 
opens up to a possibility of experiencing time directly – as heterogeneity of times existing in the same 
moment. This process works back on the initial materiality that the affect carried with it – and opens up 
to a process of rematerialisation through which the past is no longer pure past but becomes reconstituted 
in the present. As such the reparative critical practices involves a complex relationality to temporality, 
which operates on four or more different scales: the past experience itself; the rematerialisation or 
restylisation of that past experience; this rematerialisation creates a third temporality, which hovers 
in between past and present. But together all these different temporal processes involves a fourth one, 
which is the collectivities of practices that they constitute together. The collectivities, points to a future 
practice to come. 
Returning to the favourite question of my manic defensive delusional audience: What is it exactly 
that it should repair? I like the it in what is it that it should repair because it gains agentic powers and 
turns into an assemblage of complex practices, which all act on each other and are acted upon, in a 
way that is similar to the complex powers that make up the weather54 as when we say “it rains”55… or 
indeed it snows. It is not so much a question of “What is it that it should repair” but rather how all the 
broken threads in our onto-epistemological fabrics are inextricable and superimposed. It is from the 
superimpositions of diagrams that a proliferation of practices and new subjectivities emerges.
Without further ado I will leave it to you in your own time …
51  Wiegman, Eve’s Triangles, or: Queer Theory without Anti-Normativity; Crimp, “Mario Montez, For Shame,” 64.
52  Rogoff, “What Is a Theorist?”.
53  Butler, “What Is Critique? An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue.”
54  Sedgwick and Goldberg, The Weather in Proust.
55  Bennett, Vibrant Matter, 53.
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AFFECT’s MATERIALITY, Or,
“Not tonight dears, I have a headache!”
Comes the revolution, Comrade, you’ll be tickled pink by those deconstructive jokes; you’ll faint from ennui 
every minute you’re not smashing the state apparatus; you’ll definitely want hot sex twenty to thirty times 
a day. You’ll be mournful and militant. You’ll never want to tell Deleuze and Guattari, ‘Not tonight, dears, I 
have a headache!’1
In this essay I will think through the concepts of affect and materiality, to construct a concept 
of affect between somatic, performative and technical assemblage. Unfolding how affect enfolds 
materiality and how matter is enfolded in the affect will allow me to conceptually move Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick’s notion of the reparative practice understood foremost as a somatic and bodily-situated, 
performative practice, to operate on the level of the digital image in itself. To provide an answer to the 
question: 
If I understand you right, Sedgwick places a lot of emphasis on the work 
of the reparative reader, whereas what it seems you are attempting to 
do, is not to limit the reparative to the privilege of the reader – but 
rather to analyze whether there is a possibility, that the work of art 
or image, in itself, is reparative. What kinds of shifts would need to 
take place to theorize a reparative as image/art practice, or spectator 
vs. a reader? And if it is no longer privileged to the position of the 
reader, then where does the reparative work take place? Which requires a 
more careful parsing and location of the reparative: Where does it take 
place, and where does the “practice” of reparation happen, or between 
what/whom?2 
By paying attention to how the concepts of affect and materiality are already at work in Sedgwick’s 
work, I hope to show how the reparative is not only a major contribution to queer, feminist and critical 
theory and methodology but can also inform a sensibility/method for artistic practices and artistic 
research. Robyn Wiegman coins what she calls a “reparative turn” in queer feminist scholarship by 
“tracking its twin interest in the study of affect and time”3. According to Wiegman, Ann Cvetkovich, 
Heather Love, and Elizabeth Freeman “take up the call for the reparative reading, by using the temporal 
frameworks of the everyday, backward feeling, and queer time to reparative ends”4. I will try to situate 
the reparative practice not only as a twin interest in affect and time, but as a triple interest in affect, 
time and materiality. I propose that it is through affect’s materiality or texture that affect opens up 
directly to time: Affect’s Time. 
By focusing on the way in which the reparative practice is made possible through affect’s materiality, 
I attempt to take up Patricia Clough’s who see a radical potentiality in the “affective turn” based on 
the assumption that the “turn to affect points (…) to a dynamism immanent to bodily matter and 
matter generally – matter’s capacity for self-organization in being informational.’”5 Rather than turning 
away from Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Gilles Deleuze’s concepts of affect, which Clough and Mark 
B. Hansen’s call for material affect to a certain degree proposes6, I suggest that it is possible to arrive 
precisely at affect’s materiality by continuing to endure the headache induced by bringing together 
Sedgwick and Deleuze’s different conceptions of affect.
1  Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 146.
2  I am grateful to Eliza Steinbock for raising this question during the European Summer    
  School on Cultural Studies Structures of Feelings, Copenhagen 2012.
3  Wiegman, “The Times We’re in,” 4.
4  Ibid.
5  Hansen, “Feelings without Feelers, or Affectivity as Environmental Force”; Clough, “The Affective Turn.”  
  (Hansen’s emphasis) 66.
6  Hansen, “Feelings without Feelers, or Affectivity as Environmental Force,” 68.
22
In the quote above Sedgwick (ironically, I assume) notes “[y]ou’ll never want to tell Deleuze and 
Guattari, ‘Not tonight, dears, I have a headache!’” I invite Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari and Sedgwick 
to a threesome, and propose that taking pleasure in the headache caused by bringing such disparate 
thinkers together might be productive for expanding on a notion of affect’s materiality: between the 
somatic, performative and technical assemblage. Sedgwick had a strong interest and investment in 
male-male eroticism, homo-social desire7 and the figure of the triangle8. The triangle employed here 
between Sedgwick, Deleuze, and Guattari serves to open up to the pedagogy of complexity, which 
might again open up to a more complex, polyamorous constellation of shared bedfellas. Unlike the 
prediction made in Sedgwick’s joke above, the post-revolutionary moment, which we could be said 
to be in, has not left us with a libido of wanting hot sex twenty to thirty times a day. Rather it has 
left us with a general headache, hangover, along with a feeling of apathy and limited capacity to act. 
Affects are difficult to conceptualise since one only perceives them by attuning oneself to the register 
of how the affect diminishes or increase the affected body’s ability to act. Therefore, one should not get 
surprised at suffering a serious headache when dealing with affective analysis – a sensation Massumi 
describes as the gift of confusion when wondering “’what in the world to do with it all.’”9 
The threesome is an attempt to engage in affective analysis and theorising from the three, rather 
than explicitly to “undertake the proliferation of one affect, or maybe two.”10 That this is a rather 
unlubricated, uninterested, non-consensual threesome is to value a form of analysis that does not 
strive for cohesion and consensus, but multiplicity, textual and textural friction between adversaries. 
This relationality allows me to modulate the concept of affect’s materiality and to valorise the act of 
engagement with the texture and materiality of affective analysis. That it is a dull and dry escapade 
resonates with Sedgwick’s own sudden self-awareness of how little sex there is in her later writings. 
Sedgwick notes how “cancer therapy that aims to blot up every trace of circulating estrogen, makes 
sexuality a less and less stimulating motive of reflection”11. I take this as indicative of how the 
biomediated body is already at work in Sedgwick’s own body (of work)12. 
Sedgwick willingly approaches some sort of opening towards Deleuze and Guattari in her move 
away from critical hermeneutics’ “beyond” and “beneath” in favour of the “besides” – as a planar 
spatial ecology – where heterogeneous practices, objects and subjects create an “ecological field 
whose intensive and defining rationality is internal as much as it is directed toward the norms it may 
challenge.”13 Bringing Sedgwick, Deleuze and Guattari “alongside” each other, is equally an attempt to 
stay in the intensity between the involved bodies to surpass the body-as-organism and open up to the 
“technicity” or the texture of the affect as an assemblage of heterogeneous elements. This might help 
to advance or enact the reparative critical practice as a planar spatial ecology – where heterogeneous 
practices, objects and subjects make up (or make out) an image in itself. 
7 Sedgwick, Between Men.
8 As Wiegman shows the triangle “has significance across the body of Sedgwick’s work (here I am tempted to  
 write across Eve’s body) in at least three ways: a) as a convention for canonical narration b) as a metaphor for  
 the work of interpretation c) as a pedagogy for understanding the complexity and disorientations of   
 identification. See Wiegman, Eve’s Triangles, or: Queer Theory without Anti-Normativity. 
9 Danbolt, Touching History, 196.
10 Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 146.
11 Ibid., 13.
12 Mark B Hansen’s critique of affect with Sedgwick and Massumi is based on the assumption that both are  
 lingering in body-as-organism
13 Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 9.
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Diagrammatic Headache:
Sedgwick      Deleuze & Guattari
The Love for Proust   The love for Proust 
Affect     Affect
Partial Object    Machinic assemblage
Texxture/Texture   Fold: texturology
   
Besides     Close Up 
Assemblage/Camp    Rizome /Planar 
 
Paranoid/Schizo     Assemblages of Enunciation
Projection/Introjection  Image
 
Reparative     Schizoanalysis
Ecology of value    Chaosmosis/ Aesthetic Paradigm
 
Buddhism     Ecosophic Object
 
Contingency    Animism
Textile art    Anti-Oedipus
   
Queer temporarlity    Origami
   
* draw a line or stitch between the concepts you think resonate
The diagrammatic headache is an attempt to map the various conceptual crossovers that emerge by 
placing Deleuze, Guattari and Sedgwick alongside one another. The essay will touch upon some of the 
overlaps, while leaving others on their own.
Reparative
Sedgwick’s notion of the reparative practice is rather elusive. Instead of providing a clear-cut 
definition of what a reparative reading or reparative practices might be she leaves the reader with a 
tantalizing lack of fulfilment. By doing so, Sedgwick displaces the agency or power from the author to 
the reader, who is left to assemble her own notion of what this reparative might be. Encountering Eve 
on a textural level, we have already given ourselves over to the workings of affect. But how then am I 
to take on this double quest of on the one hand trying to come up with a definition of the reparative, 
while on the other keeping the notion permeable and open? 
Let us consider how Sedgwick maintain fine line in her essay. Even though her essay sets out to 
work against the paranoid hermeneutics in critical theory, she cannot help but enacting this very 
same paranoid hermeneutics. As Ellis Hanson notes Eve’s essay inveighs “against the hermeneutics of 
suspicion but it cannot help rehearsing it”14. The essay in itself comes to perform, embody, enact or 
enfold Sedgwick’s everlasting quest for “non-identitarian identity” in queer theory15. The reparative 
14  Hanson, “The Future’s Eve,” 106 my emphasis.
15  Wiegman, Eve’s Triangles, or: Queer Theory without Anti-Normativity; Crimp, “Mario Montez, For Shame.”
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does not inveigh against the hermeneutics of suspicion, as a sort of anti-criticism, but, rather enact 
the very same paranoid methods, which she is accusing everybody else of deploying; she opens 
the position up, makes it permeable, capable of changing or migrating into other positions namely 
reparative positions or practices. 
The ontology of the reparative critical practice points to the first conceptual and methodological 
headache caused by brining Sedgwick, Deleuze and Guattari together. How are we to understand 
ontology, matter and image with heterogeneous thinkers such as Sedgwick, Deleuze and Guattari?
Traditional branches of ontology seem to imply that there is some sort of deeper essence or true 
kernel, the thing itself, concealed beneath the surface. However, thinking that I can reach such “matter” 
which the reparative practice as image is manifested in, seems rather odd if the reparative is intrinsically 
related to and born out of the on-going queer quest for nonidentitarian identity. Yet, I believe this points 
precisely point to the ontology of reparative practice. The “ontology” of the reparative critical practice, 
which I want to suggest here, is neither an on/off switch board between the digital/analogue, the 
essentialist/anti- essentialist, the true kernel or the discursively constructed, but is rather, a complex, 
multi-layered “phyllo dough” or mille-feuille of the analogue and the digital16.  I find it particularly 
productive to think of the reparative in terms of a differential ontology as developed by Deleuze. 
Deleuze, for whom the identity of things is constituted within a nexus or web of relations, difference 
and the assemblage or agencement of relations that makes up identities are therefore constitutive of 
identity.17  This seems to resonate with the queer quest for non-identitarian identity, which is open to 
contingency and open to reconfiguration, difference and transmutation.
Towards the end of her essay, Sedgwick provides a rich paragraph, which is probably the closest we 
get to an actual definition of the reparative, through camp performance:
The desire of a reparative impulse, on the one hand, is additive and accretive (…) it wants to assemble and 
confer plentitude on an object that will then have resources to offer to an inchoate self. To view Camp as, 
among other things the communal, historically dense exploration of a variety of reparative practices is to 
do better justice to many of its defining elements of classic camp performance: the startling, juicy displays 
of excess erudition, for example; the passionate, often hilarious antiquarianism, the prodigal production 
of alternative historiographies; the ‘over’–attachment to fragmentary, marginal, waste or leftover 
products; the rich highly interruptive affective variety; the irrepressible fascination with ventriloquistic 
experimentation; the disorienting juxtaposition of present with past, and popular with high culture…18 
Camp is viewed as a multi-layered web of textural, affective, material practices rather than a strictly 
performative mimicry of gender constructs in society. What I find interesting in this dense paragraph 
is that if we trawl it for its descriptive terms, the reparative practice emerges as a rich pattern of 
textured, layered practices, which allows us to make a list of the properties of the reparative practice:
The reparative is: 
additive 
accretive
assemble
plentitude
inchoate
communal
historically 
dense
16  Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 114.
17  Deleuze, Difference and Repetition; “Differential Ontology | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.”
18  Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 149–150. (my highlights).
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to do better justice 
startling 
juicy
excess 
erudition
passionate 
hilarious 
antiquarianism
prodigal
alternative 
‘over’–attachment 
fragmentary 
marginal
waste 
leftover
rich 
highly
interruptive 
affective 
irrepressible 
ventriloquistic
disorienting 
juxtaposition
present with past 
popular with high
What does the list have to say about the ontology of the reparative practice? In his essay “What 
to do with Images”, art historian David Joselit revisits the American minimalist artist Richard Serra’s 
“Verb List” from 1967-6819. The verb list is a compendium of actions that later became a sort of manual 
for minimalist sculpture: “to roll, to create, to fold, to store, to bend, to shorten, to twist, to dapple, 
to crumple, to shave.” All the verbs have materials like iron, metal, wood, etc. as their “proper direct 
object” and the production of art is dependent on the “exertion of force on something, or someone”, 
generating form through action20. Joselit proposes that this list might easily be transformed by simply 
changing the direct objects. He comes up with a list for Relational Aesthetics as developed by Nicolas 
Bourriaud21: here the production of art would be to “scatter, to arrange, to repair, to discard, to pair, 
to distribute, to surfeit’ groups of people.”22 With Relational Aesthetics the verbs are changed from 
exertion of force on matter to arranging groups of people and to creating form through setting 
up encounters or situations23. While, as we shall see, this might be a slightly simplistic reading of 
Relational Aesthetics, Joselit goes on to note that in a digital economy the list would be to “enclose, 
to surround, to encircle, to hide, to cover, to wrap, to dig, to tie, to bind, to weave, to join, to match, 
to laminate, to bond, to hinge, to mark, to expand…” – which marks a shift from the manipulation of 
material (in the Fordist production line) to the management of populations of persons and pictures, 
where formatting becomes a political as well as aesthetic tool in a post-Fordist, digital economy. But 
wasn’t the manipulation of material equally political in a Fordist chain of production where the worker 
was just as manipulable? And isn’t digital image production also perfectly capable carrying out the 
tasks: “to roll, to create, to fold, to store, to bend, to shorten, to twist, to dapple, to crumple, to shave”? 
What I want to get at here is that the digital production is no less material than the analogue. Thus, it 
19  I am grateful to Trine Friis Sørensen, Sidsel Nelund and the Joint Symposium “How to do things with  
  academia”, which brought Serras’ list to my attention.
20  Quoting Richard Serra Verb List 1967- 68 Joselit, “What to Do with Pictures,” 81.
21  Bourriaud, Relational aesthetics.
22  “What to Do with Pictures,” 82.
23  I return to this in the discussion on Relational Aesthetics later in this essay.
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is not necessarily a change either of the direct object or of the task performed. What I suggest with the 
list of the reparative is that a difference is inserted in the move from verb to adjective. What does it 
mean that the qualities of the reparative practice have shifted from being verbs to being an adjectives 
or descriptive words? And in what ways does it differ from that of the action-oriented minimalist 
sculptor inserting power onto “his” materials? And if this is also startling, juicy, inchoate, additive 
and accretive, then what does this have to tell us about the materiality of the reparative or affect’s 
matteriality?
That the reparative is an adjective and not a verb suggests that it always tie onto something. It 
operates on the level of textural perception. The emphasis on adjectives over verbs somehow seems 
that it takes on an agentic life of its own in its very texture or materiality. The reparative critical 
practice is no longer a question of one body exerting force onto another body – but opens up to 
affect’s materiality in itself. As such I follow Patricia Clough and Mark B. Hansen, who take this up 
in their notion of the “technicity of affect and its centrality for extending affect to the ‘dynamism of 
matter generally’: technicity operates within material fluxes themselves. It is an internal element in 
material processes that are themselves affective.”24 But while Hansen turns to Alfred N. Whitehead and 
Simondon I propose that this is equally possible with the ménage à trois between Sedgwick, Deleuze 
and Guattari. 
Affect’s Materiality: 
To begin with I believed one of the greatest headaches throughout this project would be to try to 
sort out the reparative’s relationship and engagement with affect. Affect seems often to be the great 
battleground between a Baruch Spinoza-informed understanding of affect through Deleuze and 
Guattari as a pre-personal intensity, and a Silvan Tomkins-inspired understanding of affect, as “neural 
firing” propelled by Sedgwick and Adam Frank. I will start by unfolding the concept of affect in 
Deleuze and Guattari (although primarily the former), and then I will move on to discuss the concept 
of affect in Sedgwick. Rather than positioning one against the other, and rather than focussing on 
the terminological issues that accompany the process of sorting through these two different strands, 
affect in itself obstructs such terminological clarity.25 What I am interested in exploring is precisely 
how these two different strands in affect theory can inspire an affect’s materiality or the materiality of 
affect which can inform my later discussions on the affect of the digital image or the reparative critical 
practice as an image in itself.
Affect in Deleuze 
L’affect (Spinoza’s affectus) is an ability to affect and be affected. It is a prepersonal intensity corresponding to 
the passage from one experiential state of the body to another and implying an augmentation or diminution 
in that body’s capacity to act. L’affection (Spinoza’s affectio) is each such state considered as an encounter 
between the affected body and a second, affecting, body (with body taken in its broadest possible sense to 
include “mental” or ideal bodies)26. 
24  Hansen, “Feelings without Feelers, or Affectivity as Environmental Force”; Clough, “The Affective Turn.”
25  See the MLA roundtable on affect between Berlant, Cvetkovich, Flatley, Hoad, Love, Munoz and Nyong’o: “I 
  am wondering too about Sedgwick/Tomkins vs. Massumi/Deleuze and the set of unresolved (and 
  irresolvable?) terminological issues that come along with sorting through the different paradigms, theories, and  
  traditions.  For example, do we need or want to agree on what “affect” refers to as opposed to “emotion,”
   or “mood” or “feeling”? Or, at least, do we want to agree about what we are disagreeing about when we don’t  
  agree? Is there less terminological agreement in affect theory than elsewhere? How are the conceptual problems  
 affect theory faces distinct from other kinds of conceptual problems?” Berlant et al., “Affect Theory Roundtable  
 Questions, MLA 2012 Authors.” no. 6
26  Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, xvi.
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Brian Massumi’s often-quoted description of affect is taken from the introduction to Deleuze and 
Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus. Affect, via Spinoza, is taken as a “prepersonal intensity” between 
bodies; between an affecting body and an affected body. Massumi distinguishes between affection as 
emotion or feelings, which belong to the subject, and affect as a pre-personal intensity, which has not 
yet taken on a fixed form or become host to a specific feeling. Affect as such is able to take on many 
feelings. Further, affect is a catalyst, which either diminishes or increases the body’s capacity to act. 
Here it is important to note that Massumi stresses that the “body” is taken in its broadest possible 
sense to include mental and ideal bodies. 
But if affect is intensity, what is then the materiality of that intensity? And even if we are talking 
about bodies in the widest possible sense, are we still talking about bodies-as-organisms or is an auto-
affection able to take place internally within the intensity?
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze describes “intensities” as “implicated multiplicities, ‘implexes,’ 
made up of relations between asymmetrical elements...”27 “An intensity is an embryonic quantity in 
that its own internal resonance, which is constitutive of higher levels of synthesis and actualization, 
pulsates in a pure speed and time that would devastate a constituted being.”28 
If intensity is made up of relations between different, asymmetrical elements, and at the same time 
is an embryonic quality, with its own internal resonance, would that not imply that the intensity is 
also generating affect by itself? It is thus not just a matter of one object or body creating intensity and 
projecting this intensity onto another body but also that in this exchange a process of auto-affection 
appears. It is not only a matter of intensity between the heterogeneous elements, but that a similar 
intensity goes on inside the intensity itself. How could that be said to tie into the material; how could 
the affect as an intensity in its embryonic kernel enfold materiality – and fold back on a material body?
In Proust and Signs, Deleuze develops a notion of material signs, that is, signs which are not only 
indices off, or references of something but are that very thing in itself. In reference to Marcel Proust’s 
À la recherche du temps perdu, Deleuze notes:
But they are material signs. Not simply by their sensuous origin. But their meaning, as it is developed, 
signifies Combray, young girls, Venice, or Balbec. It is not only their origin, it is their explanation, their 
development which remains material. We feel that Balbec, that this Venice… do not rise up as the product 
of an association of ideas, but in person and in their essence… (A)t the end of the Search, the interpreter 
understands what had escaped him in the case of the madeleine or even of the steeples: that the material 
meaning is nothing without an ideal essence which it incarnates. The mistake is to suppose that the hieroglyphs 
represent ‘only material objects’. (…)29 
The sign does not refer back to an original, it is not an index of a materiality, nor is it a representation: 
rather, it encapsulates or incarnates this very materiality, and strikes the spectator/subject like a 
violence. In The Search the narrator takes a morsel of a madeleine dipped in linden tea and the memory 
of his childhood in Combray wells up in a flash. What flashes up is neither a sign, nor referent, nor 
representation of this past experience but it is this very “thing” in itself – and with it unfolds the entire 
context, as with origami. 
Later in their joint work What is Philosophy, Deleuze and Guattari write:
 
It is independent of the creator thought the self-positing of the created, which is preserved in itself. What 
is preserved – the thing or the work of art – is a bloc of sensations, that is to say, a compound of percepts 
and affects. Percepts are no longer perceptions; they are independent of a state of those who experience 
27  Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 244.
28  “Differential Ontology | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.”
29  Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 12–13.
28
them. Affects are no longer feelings or affections; they go beyond the strength of those who undergo them. 
Sensations, percepts, and affects are beings whose validity lies in themselves and exceeds any lived.30 
The work of art, we learn, is a block of sensations – that is to say, a compound of percepts and 
affects. But the percepts and affects are no longer pertinent to those who undergo them – they no 
longer belong to a subject or body: they become “beings” on their own – in their capacity as intensities:
We paint, sculpt, compose, and write with sensations. We paint, sculpt, compose, and write sensations. As 
percepts, sensations are not perceptions reffering to an object (reference): if they resemble something it 
is with a resemblance produced with their own methods; and the smile on the canvas is made solely with 
colors, lines, shadow, and light. If resemblance haunts the work of art, it is because sensation refers only to 
its material: it is the percept or affect of the material itself, the smile of oil, the gesture of fired clay, the thrust 
of metal, the crouch of Romanesque stone, and the ascent of Gothic stone.31 
This passage delicately describes how the material itself enfolds affect outside of the perception 
and comes to operate on its own and returns us to Joselit’s verb-list for art production discussed 
above. Here it is not only a subject (the artist, sculptor etc.) that does something to the materials. The 
sensations disentangle themselves from we who perceive them or do something with them and come 
to operate on their own: they pre-exist us. The sensations enfold the material (colours, lines, shadow 
and light) while at the same time fold back on the materials themselves. 
So if I am able to say anything about affect’s materiality with Deleuze and Guattari, the materiality 
is immanent, incarnated, enfolded in the affect, but at the same time affect enfolds matter and comes 
to operate on the matter. Affect, so to speak, remembers, or is informational, just as our mind when 
reading the same line twice with a twist, as stylistically employed by Deleuze and Guattari above, 
reminds us of our memory’s internal function.We can now say that affect between bodies can be taken 
in the widest possible sense of the body, which is not only body-as-organism, but that affect as an 
intensity comes to take on a body of its own, even though this is the smallest possible unit of the body, 
the monad. But how are we to understand affect’s materiality in relation to Sedgwick’s notion of affect?
Affect in Sedgwick
Sedgwick bases much of her thinking about affect on psychologist and early cybernetic theorist 
Silvan Tomkins. Tomkins names eight or nine basic set of affects: shame, interest, surprise, joy, anger, 
fear, distress, disgust and later dissmell, experienced in the body by the density of the “neural firing”32. 
By density Tomkins means the frequency of the neural firing per unit of time33. I imagine Tomkins’ 
affect machinery as a kind of early sci-fi automaton in which an affect is registered and then a barometer 
rises or falls according to the nature of this affect. I guess this instrumental and quantifiable version 
of affect is what the Spinozist-Deleuzo-informed affectionistas often object to as confusing affects 
with emotions, or embodied affections. What I find particularly interesting in Sedgwick’s reading of 
Tomkins is that it is the only place (to my knowledge) that Sedgwick approaches the discussion of 
the analogue and digital and that it alludes to the potential of understanding affect in relation to the 
invention of digital technology. Tomkins distinguishes between a digital (on/off) mode and analogue 
(graduated and/or discretely differentiated) representational models. The digital on/off mode could 
account for Freud’s drive system, in which the drive has one object – hunger: eat; breathe: air etc. The 
30  Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 164.
31  Ibid., 166 my emphasis.
32  I’m not engaging with Tomkins on his own terms but through Sedgwick & Frank’s reading of Tomkins in   
  “Shame in The Cybernetic Fold: Reading Silvan Tomkins” Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 93–121. 
33  Ibid., 106.
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affect mechanism in Tomkins is a separate but “amplifying co-assembly”34 and affects are not tied to 
one specific object but are polyamorous: any affect may have any “object” and has no single “output”35. 
That affect is multi-layered and has multiple differentiations is compared with the analogue mode. 
With today’s ubiquitous technology this seems like a rather simplistic version of the analogue-digital 
divide. Today many of our digital gadgets are constantly on even though they appear to be off. They 
don’t just carry out one function or take one object but gather multiple data, and they do this behind 
our backs or without our knowledge. Rather than seeing this as a mistake, I find it productive to think 
with of how the concept of affect was an engine for the invention of the analogue features of the digital. 
How affect became the driving force that detached the digital from its on/off features and made it 
multi-layered.36 
I find it interesting to consider the way in which Sedgwick and Frank’s essay “Shame in the 
cybernetic-fold”, adds to the complexity of the relationship the analogue and the digital. The cybernetic-
fold, according to Sedgwick and Frank, is a moment in time between the 1940s and 1960s when 
the technology was not quite able to perform the digital vision but when the minds were capable of 
imagining it. The cybernetic fold is a moment of radical technological imagination: 
The epithet ‘fold’ seems applicable to the cybernetic moment partly because systems theory, precisely 
through its tropism toward the image of undifferentiated but differentiable ecology, had as one of its greatest 
representational strengths an ability to discuss how things differentiate: how quantitative differences turn 
into qualitative ones, how digital and analog representations leapfrog or interleave with one another, what 
makes the unexpected fault lines between regions of the calculable and the incalculable (destined to evolve 
into chaos theory) and so forth… Tomkins affect theory by contrast offers a wealth of sites of productive 
opacity.37  
This quote attests to that the “affective turn” in the humanities and sciences has not failed to consider 
affect as technicity; rather affect has been deployed to enable the digital to surpass itself as digital 
(on/off) and opened up to or enfolded its analogue multi-layered features in what we today consider 
digital. I will now move on to discuss how affect enfolds matter in Sedgwick through the case study 
of shame. 
Shame
Shame is precisely one of the basic set of affects that can help to add to the complexity between 
digital as on/off and analogue as multi-layered and opens up to a sort of transitional analogico-digital 
mode as fluxes of intensities folding affect’s materiality and folding back on the materiality itself. 
In Tomkins shame is placed on the affect polarity interest-shame, with shame on the one pole and 
“interest” on the other: “suggesting that the pulsations of cathexis around shame, of all things, are 
what either enable or disenable so basic a function as the ability to be interested in the world.”38The 
workings of shame resonate with the description of affect in the vein of Spinoza and Deleuze as a 
prepersonal intensity which either diminishes or enables the body’s capacity to act, but where the 
degree of intensity is described as cathexis – the amount of energy invested into or onto an object. 
Sedgwick and Frank’s use of shame, via Tomkins, which has moved shame from a prohibition or 
taboo to an affect of interest, has been particularly influential for turning the diminishing capacities of 
34  Ibid., 100 quoting Tomkins “Quest” p. 309.
35  Ibid., 99.
36  For an interesting discussion of early cybernetic art works by Susanne Ussing and Carsten Hoff (Atelier   
  Cyberspace) from 1960s see Kryger and Lillemose, “The (Re)invention of Cyberspace.”
37  Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 106–107.
38  Ibid., 97. My emphasis
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shame into a force in the queer community and other movements39. But I want to consider the ways 
in which shame enfolds matter or matter is enfolded in the affect. Sedgwick notes that, unlike joy, fear 
etc., which seems to move in a seemingly unhindered frequency of the neural firing per unit in time, 
shame is activated by “the introduction of a particular boundary or frame into an analog continuum”. 
There is something or someone that breaks or disturbs the curve. Turning the inside out enfolds this 
something into the affect itself: 
[S]hame, as a precarious hyperreflexivity of the surface of the body, can turn one inside out – or outside 
in. Wilden writes: ‘In order for a system to be open to an environment … the system must be capable of 
punctuating itself as distinct from that environment so as to select messages within it’. Shame is one of 
those affects whose digitalizing mechanism works to ‘punctuat[e the system] as distinct.’… it [shame] can 
be a switch point for the individuation of imaging systems, of consciousnesses, of bodies, of theories, of 
selves – an individuation that decides not necessarily an identity, but a figuration, distinction, or mark of 
punctuation… [S]hame is charecterized by its failure ever to renounce its object cathexis, its relation to the 
desire for pleasure as well as the need to avoid pain.40 
I am interested in the way in which shame in this case enfolds the object – which it cannot renounce 
– and at the same time that object somehow makes a change in the outer appearance or texture of the 
body into which it has been inserted. This enfolding of the object constitutes a form of individuation 
which lies somewhere in between subject and object. I will move onto discuss what kind of texture that 
is and then we will briefly touch upon what happens when that body (that causes affect) is no longer 
present but radically cut off – which would seem to be the case in the digital media as well as in many 
other instances of human subjectivity41.
The epithet ‘fold’: Texture Texxture Texturology
Matter thus offers a texture that is infinitely porous, that is spongy or cavernous without empty parts, since 
there is always a cavern in the cavern: each body, however small it may be, contains a world insofar as it 
is perforated by uneven passageways, and the world, surrounded and penetrated by an increasingly subtle 
fluid, was like a ‘pond of matter in which there are different currents and weaves’.42
Deleuze’s concept of the “Fold”, or plis, I take to be indicative of how subjectivity is not exclusive to 
the body-as-organism but opens up to non-human subjectivity in a continuous texturology – where 
matter is folded onto matter. Affect can be taken as one such monad or body, even in its smallest unit 
that offers a texture that is infinitely porous and spongy and enfolds the outside into the inside in an 
infinite process of becoming.  
Deleuze’s texturology seems to resonate with Sedgwick’s distinction between TEXTURE and 
TEXXTURE. Drawing on Renu Bora’s essay “Outing Texture”43 Sedgwick’s slightly simplified version 
of the rather complex Texturology in Bora defines a texture with one “x” and a texxture with “xxs”.44 
To exemplify texture with two xx’s, Sedgwick use the hand moulded brick that “still bears the scars and 
uneven sheen of its making” as such carries its history of its making, folding and bending in its texture, 
is “dense with offered information about how substantively, historically, materially, it came into being”. 
As Bora notes, “it seems to remember its original shape (…) for in its remembrance, its variability of 
39  Crimp, “Mario Montez, For Shame”; Silverstone, “Duckie’s Gay Shame.” I return to discuss the collectivities of  
  shame in “Collectivities of Disco-Stretch”.
40  Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 116 quoting Anthony Wilden.
41  Fred Moten applies this radical cut or “break”, to a past which is cut off as constitutive of black subjectivity,   
  where the relationship to history and one’s ancestors is fundamentally ‘broken’ or ‘cut’ due to transatlantic 
  slavery. See Moten, In the Break the Aesthetics of the Black Radical Tradition. 
42  Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 13; Halley, After Sex?
43  Bora, “Outing Texture.”
44  Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 15.
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compression or stretch, it seems to have a mind of its own.”45 Texture (with only one “x”) defiantly or 
even invisibly blocks or refuses to convey the information about its making: “there is texture, usually 
glossy if not positively tacky, that insists instead on the polarity between substance and surface, texture 
that signifies the willed erasure of its history.”46 Bora’s own distinction between texture and texxture 
is extremely complicated, “even false at times”: the two cannot be deduced from one another but are 
ever permeable and related47. What the two slightly different versions of texturology have in common 
is the way in which affect enfolds matter or matter is enfolded in the affect comes to constitute a mind 
of its own in Bora and a non-human form of subjectivity in Deleuze. 
Affect in this sense is no less material – it is populated with the things, objects, halves, bits and 
pieces. Maybe if there is a difference between the two, it is that in Deleuze the materiality is always 
already enfolded or immanent in the affect, whereas in Sedgwick it seems to be the exterior enfolded 
in the interior or vice versa, introjected and reprojected out again.
What brings Sedgwick and Deleuze together is a shared enthusiasm for Marcel Proust; Sedgwick 
writes:
For Proust, the ultimate guarantee of the vitality of art is its ability to surprise – that is, to manifest an agency 
distinct from either its creator or its consumer. A consummated fantasy of omnipotence would be the precise 
opposite of such ability to surprise and be surprised. ‘It pre-exists us’ is one of the ways he [Proust] describes 
the work, and only for that reason is it able to offer ‘celestial nourishment’ to our true self.48 
Affect in Sedgwick’s later writings (published posthumously) is now offered as something “which 
pre-exists us”, something which is distinct from either creator or consumer, and that is how it is able 
to nourish us. Sedgwick’s and Deleuze’s different notions of affect seem to fold over each other and get 
curled up.
Affect without a body? 
In her essay “The times we’re in” (2014), Robyn Wiegman turns to her own childhood, of growing 
up with a mother who suffered from bipolar disorder, in which she comes to realise that the desire for 
reparation is not her mother’s but her own. Her mother comes to stand in for Wiegman’s own desire for 
reparation49. The desired reparation is converted from the subject/object (the mother) that is supposed 
to be in need of reparation, to the subject who sees in the object/subject a desire for reparation. This 
projection into objects or subjects, the potentiality that they posses for offering nourishment to an 
inchoate self, resonates with Lauren Berlant’s concept of “cruel optimism”50. According to Berlant, 
cruel optimism is the subject’s attachment to an object, when the subject sees a possibility for her 
redemption. Knowing that this attachment is a cruel one, the subject keeps returning to the object’s 
site of potentiality. In Wiegman’s case, the mother could be said to be such an object, offering the 
child the hope that her mother might be cured one day – even though she knows that this hope 
is fully her own. In a way this example seems to disturb the dichotomy between subject/object. It 
ventriloquizes, introjects and reprojects the object into the subject and vice versa. But it is still in this 
case a relationship between bodies (as organisms). To open up this relationship up to include non-
bodies I find Berlant’s reading of Barbara Johnson’s use of Apostrophe and Free Indirect Discourse, 
useful. Berlant notes how this creates a “performance of fantasmatic intersubjectivity”, through which 
45  Bora, “Outing Texture,” 100.
46  Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 15.
47  “Outing Texture,” 101.
48  Sedgwick and Goldberg, The Weather in Proust, 33.
49  Wiegman, “The Times We’re in,” 19.
50  Berlant, Cruel Optimism.
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“the writer gains superhuman observational authority, enabling a performance of being that is made 
possible by the proximity of the object.”51
[A] silent, affectively present but physically displaced interlocutor (a lover, a fetus) is animated in speech 
as distant enough for a conversation but close enough to be imaginable by the speaker in whose head the 
entire scene is happening. But the condition of projected possibility, of a hearing that cannot take place in 
the terms of its enunciation (‘you’ are not here, ‘you’ are eternally belated to the conversation with you that 
I am imagining) creates a fake present moment of intersubjectivity in which none the less a performance of 
address can take place. The present moment is made possible by the fantasy of you, laden with the x qualities I 
can project onto you, given your convenient absence. Apostrophe therefore appears to be a reaching out to 
a you, a direct movement from place x to place y, but it is actually a turning back an animating of a receiver 
on behalf of the desire to make something happen now that realizes something in the speaker, makes the 
speaker more or differently possible, because she has admitted, in a sense, the importance of speaking for, as 
and to, two – but only under the condition, and illusion that the two are really (in) one.52
Berlant notes that this is “an indirect, unstable, physically impossible but phenomenologically 
vitalizing movement of rhetorical animation that permits subjects to suspend themselves in the 
optimism of a potential occupation of the same psychic space of others”. But I am not necessarily 
sure what is so fake in this present moment of intersubjectivity. Isn’t the free indirect discourse, 
an object internalised, precisely capturing the ventroloquistic, inchoate, additive and accreditive 
attributes Sedgwick assigns to camp performance? The free indirect discourse is precisely a moment 
of intersubjectivity or in Deleuze’s words an assemblage of enunciation, which is: 
[C]arrying out two inseparable acts of subjectivation simultaneously, one of which constitutes a character 
in the first person, but the other of which is present at his birth and brings him on to the scene. There is 
no mixture or average of two subjects, each belonging to a system, but a differentiation of two correlative 
subjects in a system which is itself heterogeneous (…)53 
How does this concept of the assemblage of enunciation in Deleuze and Guattari as correlation 
between “two asymmetrical proceedings” translate back to my desire for an affect without a body-
as-organism, in which it is no longer a question of how the object is internalised, but rips itself from 
the entity of which it should form part and comes to operate on its own? The carthexis or intensity 
is shifted. It is neither the objects’ qualities, which are projected onto the subject, nor the subject 
projecting qualities onto an object. But it establishes a relationship of auto-affection between object-
subject, which in turn feeds back on subjectivity and transforms it. To take Lauren Berlant’s apostrophe 
and optimistic object seriously would mean precisely that this is not only something which takes place 
between bodies-as-organisms – even those bodies are not present or virtual (the foetus) – but that this 
process takes place between disparate elements, including non-organic ones.  
The material enfoldment of the object in the subject and vice versa, takes on a life of its own, 
and the two become inseparable and indistinguishable. It is not a subject “doing” something to an 
object, or “bending”, “folding” that object as Serra’s verb list implies. The subject/object dichotomy is 
ventriloquized, turned inside out; it is the fold enfolded in the object/subject relationship. And this is 
not a “fake present moment of intersubjectivity” but the constitutive factor of individuation. 
How can affect’s materiality – which takes on agentic life of its own, be suitable to describe an 
aesthetics of the reparative critical practice as image? I will move onto discuss this in relation to the 
ecology created by affect and Relational Aesthetics as proposed by Nicolas Bourriaud in the 1990s. 
51  Ibid., 25.
52  Ibid., 25–26.
53  Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 75.
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Affect’s Relational Ecology
[T]he universe itself is as alive as anything it holds. This formulation is always true for Proust, and for the 
reason we have discussed: the beings in the universe are filled, in turn, like human barometers, with the 
stuff of the universe. This is as true for art as it is for the irreducibly complex systems and substances that 
constitute the weather.54 
In the 1990s curator and art-theorist Nicolas Bourriaud published Relational Aesthetics as an 
attempt to name artistic practices which he had been working with over the past decade, each of which 
shared a common denominator, namely, that they set up social encounters between various factors. 
Relational Aesthetics was not a prescription for a certain artistic genre in the late 1990s, but rather as 
a proposition for a new-old materialism which takes the affective encounter between different objects, 
subjects and fluxes as constitutive of the aesthetic encounter. Relational Aesthetics is often seen as 
reducing aesthetics to social encounters between human bodies and “artists-who-serve-soups-at-the-
openings”. Yet, if we take into consideration that Bourriaud bases much of his conceptual framework on 
ventriloquizing Félix Guattari “aesthetic paradigm”, with little or no need to cite quotations55, Relational 
Aesthetics opens to a more complex constellation between all the varied components that make up the 
different assemblages. If it operates on a “human” scale, then it considers that human subjectivity itself 
is a complex compound or constellation of different partial objects (including machinic, technological 
parts and flows). Maybe, as a style or gesture, this lip-synching Guattari is Bourriaud’s own little 
theoretical, textual relational aesthetics in which “I (Bourriaud) is another (Guattari)”56. Returning 
to Nicolas Bourriaud’s Relational Aesthetics ten years after the quandary over relational aesthetics has 
abated or found new parishes57, it almost seems too good to be true for my project to extend Eve’s 
reparative practice into artistic practices with Deleuze and Guattari58. Guattari, who up until now 
has remained a voyeur to the ménage à trois comes back in. The lines in the diagrammatic headache 
between Sedgwick, Deleuze and Guattari start to crossover, to queer, to fold onto each other:
Partial Object   Machinic assemblage
Texxture/Texture  Fold: texturology
Assemblage/Camp   Rizome /Planar 
 
Paranoid/Schizo    Assemblages of Enunciation
Projection/Introjection immanence 
 
Reparative    Schizoanalysis
Ecology of value   Chaosmosis/ Aesthetic Paradigm
  
     Autopoiesis
54  Sedgwick and Goldberg, The Weather in Proust, 32.
55  Bourriaud, Relational aesthetics, 104: ’some quotations will not be annotated, because their content refers to   
  several passages or several books’.
56  Freely after Rimbaud “I is another” [J’est un autre]
57  “Aesthetic Jam”; Bishop, “Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics”; Gillick, “Letters and Responses.”
58  I am grateful to Frederik Tygstrup for alerting me to this possibility even though it took me several years to   
 come to terms with and actually reread Bourriaud.
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Partial-Object      
  
[I]t’s she [Melanie Klein] who put the objects in object relations. In her concept of phantasy-with-a-p-h, 
human mental life becomes populated, not with ideas, representations, knowledges, urges, and repressions, 
but with things, things with physical properties, including people and hacked-off bits of people. If this almost 
literal-minded animism makes Kleinian psychic life sound like a Warner Bros. cartoon, you might think 
it would be far to coarse-grained, too unmediated to deal with adult creativity in ambitious intellectual or 
artistic modes.59 
Although they use the concept different ways, one of the things Sedgwick, Deleuze and Guattari 
have in common is their use psychologist Melanie Klein’s partial-object. Sedgwick bases much of her 
theory of the reparative on Melanie Klein and her understanding of how the infant assembles the 
partial objects into a whole. But in her explanation of Klein’s partial object, Sedgwick cannot help 
but slip the textures into the text such as “coarse-grained”. Rather than seeing this as a mere aesthetic 
tic, the tex(x)tures might alert us to how the materiality is enfolded in the artistic creation and the 
production of subjectivity. Tex(x)ture is key to the way in which the partial objects are able to form 
assemblages:
[O]ur experience of such ambivalent positioning and fusional abolition is given through the apprehension 
of Kleinian partial objects – the breast, faeces, the penis… which crystallise the self even as they dissolve it 
in the projective-introjective relations with the other and with the Cosmos. An incorporeal complexion, 
snatched up by grasping, will only receive its character of finitude if the advent-event of its encounter with 
a transmonadic line occurs, which will trigger the exit, the expulsion of its infinite speed its primordial 
deceleration.60
Deleuze and Guattari understand the partial object not only as hacked-off bits of human pieces 
“breasts and penises”, but also as heterogeneous elements including scraps of metal, machine parts, 
flows of matter and energy, image bits, pixels, incorporeal entities, semiotic and asemiotic and 
aesthetic flows - which crystallise the self, and this self is not made possible before the encounter with 
a transmonadic line. The partial objects do not refer back to or stand in for/represent the original or 
whole, but, rather, become an entity of their own – a monad (smallest unit) – with its own agentic 
powers. And this entity or unit is then able to reterritorialise or to create what Deleuze and Guattari 
call transmonadic relationships.
Autopoiesis
To understand how the smallest unit or non-organic matter takes on agentic powers and forms 
transmonadic assemblages, it is important to clarify Guattari’s conception of the autopoietic machines, 
which he bases on the work of Francisco Varela. Varela differentiates between: “‘allopoietic’ machines, 
which produce something other than themselves, and ‘autopoietic’ machines, which engender and 
specify their own organisation and limits.”61 Autopoietic machines undertake “an incessant process of 
the replacement of their components as they must continually compensate for the external perturbations 
of which they are exposed”. For Varela the autopoietic machine is reserved for the biological domain 
(body-as-organism etc.) – while the “social systems, technical machines, crystalline systems, etc. are 
excluded.” Guattari expands the concept of autopoiesis to include evolutionary, collective entities, 
“which maintain diverse types of alterity relations, rather than being implacably closed in on 
themselves. In such a case, institutions and technical machines which appear to be allopoietic (...) 
59  Sedgwick and Goldberg, The Weather in Proust, 126 my highlights.
60  Guattari, Chaosmosis, 113–114.
61  Ibid., 39.
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become ipso facto autopoietic”62, if we take into consideration the fact that as machinic assemblages 
they include human beings, organic as well as inorganic material. 
The partial object and various different materials that makes up machinic assemblages not only 
make up subjectivity on a singular level, but also create passages or possibilities of transition from one 
territorialisation to another: what Deleuze and Guattari call reterritorialized assemblages. 
Assemblage
If we return to the discussion of affect’s “ability to make up separate but amplifying co-assemblies” 
– affect is both singular and plural at the same time. It binds us involuntarily to the other and makes us 
one with others. And here “other” is understood not as body-as-organism but as an assemblage of all 
kinds of heterogeneous elements, and equally to our own body, which is conceived of as intersection 
of various components: 
[T]he body conceived as intersection of partial autopoietic components, with multiple and changing 
configurations, working collectively as well as individually; all ‘the bodies’ – the specular body, the 
fantasmatic body, the neurological corporeal schema, the biological and organic soma, the immune self, 
the personological identity within familial and environmental eco-systems, collective faciality, refrains 
(mythical, religious, ideological…) so many existential territorialities linked by the same transversal 
chaosmosis, so many monadic ‘points of view’ terraced or structured across fractal ascents and descents, 
authorising a combined strategy of analytical approaches (…) and personal recomposition that is either 
delirious or of an aesthetic character... It is one and the same thing to declare these territories partial and 
yet open to the most diverse fields of alterity: this clarifies how the most autistic enclosure can be in direct 
contact with ambient social constellations and the machinic unconscious, historical complexes and cosmic 
aporias.63 
These different partial objects make up larger assemblages, which operate on different levels. On 
each of the different levels they form up assemblages capable of creating existential territories of 
enunciation but also of reterritorialising and creating new assemblages. Guattari differentiates three 
different assemblages: 
0.1: Territorialised Assemblages are animist societies or assemblages, which are polyphonic, 
concentric, and use chants, dances, stories about ancestors, Gods, as means of expression “where there 
is no effort bearing on material forms that does not bring forth immaterial entities.” (etc.)64 
0.2: Capitalistic Deterritorialised Assemblage is characterised by its capacity to sectorise, bi-
polarise and compartmentalise everything, while at the same time being driven by a desire for a 
univocal market. Here it is important to note that his different assemblages are not necessarily confined 
to a specific historical time and place, but stretch out and overlap. As such, elements of the Capitalistic 
Deterritorialised Assemblage can be found in Pharaonic, Mesopotamian, and Chinese empires and 
throughout antiquity65, while the territorialised assemblages of animist societies might equally be 
present in today’s capitalistic societies66.
0.3: Processual Assemblage or what Guattari calls the Aesthetic Paradigm. The aesthetic paradigm 
is a bit more difficult to define since it is in the process of being made today (or this was at least the case 
in the in early 1990s, when Guattari published his work). But the Processual Assemblage, “rather than 
62  Ibid., 39–40.
63  Ibid., 117–118.
64  Ibid., 102–103.
65  Ibid., 105.
66  An example of how Territorialized assemblages are present in Capitalist deterritorialised assemblages could be  
  the introduction scene in Martin Scorsese’s The Wolf of Wall Street where the broker teaches his young “wolf ”,  
  a shamanic chant, which becomes the refrain throughout the whole movie but also the mantra for the capitalist  
  market-driven impulses that govern the finance assemblage constituting Wall Street. See Scorsese, The Wolf of  
 Wall Street. 
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marginalising the aesthetic paradigm, “…confers on it a key position of transversality with respect to 
other Universes of value, from which it intensifies, each in its own way, creationist nuclei of autopoetic 
consistency.”67 The third assemblage consists of the ability to undertake a reterritorialisation of the 
deterritorialised components that have been sectorised by the second assemblage. As such, it is not a 
return to a pure “being” or a restorative turn towards the territorialised assemblage – but a possibility 
of creating a transmonanadic assemblage between even the smallest units. Allow me to quote at length, 
even Guattari’s wordings can be a bit hard to chew:
It is less a question of an identity of being which would traverse regions, retaining its heterogeneous texture, 
than an identical processual persistence.68 
Being is first auto-consistency, auto-affirmation, existence for-itself deploying particular relations of alterity. 
The for-itself and the for-others stop being the privilege of humanity; they crystallise everywhere that 
machinic interfaces engender disparity and, in return, are founded by it. The emphasis is no longer placed 
on Being – as general ontological equivalent, which, in the same way as other equivalents (Capital, Energy, 
Information, the Signifier) envelops, encloses and desingularises the process – it is placed on the manner 
of being, the machination producing the existent, then generative praxes of heterogeneity and complexity. 
Awareness of machinic being, on the other hand, will instead be deployed across multiple and polyphonic 
spatial and temporal envelopments and across potential, relational and sufficient developments in terms of 
algorithms, regularities and laws whose texture is just as real as its actual manifestations. 69 
What I want to foreground here is the way in which texxture | texture again plays a central role 
in the way in which the object/subject or being creates transversal relationships. In the transversal 
relationship the object/subject, transversing the different regions or interfaces (let us say), does not 
retain its original texture but this texture is folded back onto the object creating a new texture in 
between object and subject.
Returning to Sedgwick’s reading of the reparative impulse in camp, as we have already seen, camp is 
“additive and accretive (…) it wants to assemble and confer plentitude on an object that will then have 
resources to offer to an inchoate self ”. The subject internalises spare parts, residues, culture’s throwaway 
objects, into new assemblages by drawing sustenance from the texture of the objects. The two distinct 
bodies do not loose their textural properties but those textual properties mutate or rematerialise and 
in that process a third object-subject is created. And it is this subject/object constellation, in which 
the two or the many are no longer distinguishable from one another, that makes a new way of living 
or art of existence.
These complex compounds of assemblages at first, “they constitute no more than a fuzzy set. A 
discrete set that later takes on consistency.”70 What holds these assemblages together, as we have 
already seen is texture and affect: 
[T]he universe itself is as alive as anything it holds. This formulation is always true for Proust, and for the 
reason we have discussed: the beings in the universe are filled, in turn, like human barometers, with the 
stuff of the universe. This is as true for art as it is for the irreducibly complex systems and substances that 
constitutes the weather.71 
Returning to Joselit’s verb list of Relational Aesthetics: “to scatter, to arrange, to repair, to discard, 
to pair, to distribute, to surfeit groups of people,”72 we now have more substance behind the claim 
67  Guattari, Chaosmosis, 105.
68  Ibid., 108–109.
69  Ibid., 109.
70  Guattari, Chaosmosis, 105.
71  Sedgwick and Goldberg, The Weather in Proust, 32.
72  “What to Do with Pictures,” 82.
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that Relational Aesthetics, as well as the reparative practices, cannot be limited to an understanding 
of the subject exerting force onto an object. The change no longer occurs on the level of the verb and 
its object or body-as-organism exerting force onto passive objects. The reparative practice subverts 
the object/subject dichotomy precisely in the way in which the adjective takes on agentic powers of 
its own. “Accretive” and “ventriloquist” are instances of such adjectives in which affect is imbued in 
the materiality and the materiality produces affect. This move away from bodies or subjects exerting 
force onto matter becomes even more pertinent when the reparative critical practice is viewed as 
digital practice or digital image in itself. In digital image processing it is not a question of a subject 
who decides “to crop” or “to rasterize” the image, but it is the image itself which rasterizes or crops, 
and turns the fluxes into units of pixels. While reading Guattari’s “aesthetic paradigm” it seems to 
precipitate ubiquitous computing, and the digital analogue, in which the digital has surpassed its self 
as “digit” and act as analogue in the way in which it now allows for multi-layered, relational and 
variable pixels that act on each other – much like the chemical process of silver crystals in analogue 
photography. But these pixels are again able to tear themselves from the whole of which they should 
form part and to create new transmonadic fluxes: part machine, part woman, part image73.
Sub-conclusion: affect’s materiality
‘I is another’ [je est un autre]74 
What I have constructed is ‘I is another’ or [je est un autre]. This does not mean that the ego or 
the self or the subject is always already prescribed in language or enslaved by language, but that it is 
also matter, an aggregate – an image – so to speak, in which the self passes through many layers of 
transversality. In Sedgwick’s reading of camp this process of subjectivation happens when the subject 
engages, it internalises partial objects, and culture’s throw-away objects, into new constellations and 
creates a third subject/object constellation in which [Je-est-un(e) autre] becomes je-est-un(e)-autre on 
the account of and through the object.
Relational Aesthetics was criticised for sounding like a restorative desire to cure bonds in a broken 
world, or to reinsert some sort of authenticity and sociability in an increasingly asocial world, and in 
so doing it failed to consider the antagonistic relationships inherent in all relations75. The same could 
be said about the reparative practice, which sounds equally restorative, ameliorative and reformist to 
the critical ear76. What I have tried to construct in this essay is a rationality enfolded in the very affect 
or matter. And here matter is not seen as soup-bowls in white-cube galleries, but matter and bodies 
taken in their broadest possible sense: as fluxes, concepts, digits, pixels. These relations are no less 
antagonistic, they are intensities between antagonistic and radically different positions, but what hold 
them together is turning this antagonistic relationship is into an agonistic one.77 This is not a matter of 
change in the verb and the artist exerting force onto “his” material, but the material itself, which takes 
on an agentic life of its own. 
What I have done above, is to rehearse an understanding of the reparative critical practice as 
affect’s materiality or materiality of affect as an artistic, creative capacity, whether this materiality is 
always already immanent (Deleuze) or in a constant state of projection between inside and outside 
73  I discuss this futher in the chapters on Affect Image Touch and Rematerialisation 
74  Deleuze quoting Arthur Rimbaud.
75  Bishop, “Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics.” 
76  Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 144.
77  Here I am resonating the work of Chantal Mouffe Mouffe, The Return of the Political.
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(Sedgwick). Internalising the work of Proust, Sedgwick continues:
‘I felt myself enhanced by the this work which I bore within me as by something fragile and precious which 
had been entrusted to me’. Reincarnation is one way to delineate this balance of agency between the internal 
and external, where the true self becomes, perhaps uncannily, ‘this being that had been rebornpaired [with]
in me.’78 
Maybe it is Sedgwick’s Buddhist practice, which leads her to call this process of agency given through 
introjection of external object “reincarnation”? It might as well be seen in Deleuze and Guattari as 
certain a form of animism. What I want to suggest here with regard to affect’s materiality is that this 
process of agency given by the introjection of an external object encapsulates the reparative practice 
as an affective engagement with materiality where the matter itself folds back on the affect. And this 
might be the closest I will come to an answer to Eliza Steinbock’s question reiterated in the opening of 
this essay, asking where the locus of the reparative critical practice as image takes place. The reparative 
critical practice is no longer only a question of relationality between bodies-as-organisms between 
artist/author (as body) and reader/audience (as body), but it take place in the very materiality of affect 
– and in the subjective and collective enfoldment of this materiality. 
I have shown that Deleuze’s, Guattari’s and Sedgwick’s conceptions of affect, have not failed to 
consider the technicity of affect; rather, in their work being pre-digital, they anticipated what we 
understand today as digital through their work on affect. Where we have failed, if indeed we have 
failed, is to remain in the cybernetic fold of radical and creative technological (re)imagination and 
reassemeblage. 
78  Sedgwick and Goldberg, The Weather in Proust, 33.
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On a sunny day, much like today, in 2011 the ordinary activity of browsing through the News Feed on 
my Facebook account hit me in a visceral way. Some friends were circulating YouTube videos from the 
early stages of the Syrian uprising. These videos were captured by cellular phones, and compressed and 
uploaded via poor Internet connections and satellite phones, resulting in pixelated images whose original 
size and quality had deteriorated to such extend that their content was hard to decipher. From the moving 
pixels, the contours of a faceless entity in green emerge. A shot is heard. The camera tilts. The image 
dissolves into a shifting mass of grey pixels. 
The images prompted me to question: what, if anything, will one be able to re-assemble from the events 
sweeping across the Arab-speaking world? Even though the events have been captured on countless cellular 
phones, video cameras and satellite phones, will the catastrophe, accelerating to the speed of new media 
compressions and codecs, deprive us of access to “that which was” – now atomised into debris? And how 
to assemble or repair an incongruent image from the fragments?
Affect Image Touch:
Touch, I remember touch, pictures came with touch1
In this essay I will explore these questions through a discussion of the texture and affect of the 
digital image: is the digital image devoid of texture? How can it touch us, and how can we touch it? 
My motivation is not only to understand how we are affected by digital images, but also to understand 
their affordances: How did they get that way? And what do they allow us to do with them?2 
Since the inception of digital photography the question of whether the digital image has lost its 
indexicality and its ability to touch us has been much debated. While some argue that with digital 
image processing, the image has lost its direct reference to a concrete “that which was”34, others seem 
to insist that electrons do actually “remember”, and as such the data stored on the memory card still 
carries an indexical relation to the object captured and transmitted to the receiver5.
Lebanese performance artist Rabih Mroué has worked extensively on videos of the early stages of 
1  I borrow the title from Daft Punk, Touch Feat. Paul Williams 
2  This essay has been written over a longer period. By the time of submission of the thesis, and with ISIS and   
  various other fractions controling large areas of Syria the images from the war have changed. 
3  Derrida and Stiegler, Echographies of Television, 153.
4  In Roland Barthes’ Camera Lucida the analogue camera captured the photons that directly touching the object  
  in front of the lens and transmitted those same photons directly to the future beholder of the image, creating 
  an indexical relationship. Digital image processing is said to have lost this element of direct “touch”, because  
  the digital camera stores data onto the memory card “as a calculation that decomposes the elements of the   
  spectrum while waiting for the treatments that will end in the imprinting of something else, of something other  
  than the photonic ectoplasm of a this was” Ibid.
5  Marks, Touch.
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the Syrian uprising in his performance and exhibition The Pixelated Revolution6. In his work Mroué 
seems to hint that the images smuggled out of Syria in the early days of the uprising still point to some 
sort of indexical relationship: The activist captures the sniper on his cellular phone. The sniper then 
shoots the activist, and this is precisely the same field of vision that we, the consumers of Facebook 
and other social media platforms, receive on the other side of the screen. Mroué indeed goes further, 
suggesting a prosthetic relationship between the eye of the activist and the cellular phone – as though 
the cellular phone were a prosthesis, a substitute for the activist’s own eye, burning the image of the 
perpetrator onto the activist’s retina before he is injured. What we receive, then, on the other side of 
the screen, is a direct imprint, which we again share, circulate or “like” using the prosthetic “retinal 
screen” of our tablet, smart phone or laptop7. And this exchange makes us, according to Mroué, in 
some ways complicit. 
Since neither of these explanations seems to account for the visceral affect with which I was hit 
by the digital image, I want to complicate the matter by suggesting a possibility of affect and touch of 
the digital image somewhere in between, which neither completely deny the texture and affect of the 
digital image, nor insist on the indexical or prosthetic relationship between the digital image and the 
spectator. 
Following the discussion on how the affect enfolds materiality and how matter is enfolded in the 
affect, which I discuss in “Affect’s Materiality”, I want to test in this chapter the way in which the digital 
image enfolds affect in its very materiality qua digital: How does this discretisation of the image opens 
up to a process of auto-affection in the deterritorialised pixel? To do so I will return to discuss Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick’s notion of texxture/texture, and Gilles Deleuze’s notion of the affection-image. 
But before we begin I want to clarify how I differentiate or define the analogue image, analogico-digital 
image and digital image in the discussion.
Analogue Digital
The analogue image is the film image. The film medium is a light-sensitive material, which captures 
the light exposed onto its silver-gelatin surface and creates a latent image. The latent image can then 
later be developed as a 1:1 reproduction of what was originally captured. The analog image process was 
said to create a direct or indexical relationship between the object filmed and the filmic representation8. 
What I refer to, as the analagico-digital image is the analogue video image (VHS, Betacam, DVcam 
etc.). This process differs from the analogue in that the flow of light is translated into electronic 
waves on the magnetic tape. According to Maurizio Lazzarato the video image is similar to human 
perception in that the later already works as an interface or sieve that compresses the flows of matter. 
As an example he uses “’red light’, which has the longest wavelength and its oscillations therefore 
have the lowest frequency, we find that in a single moment 400 million oscillations follow each other. 
What we perceive as red light is a distribution, a contraction of this duration”9. Human perception 
contracts flows in accordance with our own perception of time. As such, “the video machine acts like 
the brain by translating movements, which are not perceivable in our categories of space and time, 
6  Mroué, The Pixelated Revolution.
7  Apple to some degree appears to share this prosthetic bodily ambition for its digital devices by naming the   
  displays ’Retina’ or ’Retina HD’ (Ipad, Iphone, Imac, Mac Book Pro etc). What is interesting in this is that the  
  screens resolution is based on the pixels per degree (PPD), which takes into consideration the proximity of the  
  viewing device to the screen. In that sense we can say that a prosthetic bodily interaction is taking place.
8  Barthes, Camera Lucida.
9  Lazzarato, Videophilosophie, 69 translated into English by Stephan Gregory, Angela Melitopoulos, Erik Stein,  
  Stephan Geene and Rosanne Altstatt.
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into movement that can be perceived”10. Perception works as an interface – “but an interface with 
a delay between movement received and the movement executed”11. Digital image processing (HD, 
Apple ProRes, H.264 , MPEG, MOV etc.) is a further discretisation or compression of this process. 
Here it is no longer signals that are captured on the magnetic tape, but rather a picture that is captured 
by a ridged array of pixels. Instead of a latent image in the crystalline emollition there is a numeric 
representation of the data captured or stored onto the memory card. The shift from analog to digital 
can in general be said – despite our terming it “High Definition” – as loss of data or information. Or, as 
Lazzarato notes, the video image is a selection (a withdrawal) from matter: “Our images, therefore, are 
not something we add to the object, but rather a selection (a withdrawal) from matter.”12 However, with 
the advent of variable pixels, quantum computing etc. – the digital image as we know it (2015) might 
exceed its current quality and gain multilayered analogue features – what I refer to as digital analogue.
☐☐☐ Texture | Texxture ☐☐☐
[T]o perceive texture is always, immediately and de facto to be immersed in a field of active narrative 
hypothesizing, testing, and reunderstanding how physical properties act and are acted upon over time. To 
perceive texture is never only to ask or know What is it like? Nor even just How does it impinge on me? 
Textural perception always explores two other questions as well: How did it get that way? And what could 
I do with it?13
The notion of textural perception as “affordances” seems crucial for the discussion of the affect 
of the digital image and what it allows us to do with the image. The single brush of my fingertips 
precipitates this double inquiry into how the texture of the material touches me, and what can I do 
with it.14 But how am I to understand these affordances, when what I am brushing over are digital 
pixels on the crystalline surface of a tablet or smartphone, devoid of texture?
According to Sedgwick there is no such thing as textural lack. Instead, she differentiates between 
10  Ibid., 70.
11  Ibid., 99.
12  Ibid., 98.
13  Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 13 quoting Renu Bora.
14  Here I borrow Sedgwick’s notion of the “the weaver’s handshake” which she describes as the “gesture [of brushing-
three-fingers over a garment] of the way a fabric person will skip the interpersonal formalities when you’re introduced and 
move directly to a tactile interrogation of what you’re wearing.” Sedgwick and Goldberg, The Weather in Proust, 71.
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Texture and Texxture15. Texxture with two xx’s is “dense with offered information about how 
substantively, historically, materially, it came into being”16; she uses as an example the hand-moulded 
brick that “still bears the scars and uneven sheen of its making”. The brick serves as an example of how 
the history of the material clay-becoming-brick is enfolded in the very surface or texture of the brick.
Texture (with only one “x”) defiantly or even invisibly blocks or refuses to convey the information 
of its making: “there is texture, usually glossy if not positively tacky, that insists instead on the polarity 
between substance and surface, texture that signifies the willed erasure of its history”17. This is of course 
a slightly simplistic differentiation between texture and texxture, and, as Bora shows, the relationship 
between the two is always permeable and interchanging18. 
Following this distinction between texxture and texture, one might conclude that analogue film, 
like the hand-moulded bricks, has “texture”, since film carries the history of its making within it. This 
information seems to be lost in the digital image, since, according to Bernard Stiegler, the digital 
image is “discrete” not only because it is composed of separate entities, but also because it conceals its 
own making 19. According to this line of thought, one may argue that the digital image is not devoid of 
texture, but is devoid of texxture. If the digital image reveals its texxture, it is only in the sense that its 
history and making are always already concealed and subject to manipulation: it is nothing but stored 
zeroes and ones, resulting in the imprinting of something else, of something other than the “that 
which was.” That there is no direct transference between the object captured and the processed image 
is often the reason that digital imagery is not of itself considered to be sufficient evidence of reported 
atrocities.20 
The YouTube videos circulated at the start of the Syrian uprising complicate this clear-cut distinction 
between an analogue image that possesses texxture and a digital image reduced to texture. 
Hito Steyerl introduces the concept of the “poor image” as “the contemporary Wretched of the 
Screen, the debris of audiovisual production (which) testify to the violent dislocation, transferals, and 
displacement of images—their acceleration and circulation within the vicious cycles of audiovisual 
capitalism”21. Following from her argument that it is the production facilities which produce the poor 
image, then the pixelated images emerging from Syria can be seen as enfolding or compressing the 
violent production mechanisms in the images’ texxture. 
Texxture operates on various levels here in that firstly the image’s pixelation is a direct result of 
the mechanisms that produced it – the war: the use of cellular phones, the upload via poor internet 
connections, the sharing on different web-platforms – are all different instances of technical deferral 
that impacts upon the image’s texture, and they are direct material inscriptions caused by the war to a 
certain extend. 
Rather than seeing this process as a deferral away from matteriality or indexicality of the original 
content, I want to suggest that the image’s violence is enfolded or compressed in the digital compression, 
circulation and dislocation of the image. As such, the image is not necessarily in need of a bodily 
prosthesis to transmit this violence – the violence is precisely enfolded in the digital body as pixel22. 
The pixelated image is not a selection (a withdrawal) from matter, but is actually the deferral of the 
15  Sedgwick borrows the concept of texture | texxture from Renu Bora “Outing Texture” Bora, “Outing Texture.” I 
retain the slightly simplified reading of the concept used by Sedgwick.
16  Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 15.
17  Ibid.
18  Bora, “Outing Texture.”
19  Derrida and Stiegler, Echographies of Television.
20  See Schuppli, “Law and Disorder.”
21  Steyerl, “In Defense of the Poor Image | E-Flux,” 1.
22  Here ”body” is understood not as organism but as body in the smallest possible sense.
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matter folded back on the image’s texture. As such, the material affect comes to operate on that matter 
itself, in that the violent production facilities which produce the pixelate image, not only operate on 
the surface of the image – but also internally between the pixels, which constitute the image. 
Deleuze’s Texture
The affection image is one of Deleuze’s three image concepts of the movement image. The affection 
image is often understood as the close-up of the face23, but the reason why the close-up of the face is 
able to affect us is because the face is ripped from the totality of which it should form part i.e. the body 
or the film as a whole, and forms an entity with its own micro-movement internally in the frame.
There is a rather intriguing place in Deleuze’s account of the affection image in which he uses the 
close-up of Marlene Dietrich’s face in Josef von Sternberg’s The Scarlett Empress to describe how the 
affection image moves from intensification to reflection, and then to lyrical abstraction, as a result of 
the treatment of light and texture:
[T]he face of the young woman is caught between the white of a voile curtain and the white of the pillow and 
the sheets where she is resting, until we see the astonishing image, which seems to come from video, where the 
face is now only a geometric incrustation of the voile. The white space itself is in turn circumscribed, redoubled 
by a veil or a net which is superimposed, and gives it a volume, or rather what one calls in oceanography (but 
also in painting) a shallow depth. Sternberg has a great practical knowledge of linens, tulles, muslins and 
laces: he draws from them all the resources of a white on white within which the face reflects the light.24 
What I would like to foreground in this quote is the way light is employed in the treatment of 
the analogue image to create reflective surfaces, and then how the texture of various materials is 
superimposed onto the surface to create depth – “a shallow depth”. The image is composed through 
superimposing layers of semi-transparent texture onto a white, reflective surface. Sternberg’s analogue 
image thus possesses both texture and texxture. As we have already seen, an analogue film image 
possesses texxture by default, since its very surface points back to its history and the process of its 
making. But in the case of Sternberg’s image, the surface of the film is treated as a reflective surface of 
white light, upon which the close-up of the face is superimposed, which might cast us into uncertainty 
whether we are talking about texture or texxture here. But the confusion is exacerbated when layers 
of voile, net etc., are added onto it. This points back to how the analogue image was made through 
a process of manual manipulation of superimpositions, but at the same time it conceals the image’s 
making, since the treatment of the image might have been difficult to detect by the general filmgoer at 
the time of its making. 
Deleuze proposes that Sternberg’s “great practical knowledge” of the materials and their affordances 
construct a “shallow depth”: the image moves from its two-dimensional surface and becomes almost 
3D, as though we always had 3D images without realising it.25 In this sense, the texture of the analogue 
image might not differ so radically from the texture of the digital image as we first assumed. Rather, 
the digital becomes an extension of the analogue. Even though the digital image might have lost its 
original referent, and lost a quantity of data and resolution in comparison with the analogue image, it 
still carries aspect of each other within each other. Today all Sternberg’s layers of linen, tulle, muslin, 
and lace are standard surface texture plugins in 3D animation programs that combine to make the 
digital 3D animated image capable of surpassing “reality” itself.26 
23  Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 89.
24  Ibid., 96.
25  Here I am refraining Deleuze’s reading of Henri Bergson  “as though we had always had cinema without realizing 
it”  Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 2
26  For an excellent survey of texture in 3D see Farocki, Parallel.
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But there is something rather odd at stake when Deleuze mentions that the image “seems to come 
from video, where the face is now only a geometric incrustation of the voile”27. What is it about video 
that makes the face look like a geometric incrustation of the voile? I have hardly any conception of 
what video at Deleuze’s time of writing in 1984 looked like, but I can only assume that it was pixelated, 
slightly soft – out of focus, cut up into squares because of the magnetic tape. While this process in 
the affection image takes place through texxture (it is film), and texture (the face is inserted onto a 
white reflective screen, superimposed and with added tulles, linens and muslins) then the difference 
between the texture with one “x” and two “x”s seems to converge. The affection image in itself performs 
a transition from texxture to texture: while it possesses all the qualities of analogue film, it becomes a 
willed erasure of the past that created it, and that is when the image seems to come from video.
Suddenly, the textural qualities of the analogue affection image appear to be always already 
analogico-digital. But the properties pertinent to both the analogue affection image and the analogico-
digital video image seem similar to the digital YouTube video of the Syrian protesters capturing their 
own deaths on camera. The sniper who shoots the activist holding the camera is pixelated, cut-up into 
squares, blurring his identity. This happens not on account of the director’s sensitivity to textures (net 
and voile), but due to the machinic assemblage that makes up the image28. The result is a digital image 
so abstracted from its original content that it is difficult to hold it accountable. Yet it is able to produce 
a visceral affect in me precisely because its object (the perpetrator) is abstracted from its original size 
and spectrum and distorted into a somewhat faceless, blurry entity. The pixelated image shows its 
texxture – the violent mechanisms that produced it (the war) – but because of the discretisation of the 
perpetrator’s face, it also conceals its own making. 
I will now move on to discuss how the affect of the pixelated image was produced in me by a micro-
movement between the discrete entities similar to the micro-movement in the affection image. 
☐☐☐ Discrete Entity ☐☐☐
The close-up does not tear away its object from a set of which it would form part (…), but on the contrary it 
abstracts it from all spatio-temporal co-ordinates, that is to say that it raises it to the state of Entity.29
The close-up of Dietrich’s face, abstracted and divided into squares, tears itself from the totality 
of the film of which it would form part, and is raised into a state of entity. The affection image thus 
detaches the movement image from the movement of which it should from part and opens up directly 
to time. But in Dietrich’s case this only happens for a few frames, then the narrative and the image re-
joins or is synchronised with the time of the film and the narrative time – Moscow time. 
But what happens if the affection image does not catch up with the rest of the film but remains in 
this limbo, or interval, as the deterritorialised entity? 
This was precisely what happened to me in the encounter with the YouTube video – the sniper, 
shooting the activist holding the camera, is raised into a blurry, discrete entity, deterritorialised from 
its original body and location. The digital image is discrete since it is in itself composed of separate 
entities 30. Each pixel contained internally within the frame becomes similar to the analogue close up, 
27  Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 96.
28  Here I use Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of machinic assemblage, which allows us to consider the way in   
  which the image in itself is comprised of and composed of heterogeneous and multiple elements, which have all  
  left their trace on the image: pixels, memory cards, cellular phones, poor internet connections, circulation on  
  websites etc.
29  Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 98.
30  Derrida and Stiegler, Echographies of Television.
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in that each pixel is torn from its spatio-temporal coordinates and raised into a state of entity.
Unlike the face of Dietrich, the YouTube clip does not catch up with the movement of which it 
should form part. It is not reconnected to a narrative time – the time of the film or the state time – 
the image stays in this deterritorialised time, ripped of its spatio-temporal coordinates. The violent 
dislocation of the digital image, which is enfolded in the very materiality and texture of the image, 
does not link up to the movement of which it should form part, but remains in this state of suspended 
agency. And this takes place not only between the frames, but also internally – in the frame between 
the pixels. 
☐☐☐ [K]not a Conclusion ☐☐☐ 
I have attempted to show that the affection image – the close-up – undergoes a process moving 
through texxture and texture, from being a partial object to becoming an entity. The affection image 
tears itself from the movement of which it should form part – and opens up directly to time. In the 
digital pixelated image, a similar process takes place through the discretisation of the image’s texture 
through the machinic assemblage, which produces it. The digital pixel thus enfolds or compresses its 
violent deferral and production in its very texxture – which it is then again able to transfer or transmit 
through the micro movement taking place internally in the pixelated images. The movement between 
the pixels transformss the face from its status as a partial object referring back to a whole to a blurry, 
deterritorialised entity shorn of its spatio-temporal coordinates. And this movement in the pixels 
composing the face annihilates individuation. This process occurs through texture – a texture that 
both points back to the violent mechanisms that produced it while at the same time erasing any linkage 
to this past. It was these micro-movements between the pixels that struck me violently. The automated 
scrolling over my Facebook News Feed was interrupted by this footage, not necessarily because there 
was some sort of indexical linkage between me, the electrons that had touched the perpetrator, who 
shot the activist holding the camera, but because the machinic assemblage of various different elements 
had deterritorialised the image. The result was an image, which was no longer recognisable within 
our current frames of what constitutes an image, or what constitutes a face. Returning to Marlene 
Dietricht’s face encrusted in veils, tulle, and muslin, the close-up of her face is shorn of its totality 
and does not point back to a preexisting whole. Through the textural composition of the face it is 
elevated into an entity. Shorn of its spatial-temporal coordinates, the close-up of the face annihilates 
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individuation and constitutes a fear, because it is no longer readable within the normative frames of 
what constitutes a face: as “individuating”, “socialising”, “relational” or “communicating”31. 
Unlike the analogue affection image, the pixilated image did not catch-up with the movement of 
which it would form part, but was abandoned to its own destiny. But how and on what level might this 
violent experience inform any notion of the reparative critical practice as an image practice and as a 
digital image in itself?
According to Sedgwick’s notion of the reparative practice, the subject engages in an affective and 
accretive encounter with a partial object. This engagement does not restore the subject back to a pre-
existing whole, but somehow transforms the subject-object relationship into a separate entity with its 
own powers and qualities. This textural, material and affective introjection of the object in the subject 
and vice versa - forms a new art of existence which blurs the binary constructs between subject-object.
In Camp performance, which is one of the practices that Sedgwick assigns as a reparative practice, 
the subject assembles or confers onto objects which are rich in texxture, only to erase their history, 
meaning, or value in a positively tacky, over-the-top treatment of the object. Shorn of their spatial-
temporal coordinates, the subject extracts “sustenance from the objects of a culture – even of a culture 
whose avowed desire has often been not to sustain them”32. Camp performance seems to resonate 
with Sedgwick’s notion of texture (with only one “x”) as “the willed erasure of its history”, which 
might help to inform a camp image or digital image practice, which is both enfolds the history of 
the making of that image in its very texxture yet erases any linkage to this violent past in a positively 
tacky, over-the top treatment of that history. Steyerl’s defence of the “The Poor Image” can be seen 
as an image practice from which usable parts might be extracted from culture’s throwaway objects 
(including outmoded image codecs and compressions) to compose an incongruent image difficult to 
read within the normative frames of what constitute a subject and what constitute an image. And even 
though this image, in this case constituted a violent thing to experience, it might just as well open up 
to a new found potentiality, which displaces the digital image’s ontological quarrel from a “that which 
was” to a “what might come”?
31  Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 101.
32  Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 143.
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A Movement Image is Being Written
The bus will stop for you at any point on the route. Just make yourself elegantly noticeable!1
1  “Beirut Bus Map | Zawarib SARL | The Mapping Company.”
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Meta data
Place | Sunday January 8 2012: 5.30 am
Time  | The coastal highway between Daura and The Cornishe, Beirut
Gear  | Bus, 5 cameras Canon 5D MarkII, 5 lenses 24-70mm, 5 memory
  cards, 5 tripods, sandbags, black linen 
Crew  | Saoma, Gig, the driver, Elie and me.
It is snowing in the mountains 
           Rain.
 
Raindrops seek their pathway on the
        Windowpane.
 
                       Viewfinder.
 
Questions emerge from the raindrops’ pathway:
How can the image move, not only technically and mechanically but also spatially and socially?
Is this a movement image at all? 
We shout: “Roll camera!”
“Camera rolling!” 
But the cameras are not rolling.
The memory-cards are writing…
What happens to the movement image at a time of progressive filming, when it is no longer one frame 
after the other, but pixels being written onto a memory card?
And what happens when it is no longer images on the same screen, but multiple channels operating 
alongside one another?
Are we still producing movement images as though they were movement images? 
Meanwhile, has the image moved on?
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1. Daybreak.
Saoma lower the ISO. 
In 2012, coinciding with the opening of Metro Al Madina, a two-floor-underground theatre and 
cabaret venue in Beirut, I created the four-channel video-installation movement. The installation was 
shot in a bus driving around Beirut to simulate a metro. The four channels where installed in the 
corridor space that links Metro’s bar area with the toilets and backstage. 
Beirut lacks a functioning public transportation system. During the Ottoman Empire in 1890s, a 
French-Ottoman company constructed a railway and cable car system which connected Beirut to Syria, 
Turkey and Palestine. In the 1970s the railway was abandoned. Today the city’s public transportation 
is scattered between a bus system comprised of mainly private buses and micro-vans and services – a 
shared taxis system. Metro Al Madina was founded with the aim of creating movement in the city, 
through cultural production and entertainment of hearts and minds and to support an infrastructure 
for emerging artists in the city and the wider region.
In 2010, Tania Ruiz Gutiérrez created the impressive multi-channel video installation Annorstädes or 
Ailleurs (2010)2, which sets Malmö Central Station in motion with the support of multiple projections 
at each side of the platform. In the installation the same image is split between the different channels 
and travels from screen to screen. Intrigued by the installation, I wanted to test what, if anything, 
would happen to the movement image if it was not the same image moving from one projection 
to the other, but if the footage was filmed synchronically with four different cameras3. The website 
documentation of Ruiz Gutiérrez’s Ailleurs mentions the way in which the “introduction of standard 
time, in the early nineteenth century, was closely related to the development of the railway system. 
Just as the standardisation of time begets the idea of synchronisation, the establishment of a universal 
2  The title Ailleurs references the oft-quoted film Ici et Ailleurs (Here and Elsewhere) by Jean-Luc Godard, Anne 
  Marie Miélleville and Jean-Pierre Gorin (the Dziga Vertov Group) (1976). I return to Ici et Ailleurs later on in  
  this essay.
3  Four was the number permitted by my production budget.
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time begets that of simultaneity”4. In Scandinavia we often take for granted that we can travel from 
one point to another without interruption. movement was equally inspired by Hassan Choubassi’s 
Beirut Metro Map, created for Home Works III: A Forum on Cultural Practices, 20055. Choubassi’s 
map reflects how the demarcation lines dividing Beirut during the Civil War were still psychologically 
and virtually present in the city in 2005. One manifestation of this virtual demarcation was enacted 
in the way in which the service taxi would not take you from the Eastern part of the city to the West, 
but would follow the former lines of segregation. Movement is thus not necessarily something which 
is experienced in its privileged totality – as the movement between singular points – but rather in its 
negation –every day life as a constant interruption of movement. The two art works placed alongside 
one another seem to open up to asynchronous experiences of movement inherent to globalisation: In 
one part of the world there is a sense of movement as a continuous flow between distinct places – while 
in the other movement becomes manifest through its constant interruption6.
In this essay-documentation of the video installation movement I discuss what, if anything, happens 
to the movement image in times of digital image processing and multichannel video installation? How 
does multichannel video-installation and digital image processing open up to a possibility of enabling 
heterogeneous space-times to exist at the same time? 
To analyse these questions we need to take into consideration the multiple elements that make up 
the video installation and the production hereof; from the pixels to the memory card, the cameras, 
the bus, the driver, the screens, the projectors, the city, the audience, the venue etc. Conceptually, I 
draw on Gilles Deleuze’s notion of the movement image, which he bases on Henri Bergson’s Matter 
and Memory and develops in Cinema 17. According to Deleuze, cinema makes us “see” movement, 
not as privileged instants but as a whole. We do not see in frames per seconds, but in the totality of 
movement between the frames. As a result, cinema is not about narrative, the reading of signs, or 
psychology, but about movement in its purest form. 
I use Raymond Bellour’s concept of image dispositif to establish a more global relationship between 
all the heterogeneous parts that makes up a video installation8. Bellour draws on Michel Foucault’s 
concept of the dipositif as a “heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourse, institutions, architectural 
forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral 
and philanthropic propositions”9. In Deleuze’s reading of Foucault in “What is a dispositif?”, the 
dispositif is not only the distribution between different concrete and pre-existing objects, institutions, 
practices etc., but is also a distribution of light that cannot be traced back to one single source of light – 
an intentional and unidirectional projector behind the beam – but rather diffuses, blurs and disperses 
what it touches10. Thinking the image as dispositif allows us to expand the image beyond the flat, two-
dimensional qualities normally ascribed to it, enabling us to consider all the different elements that 
make up an assemblage or video installation. At the same time the image dispositif allows us to operate 
on different scales: From the close-up to the full frame and to the larger picture – the context that the 
video installation ties into, which itself ties into the production of other collectivities which are again 
comprised of different technical milieus and space-times. 
Maurizio Lazzarato’s book Videophilosophy helps us to further develop the notion of the image 
in that it takes over from where Deleuze stops, at the advent of the video image. The image dispositif 
4  Ruiz Gutiérrez, “Elsewhere/Annorstädes/Ailleurs.”
5  Choubassi, Beirut Metro Map.
6  I return to discuss this in ”Rematerialisation”.
7  Cinema 1: The Movement-Image.
8  Raymond Bellour.
9  Foucault and Gordon, Power/knowledge, 194.
10  Deleuze, “What Is a Dispositif?,” 160.
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becomes, so to speak, “image in pure perception – that receives and transmits movements, in which 
action and reaction are merged. All the images act and react on each other. And this action/reaction is 
accomplished (…) by all the elementary parts of the image at once.”11 Bergson understands the world, 
or matter, as an aggregate of images, or vortex of images that “encounter one another, collide, reflect, 
compose and decompose one another. In this dimension of forces, intensities, becomings (…) the 
world is a flow of light. The world as image should be understood exactly in the sense of a streaming 
world of light, as an infinite variation of its ‘pure tremors’”.12 
Lazzarato’s argues that the video recorder works in a way similar to human perception: 
The video machine acts like the brain by translating movements, which are not perceivable in our categories 
of space and time, into movements that can be perceived. The pure perception of video technology, its 
energy-matter, exists in the electromagnetic waves, the pure oscillations from which images are ‘produced’. 
The colour is an electromagnetic wave with specific ‘oscillations’ that are contracted by the video machine in 
a duration we can perceive. But, here, it is technology that operates like the mind (subjectivity) because it is 
the machine which translates the duration of pure perception into human duration.13
Since human perception cannot perceive matter in its totality, we compress matter and movement 
to correspond to the human sense of duration. Similarly, the video apparatus compresses movement of 
matter into electromagnetic flows. For Bergson it was the “central telephone exchange”, which served 
as the technological metaphor used to describe the human brain as a switchboard between establishing 
communication and / or putting it on hold14. In Deleuze the technical apparatus of cinema was used to 
describe human consciousness as that which strings images on an invisible thread in the back of the 
brain. And with Lazzarato the technical metaphor is updated to the interface: 
The brain, then, does nothing else but continue or transform the streaming of flows of light. It is contained 
within universal variation, it does not create images, it does not add perception to things. Quite the contrary, 
its function is to draw and retain from image-matter what serves its own needs, what is necessary to its 
actions. Our images, therefore, are not something we add to the object but rather a selection (a withdrawal) 
from matter. Image and perception constitute a cut [découpage] into the continuous flow, an arrest of 
movement. In brief, the brain is not a creative centre of conscious perception and representation.
Images, therefore, are not produced by the brain. If the world is a flow of images, if perception is in things, 
the cerebral state is in the images and in perception, not the reverse.15
What I am interested in in Lazzarato’s quote is the view that images are not something which 
is external to us or external to matter, they are not representations of matter but they are that very 
matter in itself. Images, like time, are not an exterior appearance, “but just the opposite, the interiority 
in which we are, in which we move, live and change”.16 However, what I want to put forward here is 
the view that the digital is not only a cut or découpage into matter, but rather allows for – at least in 
theory – a multiplicity of heterogeneous space-times to exist within the same frame, space, sentence 
or corridor. To do so I will draw upon Ici et Ailluers.
11  Lazzarato, “Machines to Crystallize Time,” 97.
12  Ibid.
13  Lazzarato, Videophilosophie, 70. Translation from German by Stephan Gregory, Angela Melitopolous, Erik   
  Stein, Stephan Geene and Rosanne Altstatt.
14  Lazzarato, “Machines to Crystallize Time,” 99.
15  Ibid.
16  Deleuze, Cinema 2, 80.
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4. Movement image and the image of a movement
In Ici et Ailluers, Jean-Luc Godard and Anne Marie Miéville (Sonimage) try to come to terms with 
the footage they shot in 1970s as part of the Dziga Vertov Group with Pierre Gorin. The Palestinian 
Liberation Organization in Jordan had commissioned the group to shoot the footage for the film 
Until Victory. The Dziga Vertov Group can be seen as part of a larger global movement in the 1960s 
and 1970s, when filmmakers became part of the struggle for decolonisation and anti-imperialism, 
known as Third Cinema or the Militant Image17. The militant image is no longer a representation or 
documentation of a movement, but it becomes that movement in itself. As such the militant image, as 
we have already seen with Bergson, becomes matter and movement in itself.18 Shortly after the footage 
was shot, the massacre known as Black September took place, in which many of the people filmed 
were either killed or expelled from Jordan to Lebanon. Years later, Godard and Miéville reflected on 
what to do with this footage of a movement killed. This led them to question both the movement, the 
resistance movement of which they were part, and also the filmic medium – the movement image – 
employed to capture this movement. 
20 minutes into the film a group of five people walk around a camera demonstratively placed in 
the middle of the frame – as if they are workers on the assembly line. The voiceover of Godard states:
 
O.K., here the images can be seen altogether.
At the movies, this is impossible. 
One is obliged to see them separately one after the other 
Which results in this:
But it is seen as such because in fact when one makes a film,
Things really happen this way:
Each time, one image ceases to replace the other.
Each time the image after expels the image before and takes its place…
Keeping of course more or less the memory of it. 
This is made possible because the image is moving…
And the images don’t come altogether, but separately to inscribe themselves
17  Eshun and Gray, “The Militant Image.”
18  I return to discuss this in ”Reconstitution Image”
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One after the other, on their support:
Agfa, Kodak, Orvo, Gevaert…
And on the whole, time has replaced space, speaks for it, or rather:
Space has inscribed itself on the film in another form… 
Which is not a whole any more, but a sum of translations,
A sum of feelings, which are forwarded,
…That is, the Time…
…and the film that is, on the whole, chain-work images…
…renders a good account, through this series of images,
of my double identity, space & time chained to each other…
like two workers on the assembly line
where each is at the same time the copy and the original of the other. (20.25 minutes)
The five workers who are to mimic the assembly line, come instead to perform a five-channel video 
installation where the images do not bouge or move – one after the other – but are lined up next to each 
other. The camera, placed in the frame to illustrate cinema’s resemblance to the Fordist production 
line, is not the actual camera that films. What we see instead in the frame, which is supposed to be 
“hors champ” or out of frame, is what Godard sees, the all-knowing gaze of the director looking at 
his images and his crew moving in front of the camera. We see five different images and we hear five 
different sounds, two or more different cameras and five different subjects moving the images. Rather 
than replacing each other they come to constitute a multiplicity within the same frame. As if in this 
very moment, Godard and Miéville unconsciously mark a transition from the Fordist production 
line to a post-Fordist mode of production, or rather show how these two modes of production and 
stratification are perfectly able to exist at the same time19. 
This confusion of what kind of production mode we are talking about is further augmented by 
the directors’ conscious choice to reveal the production mechanisms internally within the frame, in 
which there are two cameras or two projections taking place at the same time. In the beginning we 
see a film-projector projecting the original footage of the Palestinian resistance onto the wall, one 
image after the other, while Godard didactically explains that this is what is happening in the cinema. 
19  Lazzarato, “Signs and Machines.”
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To further emphasise the cinematic feel we hear the sound of the spool, synched with the image. 
Then the workers or crew start to walk around the camera. However, the camera that is supposed to 
demonstrate the workings of film is not a film camera but an old-school video recorder. I have hardly 
any concept of what video cameras looked like in 1976 and the low-resolution YouTube copy that I am 
watching makes it hard to determine, but a quick online chat helps to confirm that it is a ShibadenFP 
video recorder20.
Ici et Ailluers is known for mixing two mediums: The original celluloid film shot of the Palestinian 
resistance and the treatment of this material or the post-reflection which takes place through video. 
But what does this simultaneity of different platforms and mediums do to our equation? One could 
intercut Godard’s voiceover and say: “No, this is not the image ‘qui bouge’ or moves, but a series of 
electric pulses on the magnetic tape!” But I find it more productive to consider the ways in which 
Godard’s didactics indicate the pre-digital nature of cinema, or the way that it anticipates the digital. 
The analogue film medium makes us aware of and able to make space divisible. 
Space has inscribed itself on the film in another form… 
Which is not a whole any more, but a sum of translations,
A sum of feelings, which are forwarded,
…That is, the Time…
That space has inscribed itself in another form, which is not a whole anymore but a sum of 
translations, which become time: would this not precisely indicate the operation of the video 
apparatus that compresses or translates matter into a sum of translation? This process has become 
(infinitely) divisible or multipliable with the advent of digital image processing. What is interesting to 
foreground in this scene is the way in which the scene itself make the viewer consider the machinic 
assemblage – the crew, cast, the multiple cameras, projectors, editing board, the sound etc. – that 
went into the production of the images that we see. The image we see is then not only composed 
of privileged instances, but the totality of all the disparate parts that makes up the image. But while 
the film allows us to believe that it is displaying its own history and process of making, it hides its 
own making, or obscures this process by the excessive use of voiceover. Ici et Ailluers both becomes 
a commentary on the way in which the technology discretises space, but at the same time the film 
also entails a possibility of assembling of all these disparate practices back together, through the use 
of the technological facilities available. However, Ici et Ailleurs leaves me unable to consider how it is 
possible to assemble the fragments that we are left with, not only on a formal and technical level, but 
with regard to the film’s content – the Palestinian resistance. Godard and Mieville’s film was a critical 
commentary on the unifying “voice” of a struggle and solidarity movement of the late 1960s early 
70s. Today it seems difficult to envisage how that struggle, which fragmented into pieces, could be re-
assembled, or re-created anew with the social and machinic technologies at our disposal?21 
When we lined up the four channels next to each other in the post-production program Adobe After Effects 
it occurred to me that the city was overwriting or covering itself. We had not done our homework properly 
and calculated the exact distance between the cameras to avoid overlap in field of vision or frames. Or 
rather, if we had placed the cameras precisely, this would either have required an extremely long bus or 
that we zoom in and only film a section of the actual window. As a result, each frame overlapped with 
another with a 20-30% margin, creating the sensation that the movement of the city was overwriting itself 
– or covering up – hiding its own movement. 
20  I am grateful to Sune Petersen for this.
21  I return to these questions in the chapters ”Reconstitution” and ”Collectivities”.
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1st. Thesis on the movement image
[M]ovement is distinct from the space covered. Space covered is past, movement is present, the act of covering. 
The space covered is divisible, indeed infinitely divisible, whilst movement is indivisible, or cannot be 
divided without changing qualitatively each time it is divided. This already presupposes a more complex 
idea: the spaces covered all belong to a single, identical, homogeneous space, while the movements are 
heterogeneous, irreducible among themselves.22
What does this mean, and what does this mean with regard to the production of the video installation? 
First, the space covered is past, which is divisible (infinitely), whilst the movement in itself cannot be 
divided. Was this what was at stake in Ruiz Gutteirrez’s installation? One image move – and then this 
movement is (infinitely) divided out into the different projections in the central station. But the first 
frame has already passed on and as such it is a repetition of space  – that is, space already covered. 
It would be an infinite (dependent on the number of screens) repetition of the same movement. As 
a result all the channels could be said to belong to one single, identical, homogenous space. In that 
sense the movement from screen to screen does not differ potentially from what is already at stake in 
the analogue single-channel movement image, but multiplies the same process and splits it out into 
different projections. We can maybe say that a difference is inserted in that it is not the cinematic 
apparatus that moves the image, but a software algorithm which synchronizes the movement from 
projector to projector and generically determines the flow of images. But does this create a difference 
in the repetition or do all the repetitions constitute the same homogenous space? 
What prompted me to produce movement was the desire to explore the question, how, if “movements 
are heterogeneous, irreducible among themselves”, to create a movement image which opens up to an 
experience of heterogeneous space-time? What happens to the movement image when it is not just the 
same movement image moving from one screen to the other? 
What I intended with movement was to allow different space-times or heterogeneous movements 
act out their own internal movements, while at the same time creating different movements between 
the screens. Yet, since each field of vision overlapped by 20–30% depending on the proximity of the 
passing object, the result was an image where this was partly present, while at the same time it was 
covering itself up. The city was overwriting itself, as if it was moving too quickly, or moving too slowly, 
being caught up by itself. But what does that do to the intended heterogeneous space-time?
It now occurs to me that the overlaps create an intersection that makes up the liminality between 
heterogeneous space-times. Let me try to explain this in the following way: if I am sitting in a train, I 
usually only see my own field of vision [____], even though I might be looking out of many windows 
at the same time. But in this case, because we filmed with different cameras, what you, as viewer of the 
video installation would see is this: [____] [____] [____]. Yet, some of the same objects overlapped 
despite being filmed by different cameras, creating something like this: [___[_]___[_]___]. This would 
be similar to three different people sitting in the train looking out the window, while what we see are 
three different viewpoints: it is as if our viewpoints overlap with a margin. I am only partly able to see 
what you are seeing and what other passengers are seeing at the same time. What I am interested in 
here is not so much singular perception vs. multiplicity of viewpoints, but more the materiality of the 
margins where the images intersect comes to create a sociality; a qualitative heterogeneity – where 
each frame is distinct while carrying aspects of the other in each other. 
22  Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 1, my italics and underlining.
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3. A movement image is being written
In cinema we never have to be wary of losing a text’s development: there is no text. And where there is none, 
it enters us without our having to look for it. Cinema weaves itself into our time; it becomes the temporal 
fabric of those ninety or fifty-two minutes of unconscious consciousness that characteristic of a being, a film 
viewer, strangely immobilized by motion.23 
There is something rather odd in Bernard Stiegler’s quote when he notes that there is no text in 
cinema only after having told us that the film he is watching – “on a gloomy autumn Sunday afternoon…” 
could either be “at a nearby movie house, if it is in town and there are a few dollars to waste, or on 
video or DVD at home …”24. With the cinema books, Deleuze wanted to free cinema from narrative, 
psychological and semiotic readings and open up to its direct form – movement. But if the viewing 
experience takes place on DVD, video or in a (more or less digital) movie theatre can movement then 
still be said to be the fundamental characteristic of cinema? Or is it text? Or rather how does migration 
of formats precisely stir confusion of reading the strictly discursive vs. the nondiscursive and create a 
possibility that the movement not only takes place between the frames, but also takes place internally 
in the frame between the pixels?
Stiegler answers himself by saying “And there is none, it [text] enters us without our having to look 
for it…”25. We do not look at analogue cinema in frames per second; we do not look at digital images 
in zeroes and ones, but they enter us without our knowing or having to look for them – behind our 
back. The movement image is in a constant state of becoming, like the animated figure that does not 
constitute a pose, or a complete figure, but is always in a state of becoming through the movement of 
lines and points. Can the digital image be seen as a constant state of writing – or is it a constant state 
of being cut or broken down into instants; digits?
When we shot the train scenes in Egypt for Leap into Colour, the image became distorted because 
of the poor quality of the memory card. Digital artefacts or anomalies entered the frame. The memory 
card writes the frame one sentence after the other until the frame is filled up, and then moves on to 
the next frame. But due to the slow speed memory card the writer simply could not keep up with 
the movement of the train. So if the object it was writing had moved on before the card had finished 
writing it, it just continued writing the new motif, without regard to the fact that it had not completed 
the first pose or figure. The result is something like the digital version of a super-fast Croquis, where 
the model changes his pose every second but the paper is not replaced. The digital artefact allows us 
to see the bridge (in the case of the scenes shot in Egypt) not as the pose, figure or sign “bridge”, but in 
its constant state of becoming or dissolving.
If, as Bergson, Deleuze, Lazzarato has noted, the brain works in a way similar to the apparatuses 
associated with cinema and video, would that entail that perception over time will become full of 
frame-gaps, missing seconds, digital artefacts and pixelated noise? Would we then need to download 
a motion-blur filter or plug-in to fill the gaps, to restore a coherent image from our perceptual data-
debris? Or is it rather, human perception that cannot perceive the machinic movement of the future? 
If human perception compresses the movement of matter to fit with our own sensory perceptions of 
duration – will future apparatuses exceed, or indeed have our current apparatuses already exceeded, 
our body’s abilities to perceive duration, returning matter to movement in its purest form? 
23  Stiegler, Technics and Time, 3, 11.
24  Ibid., 9.
25  Ibid., 11.
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6. “And”
The video installation was installed in the corridor that connects Metro’s bar area to the toilets and 
the backstage. The old discarded cinema chairs from the theatre were installed in front of the screen, 
so that the audience would sit with their backs to the projection, but be able to see the projection and 
themselves reflected in the old ‘70s mirror-wall decoration that runs through the space. 
[T]he first thesis contains another proposition: you cannot reconstitute movement with positions in space 
or instants in time: that is, with immobile sections [coupes]. You can only achieve this reconstitution by 
adding to the positions, or to the instants, the abstract idea of a succession, of a time which is mechanical, 
homogeneous, universal and copied from space, identical for all movements. And thus you miss the 
movement in two ways. On the one hand, you can bring two instants or two positions together to infinity; 
but movement will always occur in the interval between the two, in other words behind your back. On the 
other hand, however much you divide and subdivide the time, movement will always occur in a concrete 
duration [durée]; thus each movement will have its own qualitative duration. Hence we oppose two 
irreducible formulas: ‘real movement – concrete duration’, and ‘immobile sections + abstract time’.26 
The movement image takes place in the interval between the two frames – between one frame and 
that which follows. But in the video installation what we are left with contains not only movement 
between the two frames, but also movement internally in the frame between the pixels, and movement 
between the first screen and the second, and finally between what is taking place behind your back and 
in front of you reflected in the mirror. The movement image is thus an addition, as Godard says: “tu 
es additionné, je suis additionné” etc. One image + one image creates a third image. And this “and”, or 
chaining of separate entities, allows Godard and Miéville to “de-chain” the image from the assembly 
line and open up for a process of “re-chaining” or reconfiguration of space-time.
As Irmgard Emmelhainz notes: 
Godard differentiates images by de-chaining them from their commonsensical chains of signification and 
re-chaining (or recoding) them in such a way that their signifiers become heterogeneous. Such heterogeneity 
resists the formation of a visual discourse resonant with the commonsensical image of the Palestinian 
revolution found in photojournalistic and documentary images visible in the French mass media. Through 
appropriation and repetition, Godard produces a sort of mnemotechnics that allows us to memorize 
the images and thus link their signifiers in diverse contexts: the operations of disjunctive repetition and 
appropriation pull out what the signifiers lack or push out their excess.27
Returning to the clip from Ici et Ailleurs above, it is the same five images and sounds which are 
repeated throughout the clip but in five different agencements or montages. The five images move first 
one after the other with the sound, then alongside each other … etc. Godard and Miéville dechain 
the images from the Fordist chain of production, and rechain them to heterogeneous space-time. The 
images become detached from their direct signifier, and relinked in new assemblages, but at the same 
time they allow for heterogeneous space-times “ici et ailleurs” – here and elsewhere – to exist in the 
same space. If this “and” is not only a singular conjunction between the two different parts – then this 
creates a possibility of multiple “ands” taking place at the same time, as inherent in the stanza of Diane 
Ward’s poem Imaginary Movie: “Meanwhile and & at the same time”28. Here, four or five different ways 
of expressing a conjunction are inherent in the same stanza, which enables heterogeneous space times 
to exist at the same time. In movement, movement takes place not only in the interval between the two 
frames, but also between the multiple screens and between what is taking place behind your back and 
in front of you in the mirror, which entails a possibility of heterogeneous spaces and times taking place 
within the same space: in the corridor space of Metro Al Madina. 
26  Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 1.
27  Emmelhainz, “Between Objective Engagement and Engaged Cinema.”
28  Ward, Imaginary Movie, 34; see also Ngai, Ugly Feelings.
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5. What does a city allow you to film?
 ‘…when the solitary drop hesitatingly seeks its pathway on the window-pane, when the life of a city is reflected 
on the wet asphalt.’29
We shot the footage on a Sunday morning.
It was as if we filmed the city when it was not quite itself 
or too much itself. 
The space covered was not interrupted by 
traffic 
check points 
roadblocks
The city allowed us to film it in an unconditional and uninterrupted 
movement
The city left itself and became an abstracted space 
dissociated from its spatio-temporal coordinates.
I told the driver to take a right on Tariq el Matar 
After Borj El Barrajneh. 
Nobody realised where we were heading before it was too late: 
The highway-bridge cutting through Dahiye30 
The bridge had been repaired long ago 
but we became hyper aware of our set up:
Five cameras driving around in a bus.
Aware of our own movement: 
Too fast or too slow.
A white four-wheel drive passed us and made a sign to pull us over
Then speeded up and drove away.
I expected to get a call the morning after
Nothing. 
Peacetime.
The city determines for itself what it allows you to film.
29  Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 114, quoting Balázs’ L’esprit du cinéma.
30  Tariq el Matar means the airport road and Borj el Barajneh is a Palestinian Refugee camp, located in the  
   suburbs of Beirut.
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7. The movement image left the screen
At some point the video installation itself moved. First one projection moved, then the next. In the 
end there was only one projection running. Then that also left. The image moved from the corridor-
space it had been designed for and went into the theatre itself. It became the back-projection for a 
scene in the cabaret show Hishik Bishik31. The scene is set in an old train carriage in Alexandria, Egypt. 
Even the colours left and the footage became black-and-white, the footage was speeded up and a 
grainy old movie filter was added to enable the digital image keep up with the up-beat music of Hishik 
Bishik. People would come after the show and ask where you had obtained the archival footage from 
Alexandria’s corniche (sea-front promenade) in the 1940s. They did not know that what they were 
looking at was their own sea front filmed a few months back. The images left the screen and stepped 
into people’s imagination and entered a process of resignification and fabulation. It separated itself 
from the movement of which it should form part, and reassembled itself in another assemblage – an 
ensemble of people, props, projections, performances, sounds, music, textures, costumes and colours. 
As our journey has reached its final frame, how to come up with an answer to my initial question: 
How can the movement image move, not only technically and mechanically but also socially? 
In this essay, I have chosen to intercut my own work with movement, with that of Godard and 
Mieville’s Ici et Aillure, Gutierriez’ Ailleurs, Choubassi’s Beirut Map with the conceptual framework 
informing the movement image by Deleuze and Lazzarato. This has allowed me to open up the 
movement image from addition of two disparate elements to a juxtaposition of heterogeneous space-
times, which are able to coexist in the same space/time/frame. As such, the movement image not 
only anticipates the digital in that it allows us to section and divide space over time; it also allow for 
a possibility of re-joining or assembling different space-times. The movement image can move by 
ripping itself from its pre-programmed movement of which it should form part, in this case the video 
installation, and enter into new collectivities, new assemblages – in this case as the backdrop for Hishik 
Bishik. But how does this discussion on the movement image’s move from analogue to digital, from 
singular projection to multichannel installation, from “and” to “meanwhile and & and at the same 
31  Hishik Bishik is a cabaret show produced by Metro Al Madina. The show reinvents, reinterprets popular music 
  from cabaret life in Egypt in the 1930s 40s. I return to discuss Hishik Bishik “Collectivities of the disco-stretch”. 
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time” tie into my conceptual project of trying to move the reparative critical practice from a “reading” 
to an image in itself? 
If the reparatively positioned reader “tries to organize the fragments and par-objects she encounters 
or creates” because, as Sedgwick notes, she has “room to realise that the future may be different than 
the present, it is also possible for her to entertain such profoundly painful, profoundly relieving, 
ethically crucial possibilities that the past, in turn, could have happened differently from the way it 
actually did”32 then this requires movement in its purest form, both in the sense that space covered is 
eventually able to be different from the past, but also as the condition that makes bodies able to affect 
and be affected, that is to enter into assemblages with one another. Movement becomes the interface 
that connects us. This enables us to upgrade Sedgwick’s reparatively positioned “reader” to an editor 
at the editing table, splicing all the fragments she encounters and produces into something like a 
whole. But at the same time, and as I have shown, since the movement image is in a stage of becoming 
of being written the boundaries between reader and editor, image and text, human and non-human 
becomes blurred. The reparative critical practice becomes an operation of mixed, signifying, symbolic 
and signifying semiotics33. 
By connecting the disarticulated points on the map… 
          movement emerges.
32  Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 146.
33  Lazzarato, Signs and Machines, 17
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AFFECT’S TIME:
On The Temporality of the 
Repartive Critical Practice 
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Meta Data:
Time: Malmö, Signal Gallery
Location: 10 am, 4th October 2011. 
Material: Julie Ault’s Exhibition Ever 
Ephemeral: Remembering and Forgetting in 
the Archive; 
A dozen George Nelson wall clocks 
collected by Felix Gonzalez-Torres and 
reassembled by Julie Ault.
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On an ordinary morning in October 2011, as I was turning around the wall 
of the Signal Gallery, in Malmö, Sweden I was struck by:
A dozen clocks 
Hanging high and low 
Some round, some straight 
Out of sync 
Each indicating a different time 
Pointing their hands at me 
Simultaneously 
conflicting emotions welling up 
Sad optimist 
painful comfort 
fractured hope
68
 
Julie Ault had reassembled a series of George Nelson modernist design clocks which the artist Felix 
Gonzalez-Torres had collected shortly before his death in 1996. Together with Andrea Rosen, Ault had 
been responsible for dispersing the clocks together with Gonzalez-Torres’ personal belongings to his friends 
and colleagues. Fifteen years later, the clocks were reassembled in Sweden. 
It was as if the encounter with the clocks allured me to a possibility of glimpsing a different relationality 
to time, which ripped me out of the normative time, I was enmeshed in and opened up directly to time 
– a plurality of time(s): the time before Gonzalez-Torres’ death, that of his actual death, the time of the 
community to which the clocks had been dispersed and the time within each of the individual living 
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rooms where they had been hanging for the previous fifteen years. Was what struck me in the gallery a 
compression of all those different times enfolded in the very clocks themselves?  
The encounter with the clocks caused ambivalent emotions to well up in me. Each feeling had its own 
duration and time, while pointing to its relationality with the other feelings. As a totality/unity the clocks 
ripped time from the movement of which it should form part and opened up directly to time. 
But only for a moment - 
Then I was plunged back to clock time, to normative time, to Scandinavian time with its accuracy and 
perfect timing. 
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AFFECT’s TIME 
On The Temporality of Reparative Critical Practices
Dear Julie
I’ve wanted to write to you for some time now, actually ever since I saw your PhD defence and 
exhibition Ever Ephemeral: Remembering and Forgetting in The Archive in Malmö 2011. I am trying 
to place myself in the past to search for the initial affect the encounter with the clocks sparked in me. 
Something restrained me from immediately realizing the affect they caused in me, but the sensation 
has subsequently grown on me.
The encounter with the clocks produced within me a sensation of gazing at a possibility of 
envisioning the reparative critical practice’s complex relationship to temporality, but not fully being 
able to describe or account for what this entailed exactly. In this essay I want to revisit the sensation 
caused in me by your reassemblage of Gonzalez-Torres’ clocks (FGT clocks) and use the clocks as a 
“plan” or foundation for a conversation on the reparative critical practice’s complex relationship to 
time: What is the relationship between “Queer Time” and “Reparative Time”? And how does that 
relate to the temporality of affect – or what I will call affect’s time?
The timing of affect, or affect’s time is often said to be the “missing half-second” between an initial 
affect’s being registered in the brain to the affect’s registration by consciousness1. But what I want to 
suggest here, through my encounter with the clocks, is that affect’s time is more than a missing half-
second. The clocks allowed me to experience, if only for a split second, affect’s time as heterogeneity of 
times existing in the same space-time: 
“Hey you!”
(Who, me?) 
“Yeah you, the blond one with the suitcase”.
“We didn’t say: ‘we are going to alert you to the possibility of envisaging the temporality of the rrrr...’ 
whatever!”
“We said: ‘we are clocks, we are here – pointing at time, but the time we are pointing at is different from 
that of your time, now.”
“We show time but it is not just any time whatever: it is a time anterior to that of Gonzalez-Torres’ 
death. But it is also related to, but not necessarily the time of his boyfriend Ross’s death.  
We mark a time which has stopped at the time of Felix’s death. But we show a time that followed – the 
community to whom we were subsequently dispersed until we were reassembled in this room, in this 
very moment, in a place they call Sweden.” 
“It is with us as it is with Time: we split into different directions only to be assembled again. We carry as 
many ‘times’ with us as we are clocks.”
“We are the contraction of all those times and that is what we strike you with.”
Let me try again. 
The clocks pointed to many times: the time before Felix Gonzalez-Torres’ death; to the time of his 
boyfriend Ross’s death; to the time operating within the community to which each clock had been 
dispersed; and the time of the different living rooms or studios in which they had been hanging for 
1  Angerer, Bösel, and Ott, Timing of Affect.
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the previous 15 years. It was a contraction of all those different space-times I was struck by, even if I 
had no clue or no direct experience of that time and those spaces. That time did not belong to me – it 
pre-exists me. But at the same time, I had the sensation that the clocks anticipated the time I was in 
(my time). The time I was standing in and looking at them from, as if the now was in the future: Was 
my present space-time precisely that time that their title optimistic clocks was alluding to? A point in 
the future when time would differ from the past (their present)?.
Lauren Berlant’s notion of “cruel optimism” is useful in describing the incoherent sentiments the 
clocks produced in me: They alluded to a promise of pointing to a different relationality to time, but 
this was a fracturing experience. The clocks almost seem to substantiate Berlant’s concept, only fifteen 
years earlier. Berlant writes:
All attachments are optimistic. When we talk about an object of desire, we are really talking about a cluster 
of promises we want someone or something to make to us and make possible for us. This cluster of promises 
could seem embedded in a person, a thing, an institution, a text, a norm, a bunch of cells, smells, a good 
idea – whatever. To phrase ‘the object of desire’ as a cluster of promises is to allow us to encounter what’s 
incoherent or enigmatic in our attachments, not as confirmation of our irrationality but as an explanation of 
our sense of our endurance in the object, insofar as proximity to the object means proximity to the cluster of 
things that the object promises, some of which may be clear to us and good for us while others, not so much. 
Thus attachments do not all feel optimistic: one might dread, for example, returning to a scene of hunger, or 
longing, or the slapstick reiteration of a lover’s or parent’s predictable distortions. But being drawn to return 
to the scene where the object hovers in its potentialities is the operation of optimism as an affective form. In 
optimism, the subject leans toward promises contained within the present moment of the encounter with 
her object.2
What makes the objects of attachment so cruel in cruel optimism is precisely that the object in its 
very presence threatens the subject’s wellbeing – while at the same time it is precisely through this 
attachment that the subject draws sustenance, “to keep on living on and to look forward to being in the 
world.”3 The clocks contain this double inquiry in their very objecthood. They point to a time which 
will eventually lead to the dissolution of the subject while at the same time this is also the time that will 
make the subject keep on living.
Berlant’s concept of cruel optimism allows us to consider the way in which the FGT clocks open 
up to a temporality that differs from that of melancholia. In melancholia the subject temporises 
“an experience of the loss of an object/scene with which she has invested her ego continuity.” Cruel 
optimism, on the other hand, involves “maintaining an attachment to a significantly problematic 
object”4. 
Cruel optimism also provides a useful method/sensibility suitable for this essay, in that it allows me 
to engage in an affective analysis. Throughout this essay I turn and return to the scene in the Signal 
Gallery where the clocks hover in their potentialities. I lean over and feel that their very objecthood 
in being clocks can tell me something about affect’s time, by disentangling the complex layers of 
temporality inherent in the reassemblage and “which provides a way to think about the strange 
temporalities of projection into an enabling object that is also disabling.”5
I have tried to map out a composite sketch of some of the temporalities at stake in the reassamblage, 
which I would like to discuss here:
2  Berlant, Cruel Optimism, 23–24 my underlining.
3  Ibid.
4  Ibid.
5  Ibid.
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 (Normative time () Modern Time)
“Hey you, again!” 
“The time you took to get here belongs to me.”
“They say I believe in progress and growing prosperity.” 
“Everything is possible and those who look at me strive to be like me.”  
“Modern!”
“I am a refreshing alternative to conventional clocks.”
“I occupy an imagined place at the end of a sequence.”
“I take on a coordinated, carefully syncopated tempo 
between a quick ‘I’ that you feel is enforced and a slow ‘I’ 
that you think is your own free choice.”
“Leisure ‘I.’”
“When in fact both ‘I’s belongs to the one and same me.”
Free-writing after Freeman
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My initial encounter with the clocks was orchestrated by the sequential routine of everyday life. I 
and a group of friends and colleagues met at Copenhagen central station – “under The Clock” – and 
took the train to Malmö to attend your defence. Willingly, we subjected ourselves to the normative 
time of Scandinavia with its punctuality and perfect timing. I guess I was not the only one on that train 
that morning who paid little attention to how the train, and the collective welfare-state-time we were 
enmeshed in, seemed like a “somatic fact.”6  Our bodies were hooked to that comfortable motion of the 
train, which together with our schedules, calendars, time zones, etc. take part in what the sociologist 
Evitar Zerubavel calls “hidden rhythms,” which seemed natural to those “whom they privilege”7. 
Elizabeth Freeman, Fredric Jameson and various other thinkers have shown that the temporality 
of modernity was constructed (Alongside Time), between a (Linear Time) of progress, speed and 
acceleration and a (Cyclical Time) of restoration.8 Freeman shows how “living in two different time 
zones” of the restorative time of the household, on the one hand, and the quick time of the labour 
market on the other ensured that there was something with which to compare modern temporality:9 
The repetitions and routines of domestic life supposedly restored working men to their status as human 
beings responding to a ‘natural environment’, renewing their bodies for reentry into the time of mechanized 
production and collective national destiny.10 
Elizabeth Freeman describes how those hidden rhythms all add up to what she call chrono-
normativity as “the interlocking of temporal schemes necessary for genealogies of descent and for 
the mundane workings of domestic life”11 and this chrono-normativity is tightly connected with the 
construction of modernity. 
You write: 
The clocks are “symbolic period objects alluding to the paradox of progress.”12
At first glance the FGT clocks seem to point to temporality of modernity because: 
a) They are clocks: Clock time orchestrated modern life, rather than the rhythms of harvest,  
nature, seasons…;
b) The FGT clocks are not just any clocks whatever, but in their design they are symptomatic icons 
or “period objects” of Modernism.
But the FGT clocks seem to complicate this any neat definition of the temporality of modernity. 
Not only were they out of synch, it was as if their very assemblage, as they came together in that room, 
at that point in time, pointed to alternative strategies to the organization of time, breaking time apart – 
but doing so in their very function of embodying or encapsulating time. These double workings of the 
clocks pulled me in different directions and made me weirdly perplexed and self-conscious about “my 
own time” – the time I was inscribed in here and now, divided between the punctual Scandinavian 
time and my body located in the room with the clocks, with the feeling that there was more to time 
other than the clocks’ “face-value”. I will further illustrate this by zooming in on the Space Clock.
6  Freeman, Time Binds, 3.
7  In the essay-documentation of the video installation movement, I discuss how the advent of modernity was  
  closely syncopated with the industrial revolution and the invention of trains and other machines that enabled  
  movement between places and to establish an experience of a shared time.
8  Freeman, Time Binds; Jameson, “The End of Temporality.”
9  Freeman, Time Binds.
10  Ibid., 5.
11  Ibid., 22.
12  Ault and Rosen, TIME FRAMES.
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In his contribution to your publication Alternative Art, New York (1965-1985), Martin Beck shows 
how space became a buzzword in the 1960s with the space-race, peaking with the moon landing in 
1969. Space invaded society conceptually and became an object of study, informing the methodologies 
of, inter alia, architects, artists, filmmakers and sociologists: “Space was no longer an abstraction.”13 
In “The End of Temporality”, Fredric Jameson suggests that postmodernism marked a shift from 
modernism’s occupation with time to an occupation with space14. Since my encounter with the FGT 
13  Beck, “Alternative: Space” citing the MOMA exhibition catalogue Spaces 1969.
14  Jameson, “The End of Temporality.”
“Who?” [the clocks look at each other]
“Yeah, you: the Space Clock”. 
“You mean me?” 
[the little clock made up of round balls comes to the fore]
“Yeah, that is right – you, the ‘balled’ one.”
[Fake laughter]
“If you look me up in Vitra’s design catalogue you would know that my real 
name is ‘the Ball Clock’ but people here call me ‘Space Clock’.”
(Space Time)
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clocks I feel – contrary to Jameson’s announcement of the end of time – that Time is back in, with a 
proliferation of journals, publications, art works and exhibitions on the subject15. What is interesting 
with the “Space Clock” is that it in some ways encapsulates or exposes this very transition from “time” 
to “space” and points to the very problems one encounters when trying to separate the two: The “Space 
Clock” as a period object marks a point in time at which society geared itself towards space, the 
conquering of space, but it doesn’t seem to take itself seriously, or it does so in an almost Camp, over-
the-top way. Its planetary design embodies that time, but at the same time it disarms that time, with a 
twinkle in the eye.
15  See also Freeman, Time Binds., Love, Feeling Backward. Grosz, Time Travels Feminism, Nature, Power. Danbolt, 
  Touching History. Groom, Time.Lorenz, Not Now! Now! Chronopolitics, Art & Research. 
“Who me, yes me
I always already
know what you know 
I burrow backward and forward
I ward off contingency”1
1  Free-writing after Sedgwick, Touching Feeling.
(Paranoid Time)
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In her development of the concept of the reparative practice, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick notes that the 
reparative critical practice has a complex relationship to time, but she only hints at what this complex 
relationship to time could entail. Instead she spends an awful lot of time describing and enacting 
the very paranoid temporality she sets out to critique. But how can Sedgwick’s strong attachment to 
paranoid temporality help envisage the reparative practice’s relationship time?
Sedgwick traces the paranoid hermeneutics and temporality back to (among other sources) the 
1960s and the space-race. Paranoid strategies became inscribed in the mind-set of whole generations 
growing up during the Cold War, even in the mind-sets of those who protested this very ideological 
and military build-up (Sedgwick included). The “Space Clock” seems to point to this particular point 
in time when paranoid hermeneutics were turned into a somatic fact, as Sedgwick describes:
[U]nidirectionally future-oriented vigilance of paranoia generates paradoxically, a complex relation to 
temporality that burrows both backward and forward: because there must be no bad surprises, and because 
learning of the possibility of a bad surprise would itself constitute a bad surprise, paranoia requires that 
bad news be always already known. (…) No time could be too early for one’s having-already-known, for 
its having-already-been-inevitable, that something bad would happen. And no loss could be too far in the 
future to need to be preemptively discounted.16 
As I read this quote faced with your reinstallation of FGT clocks I feel goosebumps on my arms. The 
assemblage of clocks seems, on the one hand, to embrace this “having-already-known”, but rather than 
trying to safeguard against this loss, (or possible near-future loss), or lingering in the loss (melancholia), 
they lend themselves, in their very property of being clocks, to opening up to time – to more time. The 
reparative critical practice, as Sedgwick notes, draws sustenance from culture’s throwaway objects 
to continue living, even though this is a culture whose avowed desire has not always been to sustain 
the subject. With regard to the FGT clocks, it is almost as if Time itself, is turned into that object, or 
has been given object-character, enabling the subject to draw sustenance from time, even a time that 
will inevitable lead to the subject’s dissolution: the loss of lovers, friends and a whole community and 
generation of people to AIDS, but also the loss which is eventually the loss of oneself – the artist who 
collected them. 
(Bad Time) 
In 1980, if someone has prophesied
this rack of temporalities could come to us,
their ‘knowledge’ would have seemed pure hate;
it would have seemed so, and have been so.
It still is so.
 Yet every morning 
We have to gape the jaws of our unbelief 
Or belief, to knowing it.17
Hanging on the wall in front of me, the clocks almost seem to precipitate or illustrate Sedgwick’s 
poem and the rack of temporalities with the multiple meanings entailed by the term “rack”: (stand/
hanger) (frame) (torment/plague). Historically, a rack was an instrument of torture, upon which the 
victim was stretched out on a frame between turning rollers to which wrists and ankles were tied. If 
we know, as we do that the FGT clocks and Sedgwick’s poem are two different ways of responding to 
16  Ibid., 130–131.
17  Sedgwick, Fat Art, Thin Art, 11.
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the rack of temporalities that the AIDS crisis of the 1980s and 90s brought into being (and continues 
to do today but in different territories and time zones), the time itself has turned bad, pure hate. Every 
morning, affect’s time or time strikes us like an act of violence, every minute, again and again: There 
is no escape from time. For paranoid hermeneutics time is always already bad, since bad-surprises are 
what the paranoid seeks to eliminate, and since the progression of time can only lead to unforeseen 
events. But the FGT clocks open up this bad time, to envisage other possible temporalities. To expand 
on this theme, I will construct a conceptual rack between Freeman (Queer time/Bad Time) and Ngai 
(Bad Time) and Sedgwick (Queer moment – reparative time):
  (Queer time) 
  I is   asynchrony
  anachronism 
  anastrophe
  belatedness 
 compression 
  delay 
  ellipsis
  flashback 
  hysteron-proteron 
  pause 
prolepsis 
repetition
reversal18
In Elizabeth Freeman’s reading of Queer time, the concept of queer time is closely related to and 
developed concomitantly with the temporality of modernity: Modernity “offers queer possibilities 
despite itself ”19. Queer time is regarded as an intimate and affective “reterritorialisation” of normative 
time. Queer time takes on many forms which make themselves “visible in the forms of interruption” 
and “points of resistance to this temporal order that, in turn, propose other possibilities for living in 
relation to indeterminately past, present, and future others: that is, of living historically.”20
While queer time fissures and breaks apart homogenous, normative time, Freeman shows with her 
concept of “bad timing” that it is not easy always to live up to a time, which is atemporal, cutting edge 
and polygamous. Bad timing comes to signify something or someone, who has been proletarianised 
or who cannot catch up with the etiquette of time. Here Freeman employs a queer understanding 
of class, which unlike the Marxists’ traditional concern with wage and labour power, is deployed as 
that which “enables its bearers what looks like ‘natural’ control over their body and its effects, or the 
diachronic means of sexual and social reproduction. In turn, failures or refusals to inhabit middle- 
18  Free-writing after Freeman, Time Binds.
19  Ibid., 12.
20  Ibid., 22.
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and upper-middle-class ‘habitus’ appear as, precisely, asynchrony, or time out of joint.”21
Freeman’s reading of the British poet Robert Graves’ poem “It’s a Queer Time” from 1915 shows 
how the experience of a new queer temporality was fuelled by the experience of WWI. Here the 
homo-social milieu of the trench opened an alternative space for homoeroticism, a “leisurely”, slow, 
sacred time, cut-off from the heteronormative ways of living life “back home”. Wartime here, which is 
a bad time, is thus not unequivocally bad here, but opens up ambivalent feelings. Graves’ poem allows 
Freeman to open Queer Time up to consider and encompass non-privileged temporalities, inherent to 
the asynchronous experience of globalized time: the experience of so many subjects who are exposed 
to threat and violence – be these war, racial, sexual, environmentally or labour; but this BAD time 
might also open up to other orchestrations of ambivalent times and emotions22. 
Sianne Ngai deploys bad timing differently from Freeman. For Ngai, bad timing is intrinsically 
related to the paranoid temporality Sedgwick also describes, where the subject is “always already” 
linguistically and retroactively determined. Ngai notes how “always already” has become the sine qua 
non of the late twentieth-century critical theory.23 Or, as Nancy Hartsock has asked, “‘why is it just 
at the moment when so many of us who have been silenced begin to demand the right to name 
ourselves, to act as subjects rather than objects of history, that just then the concept of subjecthood 
becomes problematic?’” Likewise, Somer Brodribb notes the “strange timing” of the annulment of the 
subject by… white western wizards just about the same time as woman, black, queer and liberation 
movements a cross the world are claiming their voices.24
The AIDS crisis can be seen as a further instantiation of this “bad” or “strange timing”. Time itself 
has turned “bad”. Time is no longer able to keep up with modernity’s promise of progress and a fixed 
point at the end of sequence. The AIDS crisis hit at a “strange time”, when so many voices, which had 
been silenced for too long, started to claim a voice. The AIDS war was an efficient way of literally 
silencing those voices, putting an end to the lifestyle and values of free, experimental sex, by inducing 
fear and stigmatisation.  
But faced with the FGT clocks, there is something about this bad timing that the clocks points to 
which works counter intuitively to Freeman and Ngai’s “bad-timing”. The clocks are out of sync, they 
have stopped overnight, pointing to a bad-timing in that they are unable to keep up with their own 
queer time, but they seem so perfectly, almost provocatively, at peace with their own “bad-timing”. 
And this is when they induce a rather uncomfortable feeling, which is simultaneously soothing: They 
do not catch up… 
The clocks come to inhabit a certain queer/reparative contingency to time that “knows”, but rather 
than closing off to a future and to Time, which will inevitably lead to their dissolution, they extend 
into that future – to more time:
To recognize in paranoia a distinctively rigid relation to temporality, at once anticipatory and retroactive, 
averse above all to surprise, is also to glimpse the lineaments of other possibilities (…) to read from a 
reparative position is to surrender the knowing, anxious paranoid determination that no horror, however 
apparently unthinkable, shall ever come to the reader as new; to a reparatively positioned reader, it can seem 
realistic and necessary to experience surprise. Because there can be terrible surprises, however, there can 
also be good ones. Hope, often a fracturing, even a traumatic thing to experience is among the energies by 
which the reparatively positioned reader tries to organize the fragments and part-objects she encounters or 
creates. Because the reader has room to realize that the future may be different from the present, it is also 
21  Ibid., 19. Freeman’s concept of “bad timing” – that is, time which appears untimely, clunky, out of joint – 
  resonates with Hito Steyerl’s notion of the “poor image”, as the contemporary wretched of the screen Steyerl, 
  “In Defense of the Poor Image | E-Flux.” I return to discuss this in “Rematerialisation”
22  I return the notebook layout in the conclusion of this chapter.
23  Ngai, Ugly Feelings, 314.
24  Ibid., 311.
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possible for her to entertain such profoundly painful, profoundly relieving ethically crucial possibilities as 
that the past, in turn, could have happened different from the way it actually did.25 
The clocks stretch and create a transversal relationship over time that enabled me to glimpse, 
even if only for a second, the lineaments of other possibilities and of a collectivity – even though it 
was a moment and a collectivity, which inhabited different space-times than those of my own. As 
the title of your text – Time Frames – suggests the temporal rack not only is tormenting but they 
also become a temporal rack firstly in the sense of (hangers/frames) where each (frame) points to 
alternative orchestrations of time, and secondly in their ability in creating overlapping time frames: 
(__(_)__(_)__(_)__)
Each frame sets in train an imaginary movie, which – rather than inhabiting the paranoid temporality 
of “always already” – opens up to what Ngai, quoting Diana Ward’s poem imaginary movie, calls 
“meanwhile and & at the same time”26. The stanza “meanwhile and & at the same time” repeats four 
or five different ways of expressing the same “and” conjunction. It thus creates a saturation of times, 
enabling four or five different, distinct temporalities to inhabit the same stanza and the same page. 
In my encounter with the FGT clocks, the assemblage allowed for a dozen or more heterogeneous 
temporalities to exist at the same time, and in the same gallery space. This was not necessarily a glitch 
in normative time, a missing second, a fissure, a rupture or a hole, but rather a saturation of times, 
the tethering conjunction of many heterogeneous and conflicting times in the very same space-time. 
(Queer Moment)
Sedgwick’s notion of queer moment seems to describe precisely this over-saturation of time in one 
single moment. Giving an account of her own personal sensation of marching in the movement and 
moment of the gay-pride parade in New York City, Sedgwick notes, “It was a Queer time”. But then 
she says, “this must be called the moment of Queer”. And then she adds in a parenthesis to that “queer 
moment” she had just named:  
(Though it’s other moments, too. Right Now: the moment just before the inauguration of an ostentatiously 
heterosexual president who makes an audible, persistent claim to support lesbian and gay rights. Long moment 
of a deathly silence that means the AIDS drugs we’ve been struggling to hold on for are just not in the pipeline. 
When Melvin Dixon and Tom Yingling disappear from us, and Audre Lorde. When for the first time, the New 
York pride march has massive participation by African Americans and Latinos. When people organize around 
claiming the label bisexual; or the right to be lesbian and gay soldiers; or the right to have their children not 
protected against HIV-transmission.)27
One () parenthesis comes to encapsulate or enfold a number of heterogeneous events and 
temporalities in the very same Queer moment. As if this very moment is a continuous compression 
and unfolding of various heterogeneous moments and movements in the very same mo(ve)ment. And 
yet, it has a fleeting character which resists permanence; the very moment of its instantiation might 
just as well exceed it: “if it is here today, [it] will for that very reason be gone tomorrow.”28 
Queer is a continuing moment, movement, motive – recurrent, eddying, troublant. The word “queer” 
itself means across. Sedgwick lines up the whole etymological genealogy of the word from Indo-
European “twerkw”, which yields the German “qeur” (traverse) and the Latin “torquere” (to twist) … 
the queer moment comes to establish a transversal relationship between different temporalities across 
25  Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 146.
26  Ngai, Ugly Feelings; Ward, Imaginary Movie.
27  Sedgwick, Tendencies, xii.
28  Ibid.
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time. 
The FGT clocks enabled me to glimpse this movement, even if only for a split second and even 
if I was not standing in the middle of this moment. The clocks carried these multiple events from 
the 1990s with them in their very (frame) or (rack) of being clocks and opened up to a plurality of 
times which pre-exist me, but which I nonetheless became connected with. The FGT clocks point to a 
possibility of visualising time spatially and realising another conception and unfolding of temporality 
than the sequential one – a queer moment that is at once infinite and virtual but also forceful, resilient, 
and undeniable – what Sedgwick calls an immemorial current and a continuing moment.29 
(AFFECT’S TIME () Facing Time)
“We are about facing time.”
“We are the reflecting, immobile unity and the intensive expressive hands.” 
“We are the tiniest circuit – and the intensive expressive movements of hands.”
“pointing in different directions.”  
I notice now that it is not the clock speaking to me as a unity but all the different components of the 
clockwork: its tiny hands, its reflective plate.
One interpretation of Felix collecting ‘optimistic clocks’ the last couple of years of his life is that he was 
buying time. But I never liked that explanation, in part because it doesn’t reconcile with Felix as I knew him. 
Perhaps the clocks were not amulets so much as they were beautiful, tough objects that fed his process of 
working through the complex relationships to time, which the conditions he was living in, and with, brought 
forward. Perhaps the clocks were about facing time. Diagramming a situation of no escape. You can’t ignore 
time when you have a dozen clocks on the wall.30 
It is this combination of a reflecting, immobile unity and of intensive expressive movements which 
constitutes the affect. But is this not the same as a Face itself? The face is this organ-carrying plate of nerves 
which has sacrificed most of its global mobility and which gathers or expresses in a free way all kinds of tiny 
local movements which the rest of the body usually keeps hidden. Each time we discover these two poles in 
something – reflecting and intensive micro-movement – we can say that this thing has been treated as a face 
[visage]: it has been ‘envisaged’ or rather ‘faceified’ [visagéifiée], and in turn it stares at us [devisage], it looks 
at us… even if it does not resemble a face. Hence the close-up of the clock.31
Standing in front of the clocks in the gallery was like being faced with an uncanny group of people 
- faced with faces. The clocks become “faceified”: the clocks were given faces – they become animated, 
in the way that Berlant says “optimistic objects” have an “animating potency”.32
In my earlier chapter, “Affect Image Touch,”33 I explored how the close-up of the face in cinema, 
according to Deleuze, rips itself from its spatio-temporal coordinates and the movement of which it 
should form part, and is raised to a state of entity. Rather nonchalantly, Deleuze compares the close-up 
of the face’s properties, as a reflecting immobile unity and its intensive expressive movement, to those 
of a clock. But here the clock is not solely a metaphor for this faciality; the FGT clocks become this 
faciality in their very design and layout: each of the clocks’ mechanisms is similar, but their reflective 
plates and hands are distinct. Each one has different colours, tones, forms and features. Facing the 
clocks is like being facing a divers group of people whose faces all share the common feature of their 
29  Ibid.
30  Ault and Rosen, TIME FRAMES.
31  Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 88.
32  Berlant, Cruel Optimism, 25.
33  Dirckinck-Holmfeld, “Affect Image Touch Image.”
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being faces: communicating, socialising and so forth, whilse, at the same time, as a heterogeneous 
group, bearing different features, hues, tics, tones and affects.
The clocks are not only about our facing time; they stare back at us [devisage], they look at us…   
Unlike the affection-image, or the close-up in film, which is raised into a state of entity only later 
to re-join the movement of the film, the FGT clocks do not catch up with a normative time, but 
keep hanging in this queer continuing moment. They keep, so to speak, the queer moment alive 
and live, even after they have stopped ticking. This moment or movement is not sequential as in the 
case of analogue film. Each one of the clocks carries its own duration and temporality with it. As an 
assemblage all those multiple time frames superimpose or project their different temporalities into the 
room at the same time, as if we are watching 12 different film spools simultaneously. The sensation of 
being faced with the clocks opens up the possibility of inhabiting all those different temporalities at 
the same time and in the same space. It creates a possibility of a relationality or a web of interconnected 
times that precedes me. This relationality did not just happen spatially “between bodies” – between 
the clocks hanging in the gallery and my own body standing in the space – but it occurred temporally, 
through time itself, in their very machinic qualities qua clocks. 
To further construct a concept of affect’s time, I will now move on to discuss how this happened 
on multiple levels in the installation of the FGT clocks: I will start by zooming in on the tiniest circuit 
the crystal of time. I will then zoom out to see how the clocks made possible the cohabitation of 
multiple time frames at the same time and through contingency. I will eventually proceed to discuss 
how this opens up to a new form of generation community even if this is a virtual one radically cut of 
or unavailable to the present, and finally in (re)assemblage becoming artefact, I will discuss how the 
clocks hovers in a constant process of becoming.
(Crystals of time)
 (Contingency () Compossible)
(Generation () Community)
     (re)assemblage () becoming artefact) 
(Crystals of time)
What constitutes the crystal-image is the most fundamental operation of time: since the past is constituted 
not after the present that it was but at the same time, time has to split itself in two at each moment as 
present and past. Which differ from each other in nature, or, what amounts to the same thing, it has to 
split the present in two heterogeneous directions, one of which is launched towards the future while the 
other falls into the past. Time has to split at the same time as it sets itself out or unrolls itself: it splits in two 
dissymmetrical jets, one of which makes all the present pass on, which the other preserves all the past. Time 
consists of this split, and it is this, it is time, that we see in the crystal.34 
What Deleuze calls the “chrono-sign” or the “time image” occurs when we are able to see in the 
image the fundamental operation of time itself. Past, present and future do not exist in different, 
separate instants or [time frames] organized neatly on a linear sequence, time splits itself in different 
directions; past and present. Time itself becomes non-chronological, so that past and present exist 
“meanwhile and & at the same time”. The crystal is an inscription of this infinite splitting of time.
The time image “breaks the sensory motor links, overwhelms relations and no longer lets itself be 
34  Deleuze, Cinema 2, 78–79.
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expressed in terms of movement, but opens directly on to time”35. The time image breaks with the 
chrono-normativity or normative time and  “opens directly on to time” a queer-time, so to speak or 
heterogeneity of times, existing at the same time. But the time image does so through its own medium, it 
is still film. Cinema, as many have pointed out, was developed concomitantly with the industrialisation 
and modernity, but it also becomes that very medium which shore time from that time and opens up 
directly to time. The “time image” enables two or more images, or two or more times, to exist at the 
same time in the very same space – a GIF36 – that flickers in an undecidability between two distinct but 
35  Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 21.
36  GIF: Graphics Interchange Format is a bitmap image format in which the image constantly shifts between two or 
more frames composed of 256 pixels or more.
(Crystal of Time)
“Come closer” (A tiny crystalline voice giggles)
[I am now standing face to face with the clock]
“No, closer!”
“Yeah that’s right – too close for comfort!” 
“I’m so tiny that you can’t even see me!”
[I notice now that it is not the clock speaking, but the vibrations of 
a tiny quartz crystal, which maintains and regulates the accuracy 
of the current.]
“I am the clock’s high-quality quartz movements 
a crystal…”
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unstable images, which do not settle on one or the other but keeps reconstituting itself.
What we see in the crystal is therefore a dividing in two that the crystal itself constantly causes to turn on 
itself, that it prevents from reaching completion, because it is a perpetual self-distinguishing, a distinction in 
the process of being produced; which always resumes the distinct terms in itself, in order to relaunch them.37
Time is not something outside of the subject that we live in, but interior to subjectivity. The 
production of subjectivity thus becomes a constant folding of the two in the one:
The only subjectivity is time, non-chronological time grasped in its foundation, and it is we who are internal 
to time, not the other way around. That we are in time looks like a commonplace, yet it is the highest 
paradox. Time is not the interior in us, but just the opposite, the interiority in which we are, in which we 
move, live and change.38
That time is not interior to us, nor exterior to us but the interiority in which we are: What does 
that mean?  We are in an interiority – we are not slaves to a time exterior to us, but time itself is both 
interior to us while at the same time we are interior to that interiority… Maybe looking at what is 
already at stake in the clocks, can help to open up this rather complicated passage.:
“Hi, hi, can’t you see it, you moron?”
[The little quartz crystal comes back in, with her rusty, lungless, crystalline voice] 
“I am both inside the clock while I make up the inside of the clock!” 
“I am internal to time but time is internal to me” 
“I regulate the current while the current is what makes up me…”
“Stop speaking to me as if this is a riddle!” I furiously reply – 
“Oops, is somebody is having a bad time? Hi, hi…” 
That time is the interiority in which we are in seems to complicate the understandings of “queer 
time”, “normative time” and “temporality of modernity as rehearsed earlier. They all seem to indicate 
that time is something exterior to us; something we are hooked up with or syncopated with, even when 
it has broken away from normative time. If the production of subjectivity takes place in a constant 
folding of time, then this time is not just an exterior normative time, which we are subjected to. 
Subjectivity is never ours, never complete but in a constant process of becoming – we are so to speak 
our own reparative time or affect’s time:
Subjectivity is never ours, it is time, that is, the soul or the spirit, the virtual. The actual is always objective, 
but the virtual is subjective: it was initially the affect, that which we experience in time; then time itself, 
pure virtuality which divides itself in two as affector and affected, ‘the affection of self by self’ as definition 
of time.39
From this can we say that affect’s time is affect that rips time from the movement of which it should 
form part and opens up directly to time? But in doing so, time in itself opens up to a process of 
auto-affection or autonomy of affect: Time is time, which divides in two as affector and affected, the 
affection of self by self. 
37  Ibid., 79.
38  Ibid., 80.
39  Ibid.
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Somewhere I wrote: “Contingency”, with big capital letters and exclamation marks! I remember 
you said something about contingency as a method. You described how the desire to bringing the 
clocks back together was a contingent practice or method. I would like to discuss this further by 
considering contingency an inherent methodological aspect but also a defining characterisitc of the 
reparative critical practice, as Sedgwick notes: 
For if, as I have shown, a paranoid reading practice is closely tied to a notion of the inevitable, there are other 
features of queer reading that can attune it exquisitely to a heartbeat of contingency.40 
40  Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 147.
(Contingency () Compossible)
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How can this heartbeat of contingency, or contingency as method/sensibility bring us closer to an 
understanding of the reparative’s complex relationship to temporality and to further envisage a notion 
of affect’s time. There is something about the FGT clocks that keeps them contingently open, in an 
almost provocative way, to good or bad surprises.
At first glance the heartbeat of contingency sounds like the pulse of the heart as an “organic” body-
as-organism, which would tie onto a “cyclical” and “organic” conception of time and affect. What 
I want to wager here is precisely that the heartbeat of contingency names an eclipse of the heart or 
that “missing half-second” that occurs between the initial registration of affect and the consciousness 
registration of that affect41. The timing of affect is often described and measured by electrical impulses 
in the brain due to neuroscience’s interest in the study of affect, but why not consider whether it is 
equally possible to detect in the heart? 
In the interval between the two beats, the heartbeat of contingency opens up to a possibility of 
letting two beats exist in the same frame. 
In his reading of Leibniz’s paradox of “contingent futures”, Deleuze describes the difficulty of 
conceiving a direct relation between truth and the form of time, and obliges us to keep the true away 
from the existent, in the eternal or in what imitates the eternal.42 Using Aristotle’s example of the 
naval battle, which may or may not take place tomorrow, Deleuze describes how an near-future event 
complicates the matter of truth, because whether or not it takes place does not make one or the other 
more truthful, but allows for the possibility that two truths are possible: 
Leibniz says that the naval battle may or may not take place, but that this is not the same world: it takes 
place in one world and does not take place in a different world, and these two worlds are possible but are not 
‘compossible’ with each other. He [Leibniz] is thus obliged to forge the wonderful notion of incompossiblity 
(very different from contradiction) in order to resolve the paradox while saving truth: according to him, 
it is not the impossible, but only the incompossible that proceeds from the possible; and the past may be 
true without being necessarily true. But the crisis of truth enjoys a pause rather than a solution. For nothing 
prevents us from affirming that incompossibles belong to the same world, that incompossible worlds belong 
to the same universe.43 
Since nothing prevents us from affirming that incompossibles belong to the same world, wouldn’t 
then attuning oneself to the heartbeat of contingency then precisely entail being open to or inhabiting 
two – or more – possible futures at the same time?
In another of Gonzalez-Torres’ clock pieces, “Untitled” (Perfect Lovers)44, two clocks, perfectly 
synchronised, hang side-by-side in the same space. I read about the piece stating that the clocks are 
perfectly synched but one cannot but overcome the other: one will stop and the other go on – testifying 
to the painful task of having to survive our loved ones. But in light of Deleuze’s reading of Leibniz 
“Untitled” (Perfect Lovers) precisely comes to envisage the possibility of the “incompossible” and even 
affirm the possibility that two incompossible worlds belong to the same world. The two clocks point to 
two co-existing times, one of which might turn out in such and such a way and the other that might 
turn out differently, but both are possible, and they are perfectly capable of existing at the same time, 
in the same space-time. 
Deleuze shows how the genealogy of the concept of the compossible from Leibniz through 
Nietzsche to Foucault often is understood primarily as a discursive possibility – for instance a speech 
41  Angerer, Bösel, and Ott, Timing of Affect.
42  Deleuze, Cinema 2, 126.
43  Ibid., 127.
44  González-Torres, “Untitled” (Perfect Lovers).
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act and also, in Deleuze’s own reading of films, where it takes place at the level of the narrative plot45. 
Your contingent method of reassembling the clocks opens up to a possibility of materialising the 
compossible futures in and through the clocks. Faced with the FGT clocks, I was gripped by the 
possibility of envisaging the coexistence of different times, but this time multiplied by the dozens. 
Even though the clocks were already out of sync (over night), they point to a possibility of twelve 
different times inhabiting the same space-time. They make it possible that the future might turn out 
differently than the past and the past in turn could have turned out differently than it actually did. 
(Generation () Community) 
They’re really beautiful and compelling, but there’s some sadness about the whole thing, not only about 
Felix’s death, but that the community is so different. They represent a specific community as well as a larger 
context made up of overlapping communities that Felix’s work emerged from that not only changed but 
eventually disappeared. Addressing the inevitability of dissolution is one of the reasons I wanted to organize 
this reunion.46 
Hanging in the exhibition space, the clocks look like a family. A family, which does not follow the 
normative generational narrative (childhood, youth, adult, elderly) but a community, which shares 
all those very contingent generations, at the same time… I felt that I was staring at a community, 
which I could not fully grasp and of which I was not part of. Each clock carried with it the context 
of the community-member to which it had been dispersed and the living room or other location 
where it had been hanging for the past fifteen years. As a totality or assemblage the clocks created an 
overlapping, transient cartography of an entire context. 
In “Historical Inquiry as Subject and Object” you ponder over a “set of vexing questions which 
fuelled” your work in instituting the archive of Group Material: “How do artefacts – whether material 
or informal – communicate? Can contexts be in effect communicated?...”47
These questions are central to what I want to discuss here. I have earlier explored how the reparative 
practice is somehow context-specific and operates within a community over time48. The encounter 
with the FGT clocks produced in me a sensation of being affected and touched across time and across 
contexts. 
Deleuze describes “involuntary memory”, as “capable of internalizing the context”, and “making 
the past context inseparable from the present sensation”49. Deleuze’s example stems from the popular 
passage in Marcel Proust’s In Search for Lost Time, in which the narrator dips a madeleine cake in 
linden tea and the taste carries with it the memory of a past sensation and unfolds the entire context 
of the narrator’s childhood. The past sensation thus becomes inseparable from the present sensation, 
but in this example it is still the same person who undergoes the experience and to whom the past 
and present sensation belongs. My encounter with the clocks produced a sensation from the past and 
unfolded its entire context, but neither the sensation nor the context belonged to me. What welled 
up in the present was not my own childhood and youth, but a the context and memory belonging to 
others: The sensation unfolded a context of the life lived in living rooms, apartments and elsewhere 
where the clocks had been hanging for the past 15 years, but also the community around Gonzalez-
Torres at the time before his death, the art scene and the activist movement of the 1980s and 90s New 
45  I.e. Resnais, Last Year at Marienbad.
46  Ault and Rosen, TIME FRAMES.
47  Ault, Remembering and Forgetting in the Archive, 266.
48  Dirckinck-Holmfeld, “‘We Shall Overcome’: Notes for a Reparative Critical Practice.”
49  Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 58.
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York, all events of which I had no direct experience off. As if the clocks were pinhole cameras, set with 
two decades of exposure time, now transporting all the movement and a movement in that very single 
moment. The circuits – overlapping and leaping into each other – borrow from each other and creates 
an uncanny shared “memory of world”50. 
David Deitcher’s article “How do you Memorialize a movement that isn’t dead” explains this 
sensation of being connected to a time and movement which pre-exists oneself, in relation to another 
of Gonzalez-Torres’ works: The billboard and “date-line” over the Sheridan Square. A black rectangle 
with a white dateline runs in two lines on the lower field of the billboard. Deitcher writes: 
If Gonzalez-Torres’s billboard leaves me feeling more wistful and sad than I – or anyone else – might like, 
this is undoubtedly due to the circumstances in which we are forced to commemorate this anniversary: in 
grief and fear and barely containable rage. If ambivalence marks my encounter with this work, surely it has 
something to do with the tug of nostalgia about the billboard the artist has rented; for it too has a history. 
Gonzalez-Torres has said that he understands the black expanse above the text to be a space for imaginary 
projection. And while looking at it, there have been times when I’ve found myself recalling film footage, 
always black-and-white: of rage in San Francisco the night that justice was mocked by the success of Dan 
White’s ‘Twikie’ defense, or of bonfires burning on Christopher Street two decades ago. But I also flash 
back to this billboard in more innocent, happier, more colorful times, when, for example, in powder blue, it 
exhorted men to COME to a veritable homoerotic indoor theme park named Man’s Country, which I never 
visited but can easily imagine. And while all of this proves the success of this strangely private and public 
work of art, it also testifies to the fecundity of its site and to the persistence of eros in a time that will surely be 
remembered for tens of thousands of tragic and untimely deaths that occurred while so many other people 
– deep in denial – just drove on by.51
With little effort, but painful but soothing consequences the billboard burrows backwards to 
different times which the onlooker did not necessarily form part of, but the billboard contracts all those 
times and projects them onto the black screen (projection on black in itself is quite amazing). Deitcher 
describes how these words sets off a cinematograph inside of him which projects black-and-white 
footage from the Stonewall riots, and the riots in San Francisco. The captions set in motion historical 
events, from the passers-by’s own filmic memory; even from events, which to my knowledge were 
not captured or documented on film (Oscar Wilde’s trial). Thus, the dateline creates an interpersonal, 
shared, memory without deciding in advance for the spectator what those images or affects should 
be about. It is also fascinating to note how this black-and-white footage leaps into colour – by also 
recalling the billboard advertisement for the homoerotic indoor theme park “Man’s Country” which, 
in powder blue, exhorted men to COME.
Precisely for the same reasons the clocks caused a series of ambivalent and conflicting emotions 
to well up in me simultaneously… Rather than sealing off or pre-inscribing the affect or feeling with 
which I should be gripped, the clocks project an incongruent image emotion in motion. In that sense 
the clocks come to inhabit this dual role of projector and projected; early film cameras could both film 
and project, and as we have seen affect’s time is both affector and affected. The clocks both project 
time while at the same time I project my own (involuntary) memory onto them, but an involuntary 
memory, which pre-exists me.
50  Here I am deliberately misreading Deleuze’s “Movement of World”: which I first read as “memory of world”, 
  and which I thought could express this experience (for which I have no other words or concepts for). 
  What might be more adequate is affect as a “pre-personal”, “transversality” or “spirit” in animist societies. 
51  Deitcher, “How Do You Memorialize a Movement That Isn’t Dead?”
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Clocklusion: (Re)assemblage) (Becoming Artefact) 
You write: 
“At that moment his things were somewhere between life and becoming artefact”1
“Hey You!”
“Who me? (I look around in the stationary shop to 
find that I am the only one in there)
“Yeah you the blonde one!”
“We are a pile of notebooks who have hidden 
ourselves at the back of this shelf.”
“We are objects from the past making ourselves 
present for you in the present to say something 
about the future.”
“The future that our design anticipated but was 
obstructed due to unforeseen events.”
I have styled the essay using the OPP 
notebook, which I carried with me to your PhD 
defence. I suppose it was a coincidence that I 
brought precisely this notebook with me that day 
– but like the FGT clocks, which are not “just 
a machine that marks time”1 the OPP notebook 
is not just any notebook whatever, but a certain 
tough object of dense, layered temporalities.  
OPP: Oriental Paper Products is a Lebanese 
paper company founded in 1885 and was one of 
the first plants in the Middle East to manufacture 
stationary. Together with Azza Hussein and 
various other participants we undertook the 
project “Dear Teacher…” in 2010 as part of 
Home Works V: a Forum on Cultural Practices 
organised by The Lebanese Association for 
Plastic Arts, Ashkal Alwan. Ashkal Alwan was 
launching the post-graduate program Home 
Works Space Program and for the occasion of 
the Forum we decided to research the already 
existing forms of art education in Beirut2. We 
invited teachers to invite one of their students 
on a field trip to the Nahr Ibrahim (the river 
from which the myth of Ashtaroute [Aphrodite] 
is said to originate). Each pair (teacher and 
student) was given a small backpack, containing 
the OPP notebooks and other tools, they had 
to use during the trip. While searching for 
1  Ault and Rosen, TIME FRAMES.
2  In Lebanon there are more than 32 universities 
  catering to a population of 4-5 million people 
  and the surrounding region. 
Felix Gonzalez-Torres did not collect the 
clocks as a work of art; they were never exhibited, 
but distributed to his friends and colleagues. The 
moment you re-assembled them for the occasion 
of the exhibition the clocks re-entered into this 
transaction from being life, to becoming artefact, 
to becoming artwork. In this state of becoming 
the clocks resist falling into normative categories 
of what constitutes the artefact “clock” and what 
constitutes a work of art. Felix Gonzalez-Torres’ 
clocks open up to multiple subjectivities between 
“thing”, “clock” “community”, “artefact” and 
“image”. Rather than settling on one or the other 
they remain in a state of becoming. It is in this 
undecidability that the clocks take on a certain 
agency of their own or auto-affection: “affection 
of self by self ”. As such the clocks remain true to 
their ontology as clocks – not any clocks whatever 
– but time itself. And, as we have seen time splits 
in different directions – one which makes the past 
pass on while the other preserves itself in itself. 
In this essay I have returned and turned 
around the scene of the Signal Gallery where your 
reassemblage of the clocks hovers, offering up the 
cruel optimism of affording me the possibility 
of envisaging the reparative critical practice’s 
complex relationship with time. The FGT clocks 
enabled me to construct a notion of Affect’s Time, 
which is not a withdrawal from time, or “a missing 
half-second” between an initial affect and the 
conscious registration of that affect – it is , rather, 
an addition, a saturation, an extension and a deep 
layering of multiple temporalities existing in the 
same unit of space-time. As such affect’s time 
shares the properties of time itself in that time is 
not the interior in us, “but the interiority in which 
we are, in which we move, live and change”. As 
such affect’s time is time which divides itself in 
two (or more) as affector and affected.
In “Performative Writing”, Della Pollock notes 
that performative writing and performative 
rhetoric names a new public, rather than speaking 
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notebooks in a Hamra stationary shop, a pile 
of old discarded notebooks at the back of the 
shelf caught my eyes. Their condition was poor 
– time had aged and deteriorated what maybe 
twenty years ago would have been a fresh-
smelling, flashy notebook. Now they were lying 
at the back of a shelf, half-forgotten, dusty, 
aged and mouldy, unable to keep up with the 
glossy texture of the younger notebooks lying 
next to them. It was as if their very materiality 
possessed a sort of cruel optimism as they were 
calling on me from their hideaway at the back 
of the shelf. For many of the teachers, who 
had grown up during the war, the notebooks 
reminded them of their own school years: ball-
penned automatic drawing, jotted down in class, 
became animated on the grid of the notebook’s 
cover, creating a flimsy object flickering 
between its present and past form, like an 
animated GIF.
By using the notebook as “plan”, ground or 
interface for an imaginary dialogue with you, 
the clocks and the notebook have somehow been 
ventriloquised in my own internal dialogue, 
with several non-present discussion partners 
including you, the clocks and the notebook. 
This “apostrophe” or free indirect discourse has 
allowed me to attend to the objects “orality”3, to 
a polyvocality and enable various heterogeneous 
elements and subject-objects to co-exist within 
the same page. And as such my object of 
study, in this case your reassemblage of Felix 
Gonzalez-Torres optimistic clocks, are not 
exterior to me, “but the interiority in which I is, 
in which I moves, lives and changes”.4
3  Moten, In the Break the Aesthetics of the Black 
  Radical Tradition.
4  I have deliberately changed the case to reflect 
  Rimbaud’s “J’est un autre” I is another.
“And then it will always remind you of the good times, the growing times or the times of growing, the 
important time, the urgent time, the beautiful time we had the luck of having together, by chance.”1 
These are the dozen or more times made possible by your reassemblage, which I am grateful to you 
for letting me experience even if it was only for a  
            second.
2  Ault and Rosen, TIME FRAMES. Citing 
 Gonzalez-Torres
to an already given or established audience, 
or speaking within the established discursive 
communities. This naming of a community to 
come takes place through an “evocative processes” 
which “projects new modes of being and relating 
through its forms, constituting the very norms by 
which it will be read.”1
The clocks in their very capacity as being 
objects – not any object whatever – but tough 
objects, names a new community across 
temporalities. This is not a discursive community, 
but a community made up of heterogeneous 
bodies including clocks, gallery space, living 
rooms, people (dead and alive), crystals, 
hands, reflective plates etc. And this becoming 
community across time and space, virtual and 
actual, allows us to transport the reparative critical 
practice to an object, artwork and an assemblage 
of heterogeneous practices and objects including 
discursive and non-discursive ones. 
1  Pollock, “Performing Writing, 95,
2
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Affect as Critical Inquiry
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s essay “Reparative Reading and Paranoid Reading, Or, You’re So Paranoid 
That You Probably Think This Essay Is About You”1 has drawn some attention by aligning critical 
theory with paranoia. A common denominator in the criticism of her call for the reparative reading or 
practice is that it understates critical theory’s impact and its importance in revealing power structures 
in society in favour of more affect-oriented and ameliorative practices. In what follows, I suggest that 
the reparative practice is not anti-critical, but critical in its courtship with or by enacting the very same 
paranoia it sets out to criticise. Sedgwick’s call for the reparative practice is not to advocate good affects 
vs. bad ones, but opens up to considerations of affect as the basis of critique. 
Before we begin, let us first return to the objection of my delusional, manic defensive audience, 
which point to: 
the reparative critical practice as an oxymoron.
I like to believe that this polite critique expresses not so much disagreement, but rather the feeling 
that I am imprecise. Maybe they believe that critical theory is always already reparative? Or maybe it 
is not me who is imprecise, but the call for the reparative, which seems to negate the fact that it is still 
no-less important to criticise, to reveal and expose systemic violence, capitalist exploitation, racism, 
homophobia and other forms of oppression? 
It took me some time to come to terms with the first objection because I simply did not understand 
the word oxymoron. I learn now that oxymoron means: “a figure of speech in which apparently 
contradictory terms appear in conjunction”2. Without trying to disarm my adversaries, I think 
theorising through juxtaposing or establishing conjunctions between contradictory terms (or objects) 
seems perfectly fit for what I am trying to develop with the reparative practice. The reparative critical 
practice precisely entails juxtaposing, assembling or montaging conflicting temporal-spatial objects 
and the concepts they give rise to. But then other members of the audience cut me short: 
The call for the reparative is always already part of the neoliberal 
project itself. The reparative is partial, weak, affect-driven, micro-
political, ameliorative, reformist and is thus unable to account for 
and undermine the abstract system - the totalising grand-narrative of 
capitalism, which we are up against. It is the false consciousness of 
the feminist, queer, post-colonial critic, who is eventually doing the 
system a favour by not using grand narratives to effectively de-rail the 
system and as such she has undermined the critical figure and critical 
theory in general.
In what follows, I will try to expand more fully on the relationship between the reparative practice 
and critical practice by working my way through the questions: How is the reparative critical practice 
critical? Is it criticism, critique or criticality? Or how can we consider affect as critical inquiry?
Sedgwick first presents the concept of the “reparative” in print in her introduction to Novel Gazing 
19973, and then in Touching Feeling in 20034, with latter being the one the concept is usually dated to. 
1  Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 123–151. First published in 1997 as introduction to Sedgwick, Novel Gazing.
2  OED “Oxymoron, N.”
3  Sedgwick, Novel Gazing.
4  Sedgwick, Touching Feeling.
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In so doing Sedgwick is not alone and various other scholars and thinkers from different disciplines, 
including Paul Ricoeur, Bruno Latour, Irit Rogoff, Gavin Butt and Sianne Ngai criticise criticism5. 
The paranoid tendencies within critical theory are partially ascribed to thinkers such as Karl Marx, 
Friedrich Nietzsche, and Sigmund Freud and their intellectual offspring such as New Historicist, 
deconstructivist and psychoanalytical criticism. To work my way through the way in which affect as 
critical inquiry can open to other forms of doing critique I am not going to engage in a track and trace 
genealogy of the critique of the critique, as Robyn Wiegman has suggested6. Instead, I want to pay 
more careful attention to the methodological level at which Sedgwick pitches the critique of criticism. 
If we address the question at a methodological level, then the call for the reparative critical practice it is 
not a question of abandoning the critical project in favour of a better affective and reparative practice7, 
but opens up to the possibility of considering the critical habit of paranoia as a mutable position, “a 
possibility among other possibilities”, rather than a “mandatory injunction”8. 
Turning towards the habitual modes of doing critique, rather than the making of critique per 
se, will assist me in mutating the reparative critical practice from being understood foremost as a 
hermeneutics, concerned with the reading of texts, to become an artistic practices and an image in 
itself. The initial triangle between Sedgwick, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, which I initiated in 
“Affect’s Materiality” morphs: Deleuze and Guattari are backgrounded and instead Michel Foucault 
in the guise of Judith Butler with her essay “What is Critique? An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue”9 and Irit 
Rogoff with her concept of Criticality10 enters the ménage à trois. Later, Guattari peeps back in. 11By 
inviting Butler into the threesome, I want to consider the ways in which the reparative critical practice 
is critical in order to reconcile the reparative practice with the work of Judith Butler, rather than 
reading the reparative practice as pitched against Butler12. I want to consider the way in which Butler’s 
work compels us to think of affect as “not just the basis but the very stuff of ideation and critique”13.
Sedgwick’s paranoid reparative enactment
The reparative position is not understood in opposition to or fundamentally different from the 
paranoid position, but as a continuation or mutation of some of the same methods. Sedgwick’s 
understanding of paranoia and the reparative is based on the work of the psychologist Melanie Klein. 
Here, paranoia is understood, not as a clinical condition in mental health, but as a mutable position. 
It is not people who are paranoid, but paranoia is a developmental phase the subject undergoes as 
one of many developmental positions, which can either lead to the more schizo-destructive impulses 
and/or creative-reparative impulses. The reparative, as a creative, enabling, depressive position, is not 
5  See Ricœur, Freud and Philosophy. Ngai’s paranoia which is usually dated to Ugly Feelings is actually 
  presenten already in 2001 Ngai, “Bad Timing (A Sequel). Paranoia, Feminism, and Poetry.” Butt, After Criticism.
6  Wiegman, “The Times We’re in.”
7  Clare Hemmings takes Sedgwick’s call for the reparative and different affective modes of doing critique as   
  “flattening out post-structualist inquiry” by ignoring the contribution to counter-hegemonic practices and   
   abandoning the critical project in favour of “the good affect that undoes the bad”. Hemmings, “Invoking Affect:  
  Cultural Theory and the Ontological Turn,” 548–551.
8  Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 125.
9  Butler, “What Is Critique? An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue.”
10  Rogoff, “What Is a Theorist?”.
11  I have earlier read Sedgwick together with Butler’s essay on Foucault to show that the reparative is not in   
   opposition to the post-structuralist, feminist, queer project but a continuation of some of the very same 
  practices, this article is a continuation of some of the initial work done in Dirckinck-Holmfeld, “‘We Shall   
  Overcome’: Notes for a Reparative Critical Practice.”
12  Hemmings, “Invoking Affect: Cultural Theory and the Ontological Turn,” 556; Wiegman, “The Times We’re in,” 
  16.
13  Butler, Frames of War, 34.
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clearly distinguishable from the paranoid, but is in a constant negotiation, or to and fro process with 
the paranoid position. It is in this position that the subject juxtaposes, structures, assembles the partial 
objects, affects and percepts she encounters into new creative practices. 
Sedgwick pitches the reparative by excessively enacting the paranoia which she is accusing everyone 
else of suffering from. But rather than seeing this as a mistake, this precisely opens up to the essay’s 
critical potentiality in that she has to enact the same mechanisms that she is out to critique, to arrive at 
the concept of the reparative14. As Sedgwick notes it is “sometimes the most paranoid-tending people 
who are able to, and need to, develop and disseminate the richest reparative practices”15.
This understanding of paranoia is not, as it has often been understood, to valorise some affects as 
being a necessarily good (love, hope etc.) and others as bad (paranoia, fear, envy), but an understanding 
of critique as an affective enterprise.  Since paranoia is one among many other possible affects, this 
implicit enactment opens up to a possibility of other ways of doing critique or to be motivated by other 
affects. I will return to this later on, but let us first have a closer look at how this resonates with Butler’s 
version of critique.
Butler’s Foucault: What is Critique?
In Judith Butler’s reading of Michel Foucault’s 1978 lecture “What is Critique?”16 a performative 
practice of critique, similar to Sedgwick’s, is fashioned in her framing of the critical inquiry. By asking 
“What is Critique?” Butler shows that “the question not only poses the problem – what is the critique 
that we supposedly do or, indeed aspire to do? – but enacts a certain mode of questioning”17. Rather 
than providing an answer to the question or a prescription or judgment, critique becomes a practice, 
where the form in which the matter is put not only poses the problem but also enacts a certain mode 
of questioning. As a practice, critique latches onto an object or epistemic and institutional field in 
question – and as such it can never be made to stand alone as a “purely generalizable practice”18. 
We can refute the first objection of my manic defensive audience, which rejected the reparative 
critical practice as being oxymoronic. If, as we have seen, critique is always a practice of something, 
then the reparative critical practice is not a contradictory term but rather a conjunction or repetition. 
But we may ask what kind of practice is the reparative critical practice, then?
Critique as Liminal Texture:
Foucault’s contribution to what appears as an impasse within critical and post-critical theory of our time is 
precisely to ask us to rethink critique as a practice in which we pose the question of the limits of our most 
sure ways of knowing, what Williams referred to as our ‘uncritical habits of mind’ (…). One does not drive 
to the limits for a thrill experience, or because limits are dangerous and sexy, or because it brings us into a 
titillating proximity with evil. One asks about the limits of ways of knowing because one has already run 
up against a crisis within the epistemological field in which one lives. The categories by which social life are 
ordered produce a certain incoherence of entire realms of unspeakability. And it is from this condition, the 
tear in the fabric of our epistemological web, that the practice of critique emerges, with the awareness that 
no discourse is adequate here or that our reigning discourses have produced an impasse. Indeed, the very 
debate in which the strong normative view wars with critical theory may produce precisely that form of 
14  This seems to resonate with Brian Massumi’s understanding of fear: “analysis, however necessary, is not enough  
   to found a practice of resistance. Fear, under conditions of complicity, can be neither analyzed nor opposed  
   without at the same time being enacted.” (Ngai 302, quoting Massumi ‘Preface’ The politics of everyday fear xi) 
15  Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 150.
16  Foucault, The Politics of Truth., 41–81.
17  Butler, “What Is Critique? An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue,” 305.
18  Ibid., 304.
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discursive impasse from which the necessity and urgency of critique emerges.19
To further explore what kind of practice the reparative critical practice might be, I want to foreground 
in this densely packed paragraph how critique is a practice in which we pose the question of the limits 
of our most sure ways of knowing. It is, so to speak, a liminoid practice in which one is being pushed 
against the limits of the governing norms in question, or rather where one is passing on the limits 
of those norms. Bordering those limits one cannot simply slip back into a predefined mould, but it 
creates an impasse from which the necessity and urgency of critique emerges. 
Towards the end of her essay Butler switches from what started out as an epistemological question 
– what is critique? – and asks instead what counts as a life? In so doing, Butler shows that the 
epistemological limits become intrinsically related to ontological ones. In naming this condition from 
which the practice of critique emerges, Butler cannot help but slip in textures: “the tear in the fabric of 
our epistemological web”. Rather than seeing this as purely figurative speech, I want to consider the way 
in which Butler’s performative way of doing critique comes to show that the epistemological web is 
entangled with ontological ones. And the discursive limits are tied together with material and textured 
ones. The tear in the (epistemological) fabric cuts across other kinds of fabric including social, physical, 
bodily (in the broadest sense), psychological, institutional, virtual and machinic, which cannot be 
mended by pre-existing forms and discourses. 
How then does this mode of critical practice resonate with affect? And how can affect be understood 
as critical inquiry? 
Affect, as I described it in “Affect’s Materiality”, is not something we sit and wait for, but something 
which hits like an act of violence, which grips us and forces a reaction: 
Affect is thus essentially a pre-personal category, installed “before” the circumscription of identities, and 
manifested by unlocatable transferences, unlocatable with regard to their origin as well as with regard to their 
destination. Somewhere, there is hatred, in the same way that, in animist societies, beneficent or nocuous 
influences circulate through the spirit of ancestors, and, concurrently, of totemic animals, or through the 
“mana” of a consecrated place, the power of a ritual tattooing, a ceremonial dance, the recounting of a myth, 
etc. There is thus a polyvocity of the components of semiotization, which nonetheless are still awaiting 
their existential completion [parachèvement existential]. (…) the difficulty here lies in that the delimitation 
of an affect is not discursive, that is to say, not founded upon systems of distinctive oppositions inflected 
according to sequences of linear intelligibility…20 
Affect becomes a critical inquiry because it pushes us to the limits of our surest ways of knowing. 
In this passage – or urgency – the critical impasse has not yet found or taken a form, it does not have 
a prescription or mould it can be fitted back into, but is left open to contingency. But at the same time, 
the affect as critical inquiry not only forces us to question our surest ways of knowing, it also re-unites 
a passage where we become one with others; affect is contagious. It is in this tear in the fabric that 
affect not only forces a reaction from the affected body but also demands that this reaction be styled 
in a new way.
Open to contingency
According to Butler’s reading of Foucault, this critical impasse that emerges at the limits is only 
critical insofar as it is “’a means for a future or a truth that it will not know nor happen to be, it oversees 
a domain it would not want to police and is unable to regulate.’”21 That the critical practice is only 
19  Ibid., 307–308. My emphasis.
20  Guattari and Genosko, The Guattari Reader, 158.
21  Butler, “What Is Critique? An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue,” 308 citing Foucault.
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critical insofar as it operates with a contingency over time seems to resonate with Sedgwick’s call for 
the reparative practice as to attune oneself to the heartbeat of contingency. While the paranoid tries 
to anticipate the future, to ward off good or bad surprises, the reparative critical practice is open to 
contingencies22. 
In his contribution to the memorial symposium held in commemoration of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, 
Honouring Eve at Boston University in 2009, Ed Cohen writes about the coincidence of reading Michel 
Foucault’s last seminars on Parrhesia when he got the news that Sedgwick had slipped into the Bardo – 
the state between life and death or death and rebirth in Tibetan Buddhism. This coincidence allowed 
him to unfold the Coeur (heart) at the heart of the foucauldian courage or curiosity, and the will to 
truth, (parrhesia as a truth-telling) as a practice of the heart, of love, based on Sedgwick’s Dialogue on 
Love.23
Cohen shows how this Sedgwickian method or practice, consisting of a “generous braiding together 
of perspectives and styles”, emerges as a will to truth, or “how the risk to pursue the truth makes this 
risk available as a risk of the self before the other.”24
According to Cohen this risk is always relational. The relation unfolds in the way the subject risks 
herself, or the contours of herself, by accepting the possibility that the other offers her other versions 
of herself which might be “equally or even more true than the one she affirms.” This “necessitates 
an opening of the heart” – or to use Sedgwick’s own expression to attune oneself to the heartbeat of 
contingency. 
The double task of critical practices is thus not only to “isolate” and “identify” the nexus of power 
and knowledge, “but also to track the way in which that field meets its own breaking points, the 
moments of its discontinuities, the sites where it fails to constitute the intelligibility for which it stands.”25 
 To identify “the nexus of power and knowledge” would be a typical paranoid strategy according to 
Sedgwick. But if critique points to those very mechanisms, not to create a new “truth regime”, but to 
style itself in a way which it cannot fully know in advance, then what would this practice look like?
Art of existence
One should either be a work of art, or wear a work of art.26
You might not be an oil painting – but you are a fascinating monster.27
Introducing the notion of ‘arts of existence,’ Foucault also reintroduces and reemphasizes ‘intentional and 
voluntary actions,’ specifically, ‘those actions by which men not only set themselves rules of conduct, but 
also seek to transform themselves in their singular being, and to make their life into an oeuvre.’ Such lives do 
not simply conform to moral precepts or norms in such a way that selves, considered pre-formed or ready-
made, fit themselves into a mold that is set forth by the precept. On the contrary, the self fashions itself in 
terms of the norm, comes to inhabit and incorporate the norm, but the norm is not in this sense external 
to the principle by which the self is formed. What is at issue for him is not behaviors or ideas or societies or 
‘ideologies’, but ‘the problematization through which being offers itself to be, necessarily, thought – and the 
practices on the basis of which these problematizations are formed.’28 
22  I discuss this in the chapter Affect’s Time and Reconsitution
23  Sedgwick, A Dialogue on Love. Dialogue on love is a patchwork stitching together bits and pieces of Sedgwick’s  
  internal dialogue, stream of consciousness, excerpts from her dialogue with her therapist during cancer 
  treatment, interrupted by haibun poems and various links or refrains from literary sources etc.
24  Cohen, “The Courage of Curiosity, or the Heart of Truth (A Mash-Up),” 204.
25  Butler, “What Is Critique? An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue,” 316.
26  Wilde and Murray, “Phrases and Philosophies for the Use of the Young.”
27  Clark, Portrait of Jason.
28  Butler, “What Is Critique? An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue,” 309.
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Critique becomes a moment of self-allocation or of agency, which “emerges as an ‘art’ or art of 
existence”. This style will be critical only insofar it is not fully determined in advance and it incorporates 
“a contingency over time that marks the limits to the ordering capacity of the field in question. So the 
stylization of this ‘will’ will produce a subject who is not readily knowable under the established rubric 
of truth.”29 
In reference to a verbal gesture which Foucault performs at the end of his lecture, where he states 
“’originary freedom’” only to withdraw it again and say: “’I did not say it, but this does not mean that 
I absolutely exclude it.’”30 By staging the way in which the matter is put, Foucault “styles his critical 
inquiry in such a way it posits a value which it does not know how to ground or to secure for itself, 
posits it anyways, and thereby shows a certain intelligibility exceeds the limits on intelligibility that 
power-knowledge has already set.”31
This Foucaultian Tease or courage posits an art of existence as the production of subjects who 
‘”seek to transform themselves in their singular being, and to make their life into an oeuvre’”32. Here 
Foucault’s virtue “becomes the practice by which the self forms itself in desubjugation, which is so 
to say that it risks its deformation as a subject, occupying that ontologically insecure position which 
poses the question anew: what will be a subject here, and what will count a as life, a moment of ethical 
questioning which requires that we break the habits of judgment in favour of a riskier practice that 
seeks to yield artistry from constraint.”33
Critique thus becomes a riskier practice that through the constraints or limits opens up to a new 
creative potentiality. In Butler’s reading of Foucault the materiality through which this style, art of 
existence or virtue takes place, is still to a certain extent conceived of as a performative speech act, or 
a fiction – “the kind of fiction that genealogy is said to be.”34 Earlier, I took for granted that neither 
Butler nor Foucault were talking about contemporary artistic practices, but rather an “‘art’ in the sense 
that attention is paid to the way in which one style one’s demand.”35 But isn’t “art” understood as the 
stylisation of one’s demand precisely what (critical) artistic practices are? Rather than slipping into 
pre-existing moulds or manuals for what art is and art should look like, (critical) artistic practices set 
out their own rules of conduct, while at the same time enfolding, enacting and inhabiting the norms 
which they put into question.
I have attempted to show that affect as a critical inquiry not only forces a reaction, but also styles a 
new way of being in the world, which is not already recognisable within the current episto-ontological 
power regimes. Butler refers repeatedly to the art of existence as a discursive and performative speech 
act – of saying something without fully saying it – but would it be possible to consider that it took on 
other material forms?
Butler that Matters: Rematerialisation
In Bodies that Matter Judith Butler answers the criticism she received after publishing Gender 
Trouble by asking “Is there a way to link the question of the materiality of the body to the performative 
of gender? And how does the category of ‘sex’ figure within such a relationship?”36 Butler’s matter of 
concern is to think through how “collective disidentifications can facilitate a reconceptualization of 
29  Ibid., 314.
30  Ibid., 318 citing Foucault.
31  Ibid., 319.
32  Ibid., 320.
33  Ibid., 321.
34  Ibid., 317.
35  Dirckinck-Holmfeld, “‘We Shall Overcome’: Notes for a Reparative Critical Practice.”
36  Butler, Bodies That Matter, 1.
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which bodies matter, and which bodies are yet to emerge as critical matters of concern.”37
In so doing she conceives of reiteration, reappropriation, gender performativity and discursive 
speech acts not as a step away from matter, but as a process of rematerialisation:
That this reiteration is necessary is a sign that materialization is never quite complete, that bodies never 
quite comply with the norms by which their materialization is impelled. Indeed, it is the instabilities, the 
possibilities of rematerialization, opened up by this process that mark one domain in which the forces of the 
regulatory law can be turned against itself to spawn rearticulations that call into question the hegemonic 
force of that very regulatory law.38
Affect as we have already seen is not exclusively to body-as-organism, but to bodies in the widest 
possible sense. Bodies that matter are thus not solely confinable to the norms that prescribe who 
counts as a subject, but opens up to a possibility of considering even the smallest monad or pixel. 
By turning the critical practice from a question of epistemology – what it means to know – to a 
question of ontology – who counts as a subject – Butler shows, maybe involuntarily, that it becomes a 
practice, in a Guattarian vein, of producing other affective milieus of enunciation, which cut across or 
queer other relational fabrics including social, physical, bodily (in the broadest sense), psychological, 
institutional, technical and machinic fragments into new assemblages, without stiffening or filling 
them up. All these elements act on each other and create a form of auto-poiesis or self-fashioning in 
which a process of rematerialisation takes place. And in this process of rematerialisation the stylisation 
becomes a fable or true in its power of being false .39
Irit Rogoff: What is Criticality? 
In the article “What is a Theorist?” Irit Rogoff responds to the editors’ question “What is an artist?” 
by reframing the question and asking “What is a theorist?”40 
Rogoff identifies a movement from criticism to critique to what she calls criticality. Criticism is 
“mainly preoccupied with the application of values and judgments, operating from barely acknowledged 
humanist index of measure sustained in turn by naturalized belief and disavowed interests.” Critique 
negated “’criticism’ through numerous layers of post-structuralist theory and the linked spheres of 
sexual difference and post-colonialism”, which served as an extraordinary examination of all of the 
assumtions and naturalised values and thought structures that have sustained the inhereited truth 
claims of knowledge.”41 But now there is a certain desire not only to look from the outside, but also to 
operate from an uncertain ground, while building on critique, “to inhabit culture in a relation other 
than one of critical analysis”42. What Rogoff terms Criticality, “taking shape though an emphasis on 
the present, of living out a situation, of understanding culture as a series of effects rather than of causes, 
of the possibilities of actualizing some of its potential rather than revealing its faults.”43  Drawing on 
the work of Deleuze, Georgio Agamben and Jean-Luc Nancy, criticality Rogoff suggests that Criticality 
undoes
the dichotomies of ‘insides’ and ‘outsides’ through numerous emergent categories such as rhizomatics, 
folds, singularities, etc., which collapses such binaries and replace them with a complex multi-inhabitation, 
criticality is therefore connected in my mind with risk, with a cultural inhabitation that performatively 
acknowledges what it is risking without yet fully being able to articulate it. In criticality we have that double 
37  Ibid., 4.
38  Ibid., 2 my emphasis.
39  I continue to discuss this process of rematerialisation on the level of the image in the article Rematerialisation. 
40  Rogoff, “What Is a Theorist?”.
41  Ibid., 3.
42  Ibid., 2.
43  Ibid., 3.
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occupation in which we are both fully armed with the knowledges of critique, able to analyze and unveil 
while at the same time sharing and living out the very conditions which we are able to see through. As such 
we live out a duality that requires at the same time both an analytical mode and a demand to produce new 
subjectivities that acknowledge that we are what Hannah Arendt has termed ‘fellow sufferers’ of the very 
conditions we are critically examining.44 
Is what I am trying to develop here with the reparative critical practice not precisely the same as 
Rogoff ’s Criticality? As I have shown, the reparative is no less paranoid than the paranoid but operates 
with this double privilege. Likewise, the reparative critical practice, like criticality, is no-less critical 
than critique; it is able to analyse and unveil as effectively as its paranoid cousins – but it knows that 
knowing alone is not enough – and that knowing requires us to produce new subjectivities, which 
emerge as an art. To Rogoff, the virtue of transforming oneself into a work of art is no longer a “theory-
informed practice” in which different theoretical strands inform the practice, nor does the practice 
illustrate the theory. A somewhat oversimplified example could be that one sets out to sculpt Deleuze 
and Guattari’s “Milles Plateaus”, or perform Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble. Rather, it is a “practice-
driven theory”, where the practice itself gives rise to the theoretical concepts, of thinking through new 
ways of being in the world.
If a difference might be inserted between the reparative critical practice and criticality it would be 
that Sedgwick and Rogoff seem to practice two different kinds of Buddhist pedagogy: while Rogoff ’s 
is one of “without”, of unlearning, Sedgwick is on of “with”, additive, accretive, palpable and chunky. 
This might also apply to Foucault, who seems to preach a certain ascesis, but does so perhaps by 
deliberately saturating his writing, not with “queer little gods and deities”, as Sedgwick notes Marcel 
Proust is doing45, but with Greek philosophers, Stoics, and remnants from the Hellenistic and Roman 
periods. This practice adds a rich fabulous texture – that fiction that genealogy is said to be – to the 
critical enterprise.Rogoff writes: 
Instead I am concerned with the dynamics of loss, of giving up, and of moving away and of being without. 
These dynamics are for me a necessary part of my understanding of visual culture, for whatever it may be it 
is not an accumulative, an additive project in which bits of newly discovered perspectives are pasted on to an 
existing structure, seemingly augmenting and enriching it, seemingly making it acceptable to the pressures of 
the times.46
Since the reparative critical practice, as I have shown, is additive and accumulative, would that then 
entail “an additive project where bits…are pasted onto existing structure… augmenting and enriching 
it [and] making it acceptable to the pressures of the times”? I am not sure why acts or practices that are 
accumulative and additive or making something “acceptable to the pressure of the times”, would fit less 
the description of Criticality? 
However, Rogoff ’s point here seems to resonate with the second objection of my delusional manic 
defensive comrades and their charge against the reparative practice as being ameliorative and reformist.
Returning to Irit Rogoff ’s essay “What is a Theorist?” some ten–fifteen years after she originally 
wrote it makes me shiver. The essay almost seems to anticipate its own “withoutness”. Describing 
the unease she felt when the World Trade Center collapsed in 2001, Rogoff sees this incident as the 
culmination of an unease that “some of us” had been sensing or building up over time. An unease that 
“the theoretical framework, the twin models of post-colonial theory and discourses on globalization, 
44  Ibid.
45  Sedgwick and Goldberg, The Weather in Proust.
46  Ibid. 2. Rogoff develop ”Without” in various different contexts and articles, and they differ somewhat from   
  time to time. I will primarily focus on how it is used in “What is a Critic?”. For other articles see Phelan and   
  Rogoff, “Without.”
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did not add up to the task of trying to “think through intercultural relations on a global scale”: 
I have called this section ‘Without’ because for some time now I have been very interested in this condition 
as a starting point for embarking on new thought and new research projects. It seems to me to indicate a 
state in which we acknowledge that we had some navigational principles and some models of critical analysis 
to hand, but that they no longer quite serve us in relation to a new and emergent conjunction of problems. 47 
Rogoff ’s notion of “without” resonates with my own experience of coming to theory and to 
Visual Cultures, because the encounter with the broken bridge following the July War in 200648 had 
obstructed practice-as-usual or my habitual mode of practicing. It had literally torn the fabric of 
my epistemological web and left me without adequate discursive and practical methods to continue 
working. However, today, being “without” seems almost to foreground the same unease “some of us” 
feel in light of the current conjunction of problems: 
[Without]. In Arabic “without” is translated into ‘bidoun’. Bidoun means 
“without” or “without papers”. The Bedouin is to a certain extent derived 
from the word bidoun in that it names someone “without home” (nomad). 
The Nomad became a transgressive figure to think through with Deleuze 
and Guattari’s “1227: Treatise on Nomadology: the War Machine”49 and in 
the art world with Bidoun Magazine and various artistic practices, which 
thought to incorporate or inhabit Bedouin aesthetics50. 
But is it the itinerant artists and theorists who have fully learned the 
lesson of living without, of undoing and of “nomadology”?51
If we gloss over the current territorial configurations in the Middle East 
and elsewhere, urgent ways of being without spring to mind: On the one 
hand there is the continuum of wars and the warlords it produces (ISIS, 
the military industry, and finance capital); on the other hand there are 
the civilians forced to leave everything behind and to transverse the 
“without” of uncertainty.
Faced with such complex assemblages, where no matter how strong the epistemological desire is 
for the truth, the truth seems difficult to untangle using current methodologies: 
“Trace the money!” some say. 
“Trace the warriors!” others say. 
“It is all a conspiracy theory!” 
By the time we are done mapping, the map has moved on. 
Is there a way out or “without” then? Is there a way to attend to those complex constellations? Is 
there a way to draw and create other affective mappings? 
Pregnant. Sleeping over at my mother-in-law’s house in Shiyeh [A Southern 
Suburb of Beirut] at the beginning of the Syrian war spilling over the 
border into Lebanon on May 2013. We woke up to two explosions, one 
after the other. Our family did not take notice of the sounds and kept 
sleeping. You immediately checked the news. Nothing. They mentioned 
a gas explosion, but if it was a gas explosion how come we heard two 
explosions? In the good old analogico-digital days we would lay in bed 
listening to explosions, but at that time we almost knew, or at least we 
47  Rogoff, “What Is a Theorist?,” 3–4. My emphasis.
48  I refer to the war in Lebanon between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006 as the July War since in Arabic it is    often refered to as Harb Tammuz (July War).
49  Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus.
50  Tate Triennial Exhibition of Contemporary British Art, Bourriaud, and Tate Britain (Gallery), Altermodern.
51  T.J. Demos explore this at length in Demos, The Migrant Image, 10–15.
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thought we knew, whom the explosions were targeting. This time it was 
different. We return to sleep. 20 minutes after the phone calls start 
ticking in. It is family and friends from near and far: Hamra (central 
district in Beirut), Accra, Seattle, Paris… different parts of the world 
and different time zones, who want to make sure that we are all alright. 
(PARA) PARANOIA
In what follows, I will try to further develop affect as critical inquiry, through a case study in (para)
paranoia, to extract some usable epistemological and methodological tools. Prompted by the anecdote 
above, I depart from a new-old public feeling of “feeling car-bombed”, as an extreme stratification 
of subjectivity, in order to update paranoia, from an analogue, Cold-War paranoia in Sedgwick to a 
digital (para)paranoia of (late)late capitalism as developed by Sianne Ngai in Ugly Feelings. Sedgwick’s 
one-liner is to attune ourselves to the heartbeat of contingency, but how, we may ask, are we to attune 
ourselves to the heartbeat of contingency if our heartbeats are already being monitored, compressed 
and resold to us as commodities by Apple Watches and other ubiquitous gadgets?52 The conceptual 
endeavour is advanced further by the project My Neck is Thinner than a Hair (2000-2004)53, by the Atlas 
Group, in which Walid Raad in collaboration with Tony Chakar and Bilal Khbeiz gathered multiple 
documents in relation to the car-bombs detonated in Beirut during the Lebanese wars (1975 -1991)54. 
Within the burgeoning field of affect studies, various theorists including Ngai, Lauren Berlant Sara 
Ahmed, Heather Love, Ann Cvetkovitch and Mark Fisher have examined public feelings’ apparent 
“negative” affects and their politically ambiguity to understand the contemporary subject’s suspended 
agency55. One such feeling, according to Sianne Ngai, is paranoia. In her book, Ugly Feelings, Ngai 
takes as her point of departure the assumption that the disposition to theorise is aligned with paranoia, 
not as a mental illness but as “a species of fear based on dysphoric apprehension of a holistic and all-
encompassing system.”56 My delusional adversaries’ critique of the reparative project as weak, affective 
and unable to account for the abstract system which “we are up against” seems to resonate with 
Frederic Jameson’s “The Theoretical Hesitation: Benjamin’s Sociological Predecessor”: 
Ours is an antitheoretical time, which is to say an anti-intellectual time; and the reasons for this are not far 
to seek. The system has always understood that ideas and analysis, along with the intellectuals who practice 
them, are its enemies and has evolved various ways of dealing with the situation, most notably—in the 
academic world—by railing against what it likes to call grand theory or master narratives at the same time it 
fosters more comfortable and local positivisms and empiricisms in the various disciplines.57
While I certainly agree with Jameson that capitalism has succeeded in turning counter-cultural 
and even its own failures – the 2007-2008 financial crisis – into its own strengths, I still find it, as Ngai 
skilfully points out, problematic that other ways of doing critique are seen as “always already” doing 
the capitalist system a favour. Capitalism has become a singular system “anthropomorphized into a 
subject capable of ‘understanding’ its enemies and ‘dealing’ with them accordingly”58. “The system 
52  “When a Heartbeat Is Being Monitored.”
53  Raad et al., My Neck Is Thinner Than a Hair.
54  I refer to the Lebanese wars (1975-1991), which is often mentioned as the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1991), 
  since it had many stages, fronts and facets, and included various other nations and world powers. To describe it  
  only as a civil war might therefore be limited.
55  See Berlant, Cruel Optimism, Ahmed, «Multiculturalism and the Promise of Happiness»; Ahmed, «Not in the  
  Mood»; Cvetkovich, Depression; Love, Feeling Backward; Fisher, Capitalist Realism; 
56  Ngai, Ugly Feelings, 299.
57  Ibid., 301 quoting Jameson; Jameson, “The Theoretical Hesitation: Benjamin’s Sociological Predecessor,” 267.
58  Ngai, Ugly Feelings, 300.
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(…) ‘conspires against the contemporary intellectual’ ‘transformed into an agent who counterplots 
against’ herself ”59. 
Drawing on various debates around language, feminism and conceptual poetry, Ngai notes how 
women, queer, post-colonial and disabled subjects can never be critical, because by default we arrive 
too late - “belated”60. Through the conceptual poetry of writers such as Juliana Spahr and Diana Ward, 
Ngai develops a certain kind of female para or self-reflexive paranoia, in which the subject knows 
that she is always already reactively construed and belated, yet, this very belatedness or complicity 
becomes the very condition of agency61 or “analysis-enactment”62.
It is here that I find that the work of the Atlas Group as well as many of the Lebanese artists that 
emerged after the Lebanese wars interesting in assisting me to consider other epistemological strategies 
that (para)paranoia gives rise to. In My Neck is Thinner than a Hair Raad, Chakar and Khbeiz collected 
various materials including documents, anecdotes and photographs in the neighbourhood of Furn El 
Chebak, which was located close to the Green Line which divided Beirut into East and West during 
the Lebanese wars (1975-1991) and was a frequent target for car bombs. The project also collected an 
archive of photographs taken by photojournalists immediately after an explosion, documenting the 
engine that is often all that remains of the complex assemblage that makes up a car bomb. The Atlas 
Group is notoriously known for embodying a sort of paranoid aesthetics, in which all the art works 
are referred to as “files”, which are produced not by an original artist, Walid Raad himself, but offered 
to him by “agents”, ranging from secret service officers, explosions experts and doctors. These are 
characters that all seem to fit Ngai’s description of how paranoia is precisely valorised as knowledge 
when claimed by some subjects or “denied the status of epistemology” when claimed by others: 
In the former case (female paranoia), a mode of knowledge structured by an affective orientation already 
involving the cognition that power operates systemically will be reduced to its subjective implications alone 
(an ignoble ‘emotionalism’); in the latter (male), paranoia’s cognitive dimensions will be emphasized as an 
enabling condition for knowledge63.
The Beiruti art scene has often been seen as almost too emblematic of a post-modern relativism, 
blurring fact with fiction, questioning authorship and authenticity, found footage with fabricated 
footage in the absence of an official historical narrative.64 What I want to consider here is how My 
Neck is Thinner Than a Hair challenges Fredric Jameson’s oft-quoted claim that conspiracy is “the poor 
person’s cognitive mapping in the post-modern age: the degraded figure of the total logic of late capital, 
a desperate attempt to represent the latter’s system, whose failure is marked by its slippage into sheer 
theme and content.”65 As with Hito Steyerl’s advocacy of the poor image – as the debris of audio-visual 
capitalism – is it possible to consider “poor mapping” as a self-reflexive, aesthetic-critical practice, 
which does not aim at building an all-encompassing high resolution theory, “or the rehabilitation of 
a missing narrative or even the satisfaction that comes with comprehensive knowledge”66 but offers a 
way, even it is a weak one, to continue living in the world?  
59  Ibid. freely after Ngai.
60  Ngai, Ugly Feelings.
61  Ibid., 331 here Ngai draws on Butler’s agency as enacting those structures they are to destabalise which ties into  
  our discussion of critique above.
62  Ibid., 302.
63  Ibid.
64  The Taif Agreement (1991), which brokered the peace agreement between the warring fractions in Lebanon  
  gave amnesty to all the involved militias, which means that there has been no official truth and reconciliation  
  process and no agreed upon narrative of the events.
65  Jameson, “Cognitive Mapping.”
66  Wilson-Goldie, “Walid Raad: The Atlas Group Opens Its Archives.”
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My Neck is Thinner than a Hair is interesting to revisit in this regard, since on the one hand it is 
an older piece, which is no longer emblematic of Raad’s practice and since it deals directly with the 
affect of or what remains after a car bombs. Furthermore, I find it interesting the way in which the 
work and combines analogue, digital and various different mediums and temporalities in a complex 
multi-layered performance. As I am watching the DVD documentation of the performance in Ashkal 
Alwan’s archive, I cannot help but to feel a weird sensation of temporal disjunction: The performance 
is treating the car bombs from the Lebanese wars (1975-1991), but doing so in May 2004, only a 
few months before a new series of car-bombs are launched peeking with the assassination of prime 
minister Rafik Hariri on February 14, 2005.
While a similar material study of how the machinic assemblage that makes up the new car bombs 
would be needed to further develop how the analogue paranoia differ from a digital (para)paranioa67, 
I however, limited this intermezzo to updating Sedgwick’s composite sketch of paranoia to (para)
paranoia, with the support of Ngai, Rogoff, the Atlas Group and my own anecdotal experience from 
being in the proximity to the feeling of feeling car-bombed:
Paranoia is anticipatory.
Paranoia is reflexive and mimetic.
Paranoia is a strong theory.
Paranoia is a theory of negative affects.
Paranoia places its faith in exposure.68
(Para)paranoia is ‘meanwhile & and at the same time’
The first imperative of paranoia, according to Sedgwick, is that there must be no bad surprises. 
Surprise is what the paranoid tries to eliminate by knowing in advance what will come in the future. 
As such paranoia has a complex relationship to temporality that “burrows backward and forward 
because there must be no bad surprises”69 and “news [must] be already known”. While (Para)paranoia 
shares a complex relationship to temporality it seems to steer this complexity.
Ngai shows that in post-structuralist theory where “always already” has become “sine qua non 
of late twentieth-century theory, the subject is always retroactively determined”70. In her reading of 
Diana Ward’s poem “Imaginary Movie” and the stanza 
meanwhile & and 
at the same time 
Ngai notes how over-the-top usages of repetition of the conjunction, ‘”& and,” link two terms that 
independently signify the temporal coexistence of events “meanwhile” and “at the same time”. To Ngai 
this situation of belatedness of the poem’s subjects, who are watching the screen to find themselves 
spoken for in advance opens up to two relationships to time as a “overdetermined simultaneity or 
67  The on-going Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) also refered to as the Hariri Trial in The International 
  Criminal Court, The Hague, into the assassination of Rafic Hariri, could be seen as an ongoing large scale 
  material study. See also the work of Forensic Architecture, Model Court, Lawrence Abou Hamdan; to name 
  but a few.
68  Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 130.
69  Ibid.
70  Ngai, Ugly Feelings, 314.
(Para)paranoia is meanwhile and & at the same time.
(Para)paranoia is habit and practise.
(Para)paranoia is a poor mapping poor image.
(Para)paranoia is a theory of affects.
(Para)paranoia does not place its faith in exposure.
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contemporaneousness and a sense of redundancy and belatedness”71. Returning to my own anecdote 
above, I want to suggest a slightly alternative approach in relation to Irit Rogoff ’s notion of “geography 
in real time” and in relation to what I have previously termed affect’s time. 
According to Rogoff, “geography in real time” is the moment in which “some nebulous half-
acknowledged entity, previously no more than a vague unease or a partially avowed recognition, 
crashes into our own reality by becoming a reality itself. The events of September 11 were an instance 
of suddenly being forced to live in real time.”72 
What the incoming calls that Sunday morning in Shiyeh had in common was that they made use 
of the app “happin!” (ma2too3a), which immediately (in this case with a 20 minutes delay) sends 
the latest updates on the security situation in Lebanon to its subscribers. Apps like ma2too3a are 
dependent on citizen journalism where anyone can report on incidents happening right now. As such, 
our relatives did not need to wait for the timing of their respective national broadcast news-channels, 
to know if their own body, friends and loved ones were intact.73  
Had it been today or after January 2014, we could have pressed a button on another Beirut developed 
app “IAmAlive”, which then sends a tweet saying “I Am Still Alive! #Lebanon #Latestbombing”. And 
then we would have saved our friends and family from having to call and cause congestion on the 
telephone line. 
In what ways did this incident open up to a different experience of the “(a)live”, which was not 
televisual, but digitally perceived, not “always already” but “meanwhile and & at the same time”? In 
short, how did it allow for multiple temporalities to coexist alongside one another?
In Sianne Ngai’s reading of the Juliana Spahr poem LIVE, the preoccupation with synchronicity is 
related to the development of the medium of television itself, and video’s ability to record and transmit 
directly:
LIVE’s preoccupation with synchronicity and the timely delivery of communications comes to connect with 
the ideals of simultaneity and flow associated with the medium of television itself. In addition to the poem’s 
concern with the RIGHT ON TIME, through its absence of page numbers and continuous streaming of 
parallel texts, LIVE’s formal structure calls attention to television’s own governing ideology of liveness, ‘the 
promise of presence and immediacy made available by video technology’s capacity to record and transmit 
images simultaneously’.74
Here I find it important to note that despite the televisual fetish for and promise of the live – there 
is still a small delay even in video and live television broadcast from the moment of recording to the 
transmission.75
The events of 9/11, which Rogoff refers to, can perhaps be seen as the last real televisual event, in 
which the world’s clocks were synched to the same time – the time of the American broadcasting 
agencies. Today, asychronicity seems to be the temporal schemata of globalisation76. But what interests 
me in Rogoff ’s quote is her claim that “some nebulous half-acknowledged entity, previously no more 
than a vague unease or a partially avowed recognition, crashes into our own reality by becoming a 
reality itself ”. Wouldn’t this precisely entail that affect is a pre-personal entity, which is present but 
71  Ibid., 305.
72  Rogoff, “What Is a Theorist?,” 4.
73  Here I am paraphrasing Mahmoud Darwish: ”I plugged my ears with cotton and went to sleep after hearing the  
  last newscast. It didn’t report I was dead. That means I’m still alive. I examine the parts of my body and 
  find them all there. Two eyes, two ears, a long nose, ten toes below, ten fingers above, a finger in the middle.”
  Darwīsh, Memory for Forgetfulness August, Beirut, 1982. 5.
74  Ngai, Ugly Feelings, 323–324.
75  See also Lazzarato, “Machines to Crystallize Time.”
76  I discuss this in relation to David Joselit’s concept of the aggregator in Rematerialisation.
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awaiting its activation? In Rogoff ’s account it was the airplanes crashing into the towers. But there 
is more to it than a pure description of affect. According to Rogoff this becomes an incident of “Real 
Time”. But what is this real time Rogoff is referring to? When I first read Rogoff ’s quote I thought it was 
referring back to “real time” in terms of the “live” in the televisual transmission, which Ngai describes 
as the promise of presence and immediacy and simultaneity. But Rogoff ’s description of real time is 
REAL TIME – or time experienced directly. It is an experience of time perceived differently from 
clock time and other societal instruments, including television, that measure time in neatly ordered 
sequences. Can we say that real time for Rogoff is when affect collides with matter, rips the matter from 
the movement of which it should form part and opens up directly to time?
Back in the living room in Shiyeh, we gather around the TV set to watch 
the breaking news reporting live from what had happened, and what is 
happening, now, outside the apartment, on the other side of the wall, 
50m up the road and 50m down the road, where the two rockets struck. As 
we watch the television transmitting in “real time”, we discuss what to 
do: how to evacuate the family, while at the same time continuing the 
day as planned, meeting up with our friends for a planned picnic in the 
mountains. Even though the time that had passed might not have been more 
than 20 minutes, it felt like hours. The time as I experienced it was 
extremely slowed down, as if my inner camera was recording everything in 
50,000 frames per second. These competing formats created a time code 
conflict or problem of rendering between the different frame rates in the 
room with the TV set broadcasting “reality” in 25 frames per second and 
that of my internal one broadcasting at 50,000 per second. 
My mother-in-law, pleased that family and friends were calling from near 
and afar and having lived her whole life in this volatile situation, did 
not seem to share the same panic that we tried to supress, now that we 
knew that the rockets were small and homemade, their damage limited etc. 
Downstairs, at the neighbours, yet another temporality was unfolding. 
The family was mourning their nephew coming home from the war in Syria 
in a coffin. 
We finally left the house and drove the less than 10 km into the centre. 
Life there, the live, or the real time seemed to go on unnoticed. People 
there did not take much notice of the events in the suburbs: The Marathon 
had just finished; people were having their morning coffee in the cafés; 
a woman was packing her car to go to the beach with her children. Our 
time hooked up to normative time and life continued as usual. We went to 
the mountains with our friends.
What does this incident have to tell us about (para)paranoia’s complex relationship to temporality? 
The temporality of (para)paranoia is no longer only a uni-directionally vigilance which is “always 
already”, retroactively determined, but opens up to a temporality where multiple temporalities coexist 
within the same space, the same apartment, the same frame and sentence, as embodied in the stanza of 
Diana Ward’s poem “meanwhile and & at the same time”. It also demonstrates the uneven development 
of asynchronous temporalities existing within the same global-local situation (with family and friends 
calling from near and far; with centre and suburb operating to different times and with news-channels, 
apps and perceived time operating in different frame-rates).  As such I like to think of the over-the-top 
usages of simultaneity in Ward’s poem, not as belatedness, in which the audience watch themselves 
on the screen being talked about in advance, but as the possibility of letting multiple and conflicting 
frame rates and temporalities exist simultaneously in the same stanza and on the same page.
The real time or Affect’s Time, where affect collides with matter and opens up directly to time, is 
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thus not a real-time which is synchronic to the state televisual, but a digital time77. Or, rather, this is an 
instance of digital-time gaining analogue properties. The digital is no longer a purely on/off feedback 
mechanism but leads to the possibility of heterogeneous times that can exist alongside one another.78
Returning to the Atlas Group’s black and white photographs of the of the expelled car engines. Even 
though the photographs are analogue, I like to think of them of capturing this specific moment of 
material time: when affect collides with matter – and all that remains is the engine.
(Para)paranoia is Habit and Practice 
Sedgwick’s second definition of paranoia is that “one understands paranoia only by oneself 
practicing paranoid knowing, and that the way paranoia has of understanding anything is by 
imitating and embodying it.”79 As I have shown, Sedgwick’s essay points to this paranoid mimesis as 
“circumscrib(ing) its potential as a medium of political or cultural struggle”, but she cannot help but 
enact this implicit knowingness and mimesis in her essay. Only by enacting this paranoid knowing 
is she able to mutate paranoia into a reparative practice. The reparative reading or practice enacts a 
certain paranoia, which is perfectly aware of its own paranoia; hence (para)paranoia. Rather than 
letting paranoia grow “like a crystal snowflake in a hypersaturated solution, blotting out any sense 
of the possibility of alternative ways of understanding or things to understand”80, (para)paranoia 
becomes a mutable position. As such, it is less a circumscription of potential agency, but it becomes 
the very premise for acting at all.
In the feeling of “feeling car-bombed” what started as a default, maybe even an intuition or just a 
slight unease, might be turned into a habit or practice. The subject/object constellation might continue 
this embodied habit for many years afterwards, even when the immediate reason for doing so has 
abated. My in-laws, for example, still take a longer road when visiting their relatives, since the direct 
road had a higher probability of being subject to explosions (2013-14). 
Habit is central here in that it is both the form and method through which paranoia is enacted – but 
it is eventually only through this enactment or stylisation of a habitual practice that the possibility of 
continuing to live emerges. In Sedgwick’s own case, it is only through her own over-the-top acting out 
of paranoia throughout the essay that she is able to come up with the notion of the reparative. Habit 
and practice come to play an important part in Sedgwick’s Buddhist practice as the way in which the 
subject, through a refinement of the practice of everyday life, changes or styles herself, in order to 
continue living. 
In Cruel Optimism, Lauren Berlant also turns to habit or intuitive rehabituation for the which “the 
subject/world’s capacity to maintain itself admit an impossible, but no longer unlivable, situation” in 
the situation of living with HIV/AIDS81. In Ngai’s reading of Juliana Spahr the “small subject’s inevitable 
complicity (or perhaps even her ‘paranoia’) might eventually become ’the condition of agency rather 
than its destruction’”, since paranoid logic offers a dual option of escaping and thinking.82
Cathrine Malabou exquisitely brings to light the dual enterprise of habit, in her introduction to 
77  At least in theory, digital image allow for multiple frame rates to coexist within the same sequence (although  
  this still causes a great many problems in editing). Also the invention of different digital cameras advanced 
  the number of frames filmed per second from 50,000 to up to 1,000,000; see for instance Phantom v12.1. These  
  cameras are used for various purposes, ranging from transmitting affect of football and the movie industry.   
  Their primary purposes are likely to be surveillance, complex data analysis and warfare drone-technology.
78  I continue to discuss this notion of what I call affect’s time in the essay ‘Affect’s Time’ and later in this essay.
79  Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 131.
80  Ibid.
81  See chapter The Intuitionist Berlant, Cruel Optimism.
82  Ngai, Ugly Feelings, 331. quoting Butler in Contingency, Hegemony and Universality, 277.
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Félix Ravaisson’s work Of Habit: 
There are, in the European philosophical tradition, two basic ways of speaking of Habit. (…) The first 
(Aristotle, Hegel, Maine De Biran, Ravaisson, Bergson) sees in habit a primary ontological phenomenon. For 
beings subject to change, habit is the law of being. Without a general and permanent disposition, a ‘virtue’, 
which is developed as a result of change, as resistance to this change, the finite being cannot endure, would 
not have time to live. For such a being, being is fused with the habit of being. The second way (Descartes, 
Kant etc.) sees in habit the epitome of inauthenticity, a simulacrum of being, an imitation of virtue. Pure 
mechanism, routine process, devitalization of sense, habit is the disease of repetition that threatens the 
freshness of thought and stifles the voice, repeatable but never stale, of the categorical imperative.83
Malabou asks if we are not habituated by the latter version of habit, and I believe this reading of 
habit encapsulates the repetition vs. reparative, Judith Butler vs. Sedgwick, enacted by readers of the 
Sedgwick’s essay84. Butler’s early work is often turned into advocacy of mimesis, repetition and re-
appropriation as the only means for contemporary agency. This repetition is seen as producing a stiff, 
deadlocked narrative in which nothing new can emerge. But what I find particularly interesting in 
the quote above is that there can never be one habit (vitalist) without the other habit (mimetic). This 
“affirm(s) that it is one and the same force, one and the same principle, which produces habit at once 
as grace (ease, facility, power) and as addiction (machinic repetition).”85 And it is precisely through 
this care of the self, or habit that Sedgwick and Butler come to approach one another. As we have 
already seen in Butler’s reading of Foucault, Critique becomes a practice, a virtue, or art of existence in 
which the subject styles itself in order to continue living, while in Sedgwick it is paranoia as migratory 
position which is able to move from a ossified narrative, and open up to a Foucaultian “‘care of the self,’ 
as the often very fragile concern to provide the self with pleasure and nourishment in an environment 
that is perceived as not particularly offering them.”86
This implicit knowingness or habitual practice is closely related to the feeling of feeling “car-
bombed”. (Para)paranoia is not dissociated from its object of inquiry, but closely intertwined with it. 
(Para)paranoia is developed in drivers, commuters, walkers, bus-passengers or people who use other 
means of transportation. Unlike driving on German highways where one “always already” knows 
how the cars in front, behind and alongside are behaving, (para)paranoia requires a sort of relational 
driving in which one has constantly to analyse and anticipate what the cars in front and behind might 
do and how best to respond accordingly. As such, this knowingness is extended beyond the limits 
of the subject and forms a co-assemblage with the objects/subjects it involves (including clocks, 
cellular phones, cars, buses, trucks, roadblocks, car engines, embassies and sandbags). Manoeuvring 
this situation requires agility, improvisation, intuition and being literally attuned “to the heartbeat of 
contingency”. 
As a result, (para)paranoia differs from “the dogged, defensive narrative stiffness of a paranoid 
temporality, after all, in which yesterday can’t be allowed to have differed from today and tomorrow 
must be even more so, takes its shape from a generational narrative that’s characterized by a distinctly 
Oedipal regularity and repetitiveness”87. (Para)paranoia has a different relationship to narrative 
development. One does not proceed from a – b but might go a –f –a-a –back to c to reach b, or might 
inhabit or occupy all those different spatio-temporal coordinates at the same time. And this is what 
83  Ravaisson and Malabou, “Addiction and Grace: Preface to Félix Ravaisson’s Of Habit,” vii.
84  Wiegman, “The Times We’re in”; Hemmings, “Invoking Affect: Cultural Theory and the Ontological Turn.”I am 
85  Ravaisson and Malabou, “Addiction and Grace: Preface to Félix Ravaisson’s Of Habit,” viii.
86  Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 137.
87  Ibid., 147.
110 111
comes to constitute Sedgwick’s Anti-Oedipus88. In reference to a group of friends, all diagnosed with 
terminal illnesses, Sedgwick notes:
It’s hard to say, hard even to know, how these relationships are different from those shared by people of 
different ages on a landscape whose perspective lines converge on a common disappearing-point. I’m sure 
ours are more intensely motivated: whatever else we know, we know there isn’t time to bullshit. (…) there’s 
a sense in which our life narratives will barely overlap. There’s another sense in which they slide up more 
intimately alongside one another than can any lives that are moving forward accordingly to the regular 
schedule of the generations.89
The relationships Sedgwick describes have turned into a “crisis-ordinariness”, in which even those 
lives that were supposed to continue in a generational lock-step have come to slide up more intimately 
alongside one another. This opens up to a possibility of relationality across different contexts, 
generations, race, gender, sexuality etc. What constitutes this relationality, is texture. And I guess this 
would be the habitual knowingness of the (para)paranoid: whatever else we know, we know that we 
are given to each other, across contexts and generations through each other’s textures. 
(Para)paranoia as poor mapping
According to Silvan Tomkins, paranoia is a strong theory of negative affect. Tomkins consider 
affect theory the “largely tacit theorizing all people do in experiencing and trying to deal with their 
own and others’ affects”90. What characterizes strong theory is the size and topology of the domain 
that it organises. As Sedgwick writes, quoting Tomkins: 
’Any theory of wide generality, is capable of accounting for a wide spectrum of phenomena which appear 
to be very remote, one from the other, and from a common source. This is a commonly accepted criterion 
by which the explanatory power of any scientific theory can be evaluated. To the extent to which the theory 
can account only for ‘near’ phenomena, it is a weak theory …A humiliation theory is strong to the extent to 
which it enables more and more experiences to be accounted for as an instance of humiliating experiences 
on the one hand, or to the extent to which it enables more and more anticipation of such contingencies 
before they actually happen’.91 
This quote seems to exemplify my delusional audience’s critique of the reparative as always already 
weak and unable to account for the complex system that we are up against. It also seems to resonate 
with Ngai’s critique of Jameson to the effect that the local and the partial is turned into an agent who 
counterplots against herself. 
Returning to the digital version of The Thin Neck Files stored in the Atlas Group Archive, I notice 
now that part of the project included a map with the title: “I was overcome with a momentary panic 
at the thought that they might be right”92. The file is a map or scaled model of the 3,641 car bombs 
detonated in Beirut between 1975 and 1991. The map is attributed to Nahia Hassan, whom we are 
told was a senior topographer in the Lebanese Army’s Directorate of Geographic Affairs. Hassan had 
presented the map to the Lebanese parliament’s Committee on Development and Reconstruction in 
1994, and created such a fuss that it led to a suspension of all reconstruction activities. In addition, 
we are told that this is a replica of the original model, which was vandalised and destroyed during 
88  Here I am deliberately paraphrasing Gilles Deleuze & Guattari’s Anti Oedipus, which thought, according to   
  Foucault’s introduction, to free political action from all totalising paranoia. See Deleuze and Guattari,   
  Anti-Oedipus.
89  Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 149.
90  Ibid., 134.
91  Ibid. citing Tomkins.
92  Raad, “The Thin Neck File TypeAGP.”
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the debates. What I am interested in here is not so much the whole narrative that surrounds the map, 
and whether or not it is true, but that the map itself is weak or poor. The map does not create an all-
encompassing strong theory which can account for the complex mesh that makes up the civil war 
and its car bombs. Rather, precisely as a consequence of being weak, poor, full of holes, a replica of an 
original, is it able to capture the contingencies of affect as (critical) inquiry and to operate on different 
scales. 
Returning to Jameson’s idea of conspiracy as the poor person’s mapping in a postmodern world – I 
am no longer sure what makes conspiracy so poor, or belonging to the poor. Rather conspiracy theory 
is a strong theory of negative affect, which leaves little room for contingencies. I like to consider poor 
mapping as an epistemological tool, which does not offer an all-encompassing theory, which is not 
easy to fit into already existing modes of how scientific theory can be evaluated, but rather opens up 
to other modes, or “tacit knowledge production” (in the absence of a better term). Raad, Chakar and 
Khbeiz have to enact certain paranoid strategies and to ally themselves with the traditional producers 
of true, scientific knowledge (documents, maps, topographers, secret agents, doctors etc.), but what 
becomes interesting is the way in which they assemble all those scraps of material into something like 
a whole. But this whole, is literally full of holes; it is a strong map but only in its quality of being poor.
Returning to the episto-ontological tear in the fabric which Butler identifies as the urge to critique, 
it is then possible to say that the quest is not so much how to build an all-encompassing strong theory 
that can mend the hole, but to loosely weave a poor map out of the fragments, partial objects, engines 
and shrapnel shells one encounters and produces.
(Para)paranoia as a theory of affect 
According to Sedgwick, “paranoia is characterized not only by being a strong theory as opposed to 
a weak one, but by being a strong theory of a negative affect”. Sedgwick derives her distinction between 
negative and positive affects from Silvan Tomkins, who sees paranoia as a negative affect. In Silvan 
Tomkins’ theory of activators of affect, a given affect is measured over time according to the density 
of the neural firing. According to this schema paranoia is similar to anger and distress in that it is a 
feeling, which is embodied for a longer period and which does not decrease or increase with time like 
joy and fear. 
This understanding of affect is maybe one of the essay’s weaknesses and why it has been criticised 
for valuing so-called “positive affects” over “negative affects”. To do better justice to Sedgwick, I think 
that there is a way out of this clear-cut distinction. 
As we have already seen, Sedgwick has to enact paranoia to come up with the reparative, testifying 
to its mutability. It is, so to speak, a way in which the subject gathers partial objects to continue living, 
even those objects stemming from a culture which has not been able to sustain the subject. Sedgwick 
explains her recourse to Tomkins and Melanie Klein, as a step away from a paranoid Freudian 
epistemology, for which it is “implausible enough to suppose that truth could be even an accidental 
occasion of joy, inconceivable to imagine joy as a guarantor of truth.”93  She writes:
In Freud, the, there would be no room – except as an example of self delusion – for the Proustian epistemology 
whereby the narrator of À la recherche, who feels in the last volume ‘jostling each other within me a 
whole host of truths concerning human passions and character and conduct’ recognizes them as truths 
insofar as ‘the perception of [them] caused me joy94
93  Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 137–138.
94  Ibid., 137 citing Proust her emphasis.
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As I show in “Affect’s Materiality” Tomkins considers affect to be a separate but “amplifying co-
assembly”95 and affects are not tied to one specific object but are polyamorous: any affect may have any 
“object” and has no single “output”96, while the drive system in Freud was considered as digital “ON/
OFF”. Proust’s narrator is a great example of how this distinction between positive and negative affects, 
between digital drives (ON/OFF) and analogue multi-layered affects becomes blurred.
If paranoia has a “remarkable capacity for duration”97, is it possible to consider the ways in which 
the feeling of “feeling car-bombed” and (para)paranoia have a more complex relationship to duration. 
It takes place over a long period of time, but you can touch in and out of it. You may feel it when you 
are going to work, but then while you are at work you can escape the feeling for a while, as long as 
your work is not located close to any obvious targets (Downtown Beirut, Tayyoune, Dahiye etc.) and 
then when you have to return home from work the feeling comes back. It might also leave for entire 
months, when there is a quiet period or peacetime and then suddenly return with renewed intensity. 
As such (para)paranoia disturbs Tomkins’ division between analogue affects (complex and multi-
layered) and digital drives (ON/OFF) since it can be dormant, appear OFF while it is ON – or be 
reactivated with renewed intensity. (Para)paranoia becomes what we could call digital-analogue, that 
is, when the digital surpasses its preprogramed character and gains analogue and contingent features. 
Within affect studies there has been a tendency to valorise the act of lingering in the intensity of 
what is often understood in society as “negative” affects such as shame, paranoia, loss, and to turn these 
experiences into pleasurable and productive encounters for critical inquiry. Here close reading, even a 
close reading which is too close for comfort, is often heralded as a hermeneutic tool of affect analysis. 
But this practice aimed at “’taking the terror out of the error, at making the making of mistakes sexy, 
creative, even cognitively powerful”98 becomes slightly more complicated with the feeling of “feeling 
car-bombed”: 
[Facebook update (10 hrs.) after the Tayyone car bomb]
This Facebook status update, a few hours after the Tayyone car bomb, is indicative of how affect as a 
prepersonal intensity, which was nothing more than certain unease lingering in the back of the mind, 
suddenly as Rogoff describes collides with matter and returns with renewed intensity. It is literally too 
close for comfort. But what kind of methods does this leave us with? 
I want to return to the strategies developed in The Thin Neck Files and the different levels it seems 
to operate on. On the one hand there is a fetish for minute detail, for car-engines and residual objects 
from detonated car bombs. But it is only through a collective process of aggregating and amassing an 
amount of data that these details are put into effect.
As an extension of this, would it be possible to consider or develop digital aggregators not only as 
tools for surveillance, but as way of considering the way in which strong theoretical constructs interact 
with weak ones in an ecology of knowledge? 
95  Ibid., 100 quoting Tomkins “Quest” p. 309.
96  Ibid., 99.
97  Ngai, Ugly Feelings, 7.
98  Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 147 quoting Joseph Litvak.
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Here the algorithm is not necessarily one that stiffens the narrative, nor a proxy spying on your 
search engine and organising your desires accordingly, but one that becomes a relational tool – maybe 
even a schizo-cartographic assemblage connecting disparate entities, sentiments, feelings, anologue 
images, digital images, videos, bodies, objects and subjects, which were otherwise kept apart into a 
diagrammatic PowerPoint performance. 
(Para)paranoia does not Place its Faith in Exposure
Black banners and posters with white inscription in Arial Black, 
decorated the walls and hung from the balconies. (Beirut 2005) The 
banners demanded to know THE TRUTH of who had planted the one ton 
TNT car bomb that blew up Prime Minister Rafik Hariri alongside 21 of his 
security and advisors on 14th of February 2005. As the years passed, the 
digital clock, at the entrance to Hamra Street, which marks the days 
since the assassination, reached more than a thousand (when the clock 
ran out of digits to continue its task). The clock stopped and banners 
vanished from the cityscape, while “the truth” remained concealed. What 
had happened to the promise, desire of knowing the truth? Had the promise 
of the truth itself expired? Had the machine invented to count the point 
in a near-possible future, when we would know the truth, reached its own 
limit? 
Placing their fate in exposure is where the analog paranoia and the digital (para)paranoia differ the 
most. The (para)paranoid position, “always already” or “meanwhile and & at the same time”, operates 
from the contingent position that knows, that no matter how hard we try to know THE TRUTH, we 
will never know. The (para)paranoid knows that it is a complex, enmeshed assemblage of conspiracy 
theories, foreign powers, intelligence services, with each one itself containing as many different factors 
as what we call the weather. No matter how hard we try “to reveal” it, “to untangle” the mesh, “to 
map out” the different components, we know that we will never know. Or by the time we are done 
mapping, the map itself has moved on. But this does not mean that (para)paranoia reduces everything 
to post-post-modern relativism, because the (para)paranoiac knows that when it hits, it hits violently, 
physically and materially. Even when it hits discursively, it burns and injures. As such, the (para)
paranoid always analyses, screens her surroundings, takes detours and changes sidewalks, not in order 
to know its deeper meaning or to expose its hidden power structures, but simply because she cannot 
afford not to. 
And that is when we can say WITHOUT or BIDOUN. 
“Without”/ “bidoun” becomes an epistemology that knows, but doesn’t know, a hermeneutics that 
desires the truth, but knows that the truth is true in its power of being false. (Para)paranoia or the feeling 
of “feeling car-bombed” is not something we sit and wait for because we find it sexy or titillating – even 
though it might be. It grips us like an act of violence and it forces a reaction from us. But this reaction 
we are without, we do not have a prescribed mould which can fit adequately. We are, so to speak, given 
to each other’s textures, to rub up more intimately against one another – to find new practices and 
habits in order to continue living. But rather than seeing it as a without, I like to think of it as a with 
– or and – an ethico-aesthetics of the “meanwhile & and at the same time”. Like Rogoff ’s ‘without’ the 
“meanwhile & and at the same time” has run up against the limits of the ordering capacity in question, 
and it is by styling, enacting or assembling those already-required habits that it can mutate those into 
a new creative practice.
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In an interview with Kaelen Wilson-Goldie, Raad says:
If truth is not what’s available to the senses, if truth is not consistent with rationality, then truth is not 
equivalent to discourse. Today, we find ourselves in a position where what we take to be true is what rings 
true at the level of the psyche … In Freud’s analysis of hysteria, when a subject undergoes a traumatic 
experience, what they come to believe has been little to do with what actually happened to them. But what 
they come to believe is certainly related to fantasies that are based on memories and that those fantasies 
are very important. You can’t just dismiss them and tell them, wake up, these are just fantasies. The fantasy 
captures the subject’s imagination and is his or her reality. So those are called hysterical symptoms. The 
hysterical symptoms bear no resemblance and have no real proximity to the event that caused them, and 
that’s what fascinated Freud … And I think the hysterical symptom then becomes, in a way, a document 
of something. And the interesting thing about it is that it’s not a question of returning to the origin, it’s a 
question of the future. It’s a question of the production of a narrative that rings true to the subject … The 
story you tell yourself may have nothing to do with what happened to you, but that’s the story that may cure 
you.99 
What I am interested in here is the way in which Raad might do better justice to his own practice, 
by turning to Félix Guattari rather than Freud. According to Guattari, paranoia and delusion have a 
strong resonance in reality and real life experiences. But what becomes interesting to consider here 
in relation to Guattari and his work on the ethico-aesthetic paradigm is the way in which it allows to 
produce a poor mapping, which does not try to signify and communicate but to produce assemblages 
of enunciation capable of capturing the points of singularity of a situation. If we consider Guattari in 
relation to Rogoff ’s Relational Geographies – a practice of mapping, which does not “operate from a 
single principle that maps everything in an outward-bound motion with itself at the centre”, which 
proposes a practice of mapping that is composed of “aggregates of intensities, of insurgencies that link 
and empathies and spark off each other, of generational loyalties that cross boundaries, histories and 
languages”100 – then poor mapping becomes an epistemological tool, which has given up on placing its 
faith in exposure. The (para)paranoiac knows that, no matter how great the desire for the truth, she 
will never know, but she is still left with the same habits of mimicry, exposure, gathering documents 
and mapping as her paranoid brothers. In My Neck is Thinner than a Hair this poor mapping becomes 
the excessive fabrication or unearthing of documents. Raad collects as much data as possible only to 
deny himself: “I’m not sure what you will know, and the same goes for the victims.” In so doing, he 
seems almost to perform a Foucaultian Tease, who as we have seen, approaches some sort of “originary 
freedom” only to deny it and say: “I did not say that”. In addition, the fabrication of documents 
cannot be traced back to one artist, a consistent and accountable doer behind the deed, but a more 
or less fictitious group. This group again has just compiled the documents presented or offered to 
them by more or less delusional agents, chief investigators, secret police, documentary photographers 
and doctors. Like Ngai’s reading of Juliana Spar and Diana Wards poems, where bureaucracy and 
complicity become the engine for creative production – a similarly bureaucratic paranoid sensibility 
is at stake in The Thin Neck Files. This auto-generated mode of production is only punctuated by the 
always excessively poetic titles and an almost frantic sensibility for the materiality of the document. 
And it is by alternating between those different scales and sensibilities that projects like The Thin 
Neck Files are able to capture the singularity of a situation while opening up to a larger ecology; that 
is how weak theory interacts with strong theory and creates a more ecological view of knowing101. The 
assemblage does not attempt to restore or build an all-encompassing grand theory, yet it is this fable 
99  Wilson-Goldie, “Walid Raad: The Atlas Group Opens Its Archives.”
100  Eshun and Gray, “The Militant Image,” 2; Rogoff, “Engendering Terror.” I return to discuss Relational 
  Geographies in the chapter ”Reconstitution image”.
101  Butler, “What Is Critique? An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue,” 319.
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“that may cure you.” 
a (Para)Paranoid sub-delusion: affect as critical inquiry 
How may we conclude, or sub-delude, an answer to my manic defensive delusional audience’s 
critique of the oxymoronic relationship between paranoid and reparative, and its slightly more 
aggressive sibling, who sees the reparative as turned agent, counterplots against oneself? How to 
shake out some usable tools from the (para)paranoia rehearsed above? And how to turn those (para)
paranoid impulses into reparative ones?
Eve’s essay points to a tear in the fabric of our epistemological and methodological web where new 
ones have to be invented if we want to respond to the present state of “crisis ordinariness”102, but rather 
than providing us with a prescription of how to stitch the hole back together we are given to each 
other’s practices to assemble or restyle our own ways to continue living. 
Sedgwick’s critique of critical theory takes place at a methodological level and whether or not 
her enactment of a certain belated cold-war paranoia in the mid-90s/early 2000s might have been 
a timely one, I do think it offers an important check-and-balance wake-up-call to remind us that 
our epistemological and methodological suitcase needs to be repacked in response to the multiple 
urgencies and contingencies facing us today. By enacting the very same paranoia that she sets out to 
criticise, Sedgwick’s call for the reparative practice is not a do away with critical enterprise, but the 
habitual, surest ways of knowing to open up for an ecology of knowing tied to other affects.
As such, I can look my first group of my delusional adversaries in the eyes and say: “Yes, the 
REPARATIVE CRITICAL PRACTICE is an oxymoron, in the sense that it is a repetition of three 
concepts that appear in conjunction and are folded within one another”. I have shown that critique 
always ties into a practice – and that practice becomes reparative only insofar as it is open to 
contingency. Affect becomes a critical inquiry because it pushes us to the limits of our surest ways of 
knowing. In this passage – or urgency – the critical impasse has not yet found or taken a form, it does 
not have a prescription or mould it can be fitted back into, but is left open to contingency. But at the 
same time, the affect also re-unites a passage where we become one with others; it forces us to create 
other affective assemblages of enunciation through a process of developing thought, practices and 
“desires through juxtaposition and disjunction.”103 And this excessive repetitiveness which opens up to 
a possibility of styling ethico-aesthetic practices of the “meanwhile and & at the same time”.
I could turn to the second group constituting my delusional audience and look them in the eyes 
and say: “Paranoia is one of many possible affects and as such critical practice always stems from an 
affective enterprise with paranoia and male-ideation as being one of many possible affects.” But I know 
that no matter how fiercely I try to motivate my response it will always bounce off the iron wall they 
have built around their critical enterprise. 
The reason why I have chosen to share with you my own personal anecdotes of being in proximity 
to the “feeling of feeling car bombed” is to show that there are certain instances when affect strikes, 
and strikes violently, demanding of the situation agility, improvisation and being literally attuned “to 
the heartbeat of contingency”. Affect becomes a critical inquiry which both forces a reaction from the 
affected body but also styles a new way of being in the world, which does not have a mould or adequate 
form which it can easily slip into. Habit becomes central here, as the way in which subjects fashions 
their habitual mode into a new practice in order to continue living. And this is when the epistemic 
102  Berlant, Cruel Optimism.
103  Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, xiii.
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limits become closely tied to the ontological ones of what counts as a subject at all? Here I have argued 
that this style, or art of existence, is not necessarily an ascesis, or a “without” in Rogoff ’s terms, even 
though it might be. As I show with the work of the Atlas Group, this is a collective, historically dense 
assemblage of materials, which operates on different scales. By turning the critical practice from a 
question of epistemology - what it means to know - to a question of ontology - who counts as a subject 
- Butler shows, perhaps involuntarily, that it becomes an practice of assemblages, in a Guattarian 
sense of producing other affective milieus of enunciation. These assemblages cuts across or queer other 
relational fabrics including social, physical, bodily (in the broadest sense), psychological, institutional, 
technical and machinic fragments into new co-assemblages, but without stiffening or filling them 
up. Bodies that matter, taken in the widest possible sense, are thus not solely confinable to the norms 
that prescribe who counts as a subject– but opens up to a possibility of considering even the smallest 
monad, pixel or car-engine. 
While the explosions for me were terrifying to experience, for my mother in-law they also became 
moments of connection with friends and family. During that following trip to the mountains there 
was a sense in which our friendships slid up more intimately alongside one another. In Sedgwick 
words, “whatever else we know, we know there isn’t time to bullshit.” 
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Still from Leap into Colour, to watch the video please visit: https://vimeo.com/131082332 password: armand
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Allow me to begin with an anecdote about something which happened to me, not long ago, on an October 
night, in the Northern port town of Eskanderia (Alexandria) in Egypt. Harun Farocki was showing his 
films In Comparison1 and Videograms of a Revolution2 at the Goethe Institute3. Initially, the two films 
seemed to have very little in common: in Videograms of a Revolution, Farocki and Andrei Ujică assembled 
VHS and video footage shot by amateurs and newsreel cameramen to reconstruct the events that led to 
the fall of the Ceauşescus in Romania in 1989. In Comparison traces the making of bricks, from hand-
moulded bricks in Burkina Faso and India to the highly-industrialised production of standardised bricks 
in Germany and France. At the end, the camera settles on a robot constructing a relief from bricks, each 
of which constitutes a pixel in a larger image.
As I was sitting there in the Goethe villa, watching the digitised, poor version of the original VHS tapes 
and films burned onto a DVD copy, a chilly breeze blowing from the Mediterranean Sea transported my 
childhood memories of watching the live transmission of the same event, and superimposed them onto the 
screen. These were memories I had forgotten I had: 
It was a cold Christmas. Due to heavy snow the oil-truck could not deliver oil to the local heating system. 
We gathered around the woodstove as the TV showed the live transmission of Nicolae and Elena Ceauşescu 
waiting to die. 
The tenses, formats and contexts dizzy my consciousness. ‘I shudder over a catastrophe, which has already 
occurred’4, or which is taking place in this very moment: I am not sure. 
☐☐☐ Rematerialisation ☐☐☐
Some people nowadays are too eager to criticize this numerical organization, denouncing it as a military 
or even concentration-camp society where people are no longer anything more than deterritorialized 
‘numbers.’ But that is false. Horror for horror, the numerical organization of people is certainly no crueller 
1  Farocki, In Comparison.
2  Farocki et al., Videogramme einer Revolution Videograms of a revolution.
3  I am grateful to Harun Farocki, Antje Ehmann and the participants of the workshop “Labour in a Single Shot” 
  organised by Beirut  (Cairo) Sarah Rifky, Jens Meier-Rothe, and Antonia Alampi 2012. 
4  Barthes, Camera lucida, 97.
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than the lineal or state organizations. Treating people like numbers is not necessarily worse than treating 
them like trees to prune, or geometrical figures to shape and model.5 
Motivated by my encounter with Farocki’s films, I return to discuss the recurrent question: What, 
if anything, will one be able to assemble of the events sweeping across the Arab-speaking world, if we are 
to go back after the events like Farocki and Ujică did in Romania, to assemble the videograms, pixels 
and fragments captured on countless cellular phones, video cameras and satellite phones. And how to 
assemble or repair an incongruent image from the fragments dug out of the rubble?6
My aim in this essay is to construct how the reparative critical practice as image opens up to a process 
of rematerialisation. As I have discussed in the previous chapters, affect enfolds the materiality of the 
initial body which produced it7. The affect is able to tear itself away from that body or totality of which 
it formed part and is raised into a state of entity – [a brick], [a close-up], [a videogram] or a [pixel]. But 
this entity is again able to affect and be affected and enters into a process of rematerialisation in which 
a third entity is produced. This third entity still carries the history of its making in its newfound form, 
hence the [video[gram]pixel] [clay[handmoulded]brick]. 
I will work my way through this process of rematerialisation by splicing elements of my own 
experience watching and learning from Farocki with reflections from my own work with the video-
installation Leap into Colour8.
Seeing In Comparison and Videograms of a Revolution together made me aware how the films’ 
content become analogous to the films’ own migration between multiple different formats, platforms 
and contexts. In Comparison traces the manual processes involved in the production of hand-moulded 
bricks from clay in Burkina Faso, to the industrialized fabrication of bricks in Germany, but at the same 
time the film itself migrates from being analogue to being digitised. But this migration from texxture 
(hand-moulded brick, film) to texture (standardized brick, digital image)9 is somehow subverted 
when, in the end, a robot assembles a brick relief from the pixels in the image. Even though the 
enormous brick image is constructed digitally and hyper-industrially, it still has a shallow depth, which 
complicates a clear-cut textural division between manual manufacture and mechanical production. 
As I watch In Comparison together with Videograms of a Revolution, the filmmakers and their post-
production editing board become the machinic assemblage that stitches fragments of videograms and 
VHS together to reassemble – or rematerialise – the missing seconds of a revolution that was omitted 
from the official broadcast.
In the chapter “Affect’s Time” I discuss how affect’s time is often described as a “missing half-
second” between the initial registration of an affect in the brain to consciousness’s registration of that 
affect10. I show that this is not a missing half-second but the multiplicity and heterogeneity of time 
experienced as direct. Farocki and Ujică’s montage technique indeed shows that the missing seconds 
of the Romanian Revolution were not in fact missing, but were rather a proliferation of moments 
captured by amateur photographers, and which they were able to splice back together.
5  Deleuze og Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 390.
6  I am grateful to Abbas Mroueh for initially raising this question in the Q&A that followed the screening.
7  I use body in its widest possible sense to include mental bodies, virtual bodies etc. which and not necessarily  
  bodies-as-organisms.
8  Dirckinck-Holmfeld, Leap into Colour.
9  I discuss Renu Bora and Sedgwick’s concept of Texxture | Texture in “Affect Image Touch”. “Texxture”, the   
  history of the object’s making, is enfolded in the surface (the hand-moulded brick) while “texture” is the 
  willed erasure of that history; however, as Bora notes, this is not a clear-cut division, but ever-permeable.
10  Angerer, Bösel, og Ott, Timing of Affect.
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☐☐☐ Farocki’s method: the Metal Souk ☐☐☐
Harun Farocki asked me to go back and re-shoot the man mending the iron-fence in the Metal Souk 
of Cairo. I never went back. Farocki passed away but the man is most probably still there, splicing his 
fences with a steady persistency, while trucks, horses, flocks of sheep, tea-vendors, scooters and cars pass 
over his metal work. Like the production of subjectivity itself, the iron-fence enfolds the fluxes that pass 
over it – animal parts, body parts, spare parts, shoe imprints, machine parts, dust and exhaust fumes. 
Maybe going back and re-filming the shot would have brought me closer, not only to Farocki’s method 
– the steady persistency with which he treats his shots – but also to the reparative critical practice as an 
assemblage of images.
My failure to fulfil Farocki’s wish left me with an aspiration: the reparative critical practice is not in 
need of a story or text to make itself legible but becomes an image in itself through the juxtaposition of 
images and blocks of movements/duration11. The reparative critical practice becomes a commentary 
on images through its own means and its own technology – montage. Farocki notes “a montage must 
hold together with invisible forces the things that would otherwise become muddled.”12 
In the e-flux journal published to commemorate the life of Farocki, Kodwo Eshun attests to 
Farocki’s method and immense contribution to the field by creating an image repertoire, in which 
images comment on images or study images by the means of the images themselves:  
They [Farocki and Antje] conclude that Pier Paolo Pasolini: corpi e luoghi relies on ‘the successively juxtaposed 
images to form relations, on the images to comment on images.’ In other words, it studies the image by means 
of the image itself. The immanent logic of the Pasolini Antropologo seemed to have overcome the ‘peculiar 
unquotability’ of writing on film that faced film theorists like Raymond Bellour from the 1970s onwards. 
It seemed to speak about film using the same techniques as film itself. It looks forward to the cross-section 
epic of A Day in the Life of A Consumer (1993) or the ‘elementary motif analysis’ of The Expression of Hands 
(1997). It is a summa logica of Farockian soft montage. It prompts many questions. What happens when 
you place images side by side? Face to face? When you put them to work? What capacities for comparison 
or commentary emerge in the movement from one image to another and back again? If images comment 
on images, then what kind of commentary do they produce? What are they saying? How do they explain 
themselves? What are they arguing about? What do they demonstrate? What do they imitate? When do they 
11  Here I paraphrase Gilles Deleuze who notes that the filmmaker invents or put together blocks of movement  
  duration. ”It is not a matter of invoking a story or contesting one. Everything has a story”. Deleuze og Kaufman  
  (Ed.), «Having an Idea in Cinema.»
12  Ehmann og Eshun, Harun Farocki, Against what?, 069–074.
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copy each other? Who do they inhabit? What do they emulate? Who do they rival? Where are they going? 
What do they possess? Who do they possess?13
Eshun shows how Farocki’s films become a study of images through the image itself by means of a 
“soft montage”14. Farocki’s soft montage aggregates, amasses, gathers and juxtaposes images, to report 
on images with little if any written commentary. The composition is not based on the advancement of 
a story or narrative, but on the topology of the images themselves. The role of the filmmaker becomes 
montage - a soft montage – of organizing, juxtaposing, the shots, the blocks of movements/duration 
and affects/percepts15. But if we take into consideration that the French word agencement (which 
Deleuze uses for “montage” and is often translated into “montage” and “assemblage”) is more like an 
organization, arrangement or association closely related to the word “agency”. Then montage is not 
exclusive to the filmmaker, but the different blocks that make up the montage begin to acquire agentic 
powers of their own and operate on their own and in relation to each other16. 
The robot at the end of In Comparison that constructs the brick-relief based on an analysis of 
pixels made me realise how my own mental camera was making up blocks of movement and duration 
and intercutting and superimposing them onto the screen. Montage is not only the privilege of the 
filmmaker but becomes a collaborative practice where the viewer is invited to sculpt with the bricks 
and blocks of movement offered to us by the filmmaker and to intercut these fragments with our own 
(involuntary) memory, or mental footage of the events.
Farocki notes the process of digitisation is not a withdrawal away from matter but a process of re-
materialisation17. It is not only the film which enters into a process of rematerialisation in its migration 
from analogue film, to video, to digital; the formats blur, pixels interchange with video streams, with 
film light, with my own mental images. “I is another is a robot”, translating pixels into compounds of 
images. I burrow backward and forward in my own discarded memory, stitching the bits and pieces 
into a whole. The result is an incongruent image – part pixel, part film, part video, part electromagnetic 
flow, part woman, part memory – presenting itself as a relief with a shallow depth. 
Affection is what occupies the interval, what occupies it without filling it in or filling it up. It surges in the 
centre of indetermination, that is to say in the subject, between perception which is troubling in certain 
respects and a hesitant action. It is a coincidence of subject and object, or the way in which the subject 
perceives itself, or rather experience itself or feels itself ‘from the inside’ (the material aspect of subjectivity). 
It relates movement to a ‘quality’ as lived state (adjective). Indeed, it is not sufficient to think that perception 
– thanks to distance – retains or reflects what interests us by letting pass what is indifferent to us. There is 
inevitably a part of external movements that we ‘absorb’, that we refract, and which does not transform itself 
into either objects of perception or acts of the subject; rather they mark the coincidence of the subject and 
the object in a pure quality. This is the final avatar of the movement-image: the affection image. 18
The montage is comprised of heterogeneous components, which are able to act on each other and 
13  Eshun, “A Question They Never Stop Asking | e-flux.”
14  Ehmann and Eshun, Harun Farocki, Against what?, 069–074.
15  While the filmmaker according to Deleuze creates blocks of movements/duration and visual artists sculpts   
  with affects and percepts, I want to suggest that the film work of Farocki and video-art/installation in general,  
  creates blocks of movements/duration and affects and percepts and the concepts they give rise to at same time.
16  I use montage as described by Deleuze as “a composition, the assemblage [agencement] of movement 
  images  as constituting a direct image of time” Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-image, 31. It is important to  
  stress that the French word agencement, which is often translated as montage and assemblage, is more like 
  an organization, arrangement or association. The agencement as montage or assemblage is closely related to  
  agency, and here agency is not solely understood as pertaining to humans but the things assembled so to speak  
  gain agentic powers, Callon, «What Does it Mean to Say that Economics is Performative?»
17  HARUN FAROCKI on MATERIALITY - cine-fils.com.
18  Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-image, 67–68.
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rip themselves from the totality of which they should form part and enter into new assemblages. 
But what holds the montage together without filling it up?  Unlike the robot that ejects glue onto the 
bricks, the reparative critical practice is held together by an invisible force. That force is affect as pre-
personal intensities.
☐☐☐ Leap into Colour ☐☐☐ 
Instead of going back and refilming the man in the Souk I embarked upon the production of the 
video installation, Leap into Colour, which had taken me to Cairo in the first place. 
Leap into Colour researches the photographic practice of the Armenian Egyptian photographer 
Armenak [Armand] Azrouni (1901-1963). While working and living in Beirut I used to see Armand’s 
photographs of the famous Egyptian singers and actors Abdel Wahab, Samia Gamal, Lola Sidky 
and Madiha Yusri as preserved by the Arab Image Foundation in Beirut. I did not realize that these 
photographs were taken by Armand, the father of Philippe Arzrouni, whom I had known my entire 
life and who was like a grandfather to me, living in Hvidovre, a suburb of Copenhagen, Denmark. 
When I went to Cairo, I thought I was making a film about memory, retrieving the memory of 
Philippe, but also of a whole period in Egypt’s history, which to a certain extent is unavailable to the 
present. But it occurred to me that the project was becoming less about memory as storage, with or 
without access, but rather about memory as a process of re-materialisation and migration.
In my work with Leap into Colour it became apparent that Armand’s photographic practice had 
leapt or rematerialised itself in several ways: 
In the 1930s - 50s Cairo was an international hub for political, royal, and economic elites from 
all over the world and witnessed a bourgeoning of the art, film and music industries. Armand 
portrayed the celebrities as well as regular clients who frequented his studios in downtown Cairo. 
Like his contemporary photographers19, Armand used various black-and-white techniques, including 
exaggerated use of light and shadow, superimposing layers and textures; adding dust and fingerprints; 
19  Some of the most well known photographers from that era in Egypt were Alban (Aram Arnavoudian 1883-
  1961) and Van Leo (Levon Alexander Boyadjian 1921-2002). Like Armand they were of Armenian descent,   
  based in Egypt. See Zaatari, Portraits du Caire, Van Leo, Armand, Alban. 
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etching into the image surface during the development process20. In addition he often hand-coloured 
the print using a paintbrush. After Armand’s death in 1963 Armand’s oldest son, Armand Jr., took over 
the studio, and continued using his father’s name and signature. In the 1990s, with the dissolution of 
the studio, the photographic oeuvre was divided up: one part went to Beirut and is incorporated in 
The Arab Image Foundation21. A small part was kept in Cairo in Armand Jr.’s “Chambre Secret” (secret 
room) where he maintains the remains of the studio. The rest of Armand’s work has been dispersed all 
over the world, sold to private collectors. A small part has been preserved by the remaining Arzrouni 
family members who, like the photographs, have dispersed all over the world, with Philippe in 
Hvidovre, Denmark, his brothers (now passed away) in Canada and Switzerland and a sister in South 
Africa. A further process of rematerialisation takes place in that a rumour within the city has it that 
many of the silver gelatine negatives in Cairo were sold by the kilo for the price of silver and remelted 
back to silver.22 
b) In their various locations, the photographs continue a process of re-materialisation: The Arab 
Image Foundation (AIF) in Beirut has preserved around 300 of Armand’s negatives.23 The archive 
provides excellent preservation facilities and the negatives are stored in a cooled and safe storage 
room24. AIF has digitised a large part of Armand’s work, and the public can browse through low-
resolution versions of the photos on the AIF website. They have also developed contact sheets, which 
the visitor to the archive can browse through manually. In the digitised version of the archive each 
photograph has been assigned a number and meta-text/captions that describe the photo’s content. 
Since what has been preserved by the AIF is the black-and-white negative, and not the actual hand-
coloured print, what is available to the present is the black-and-white version. The photographs have, 
so to speak, leapt first from black-and-white to colour and then back to black-and-white. But then 
they have also leapt from full format negatives to low resolution/variable resolution in the digital copy. 
In addition their content has leapt between one description made available in the public archive, and 
another in the internal achieve.
b.2) The images preserved or scattered across the globe are no longer accessible to the general 
public; they hide in various locations. From time to time, an original photograph belonging to the 
person portrayed appears on the Internet, uploaded by private people in various places around the 
world.25 These personal uploads might come with some personal memories of the person portrayed, 
or with those of his or her relatives, which of course create different meta-data than the data stored in 
the archive.
b.3) If it is not merely a rumour that some of the silver gelatine negatives have been remelted back to 
silver, then those negatives have also leapt first from silver halide, or latent image, to actual photograph 
– and then back to silver…and then perhaps acquired a new host in the form of a necklace, a silver-
20  There are some similarities to the texture and treatment of light and shadow in Sternberg’s The Scarlet Empress,  
  which I discuss in “Affect Image Touch”.
21  The Arab Image Foundation is a non- profit organisation in Beirut, created in 1997 by the artist Akram Zaatari 
  and photographers Fouad El Khouri, Samer Mohdad in response to the non-existence or rapid disappearance 
  of photographic archives in the Middle East. AIF today holds more than 600,000 photographs. 
22  Conversation with Mohamad El Maymouny from Contemporary Image Center, Cairo December 2012.
23  In the file 0043ar (Armand) there are around 1100 negatives. But the file does not distinguish between the   
  work of Armenak (father) and Armand (fils/jr.). But around 300 can be dated to the father, with whom I am  
  primarily concerned.
24  Since AIF is a not-for-profit organisation and due to lack of public funding in Lebanon, the wellbeing of the  
  archive is dependent on private funding and the work of volunteers with few fulltime staff.
25  One of these photographs appeared during research on Facebook uploaded from Arizona US, while another  
  is the wedding photograph of Tahia and Gamal Abdel Nasser, which appeared in the biography of Tahia, and in 
  low resolution in an As-Saffir newspaper article.
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draped garment or a new photograph.
Walid Raad’s on-going research project, performance and installation Scratching on Things I Could 
Disavow26 made me realise that it is not only people who get affected, but that colours, shapes and forms 
equally get affected. In response to the mushrooming of large scale museums and art-infrastructure 
projects27 alongside the continuum of war, territorial and socio-political reconfiguration which the 
Arab-speaking world is currently witness to, Raad’s project researches the loss of accessibility to 
the cultural heritage and specifically the modernist artists from the Arab region. Informed by his 
collaboration with artist and writer Jalal Toufic28, Raad speculates how those artists, as well as the 
colours and shapes that they used to employ are “withdrawn” – unavailable to the present. Sensing the 
forthcoming disaster, colours, shapes, and forms leap; they hide in other formats and materials – such 
as notebooks, index cards, stationery, ledgers etc. – materials which are anonymous and bureaucratic 
in nature. According to Raad the forms, shapes and colours are made accessible to him again through 
a kind of “telepathic” intervention from the future29. Raad’s work made me realise that this process 
is not an “immaterial withdrawal” of literary, philosophical texts, films, or music which has not been 
directly or materially damaged as Toufic to some degree argues30. Rather this process takes place 
materially (while perhaps not being recognised as such) and this is not a withdrawal from materiality 
alone, but is a process of radical re-materialisation. Sensing the forthcoming disaster, the colours leap, 
they take hide in new materials, but they still retain aspects of their initial shape, hue, tone, which 
they incorporate into the new materials they take refuge in. Through this process they create a third 
material, somewhere in-between - hence the [the colour red in a modernist painting[becoming] bank-
note] in Raad’s example. 
To use an example from the archive, Number 0043ar00195 is an image of Philippe’s mother 
Margueritte Arzrouni, photographed by Armand in the late 1930s (before Philippe was born). In the 
online public database the caption says: “Studio portrait of a woman in traditional clothing. Egypt/
Cairo, 1945”. In the internal archive the caption accompanying the image says: “The image of Armand’s 
wife before their marriage”. The photograph was most probably not taken in 1945 since it was taken 
before Philippe was born in 1942. In addition, the image-caption doesn’t mention that she was a Swiss 
woman living in Cairo and as such there is a great deal of performativity going on in this photograph 
in that she is posing in full Upper Egyptian tulle Assuit.31 This process of rematerialisation takes place 
not only on a discursive or “immaterial” level, but also materially in the very image itself. The large 
format negatives were printed and hand-coloured, but what remain in the archive are the black-and-
white negatives; variable resolution etc. 
This does not make the archive less truthful or incoherent, but testifies to that it has been developed 
through contingent practices, where various different sources and actors have added to the inscription 
of the image, its legacy and future form. All these instances take part in a process of re-materialisation. 
Even though they take various different forms, they still bear something of their initial form through 
the process – just like the hand-moulded bricks in Burkina Faso retain the initial clay in their making. 
Ina Blom notes the digital archival processes are not in fact storage processes – but a constant 
26  Ahmed, “Imaginary Prohibitions.”
27  Sharjah Biennial, the Dubai Global Art Forum, Guggenheim Abu Dhabi, MATHAF Doha, Louvre Abu Dhabi,  
  Performing Arts Centre etc. to name but a few.
28  Raad og Toufic, The Withdrawal of Tradition Past a Surpassing Disaster.
29  Raad, “Index XXVI.”
30  Raad and Toufic, The Withdrawal of Tradition Past a Surpassing Disaster, 11.
31  “Tulle be telli” is a metal/silver-plated tulle, which is produced in the area around Assuit in Upper Egypt and  
  became a popular costume, as worn by Samia Gamal and others in 1930s Egyptian movies.
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reactivation – where one is constantly in need of technical and mathematical programming to re-
vitalise or recreate the material anew: 
Dette er egentlig ikke lagring, men konstant reaktivering. Man er avhengig av teknisk-matematisk 
programmering for å få det samme materialet opp igjen. Men det er aldri det samme materialet, det er 
alltid aktivert på nytt. Elektronisk materiale har nemlig ingen stabilitet. Det dreier seg om ytterst flyktige 
prosesser.32
The material will never be the same material again but will always be activated anew. Electronic 
material is not stable but transient. Here I want to add that this is not exclusive to digital materials but 
is also the case for the analogue archive. But the transient nature of the material was already present 
in Armand’s studio. Armand developed the latent silver halide image, treated it with different textures, 
dust, sand fingerprints in the chemical development process, and then hand-coloured this image. 
This analogue image was not more stable but was at all times in a transient state of becoming. The 
editor, artist, brick-maker cannot help but enter into some sort of rematerialisation of her materials. 
And in so doing she makes herself apprentice to the signs, the materials and the affordances offered 
to her by the material’s texture33. Deleuze notes: “There is no apprentice who is not the Egyptologist of 
something: one becomes a carpenter only by becoming sensitive to the signs of wood, a physician by 
becoming sensitive to the signs of disease.”34 Here, signs are not understood as pure scripture, but the 
sign carries with it a materiality in itself. 
I will now move on to discuss how this process of rematerialisation refers back to the production of 
subjectivity as an aggregate of images.
☐☐☐ The aggregator: montage and archive ☐☐☐
Matter, in our view, is an aggregate of ‘images’. And by ‘image’ we mean a certain existence which is more 
than that which the idealist calls a representation, but less than that which the realist calls a thing – an 
32  Helsvig, “Mediearkeologen.”
33  Deleuze, Proust and Signs.
34  Ibid., 4 my itallics .
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existence placed halfway between the ‘thing’ and the ‘representation.’35
Affects are no longer feelings or affections; they go beyond the strength of those who undergo them. 
Sensation, percepts and affects are beings whose validity lies in themselves and exceeds any lived. They could 
be said to exist in the absence of man because man, as he is caught in stone, on the canvas, or by words, is 
himself a compound of percepts and affects. 36
Through my work with Leap into Colour it became possible to extend Judith Butler’s conception 
of matter as process of rematerialisation, which is never fixed and thus temporal, to other forms of 
materialisation – the image archive of Armand37.  By juxtaposing the archival footage with restaged 
footage and Philippe’s personal memory it became apparent that matter, as described above by Henri 
Bergson, is an aggregate of images, which are able to tear itself from the totality of which it should 
form part and enter into a process of rematerialisation. But how does this process refer back to the 
production of subjectivity itself?
To navigate my way around this question I will update Henri Bergson’s understanding of matter 
as an aggregate of images by using David Joselit and Hito Steyerl’s different conceptions of digital 
aggregators.
Art historian David Joselit’s article “On Aggregators”38 introduces the concept of the aggregator 
in relation to art practices as “’constituted by the collection of many particles or units into one body, 
mass, or amount; collective, whole, total.’ (…) An aggregate is ‘composed of many individuals united 
into one association, and grammatically it signifies a ‘collective’. In each sense, an aggregate selects 
and configures relatively autonomous elements.”39 Similar to the big-data organizers, like Google, 
which amass data and package it according to the user’s monitored desires and preferences, the 
aggregators in the art world “shape vast flows and reservoirs of art-world information through the 
digital template of search algorithms and screen-based visual interfaces from laptops to smart phones.” 
As an example, Joselit mentions e-flux, the artist generated web-platform for the promotion of art 
world news, events and reflection. What distinguish the aggregators in the art world from Google’s 
“algorithmic automatism” is, according to Joselit, that they operate from a modus of “curation”. While I 
am sympathetic to the idea that curation might be what holds the aggregator in the art world together, 
it might equally be various other less transparent factors including algorithms, finance capital and 
corporate interests that do so.
What I find useful in Joselit’s concept of the aggregator is that he identifies two syntactic levels upon 
which the aggregators operate across scales, which are asynchrony and the common: 
 
Asynchrony The aggregate is a figure of uneven development, both literally and methaphorically, 
and this is why it exemplifies the deep structure of globalization…40
The Common Aggregators furnish platforms where semi-autonomous elements come together. Since these 
elements are not integrated into a coherent structure (…) but rather have their conceptual unevenness 
heightened, aggregators raise the question of the common. The aggregate differs from two of its close modern 
cognates: montage an archive. In montage, individual elements are subsumed within an overall compositional 
logic; even if the source of its constituent elements remains apparent, these components don’t typically maintain 
the disarming quality of independence characteristic of an aggregate, which seems always in danger of falling 
apart.  An archive principle of selection is inclusive with regard to theme, institution period or event. It serves to 
35  Bergson, Matter and Memory, 9.
36  Deleuze et al., What Is Philosophy?, 164.
37  I discuss Butler’s notion of rematerialisation in Affect as Critical Inquiry, see also Ahmed, “Imaginary   
  Prohibitions.”
38  Joselit, “On Aggregators.” I am grateful to Nanna Bonde Thylstrup for directing my attention to this article.
39  Joselit, “On Aggregators”, 13.
40  Ibid., 13.
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collect, preserve, and even constitute evidence as a pillar of epistemological stability. Aggregators (…) proceed 
from an obscure principle of selection, typically staging confrontations among an array of objects that are 
entirely different value or epistemologies.41 
The aggregator reinvents the notion of the common allowing for multiple semi-autonomous 
elements to come together and exist within the same space. However, Joselit positions the aggregate in 
opposition to two “modern cognates, the archive and montage”, and in so doing he risks rehearsing a 
rather simplistic version of archive and montage.
If we return to Farocki’s method, the composition, the “agencement”, the montage is not based on 
the advancement of a story or narrative, but on the topology/materiality of the images themselves. As 
Eyal Zivan has noted with regard to Godard’s filmmaking, this is the very essence of montage itself: 
Shot and counter shot do not imply any form of similarity or equality but they pose a question. According 
to Jean-Luc Godard, montage, as the essence of cinema, does not solely consist of putting one image in 
juxtaposition or in opposition to another or to draw together heterogeneous elements; its purpose is rather 
to create a space of thought in which the possibility exists that one reality inhabits another.42  
Montage precisely offers a possibility of enabling multiple realities and possibilities to exist within 
the same frame and to inhabit each other.
Through my work with Leap into Colour, it became apparent that the archive is also not a coherent 
storage space, where everything is organised neatly according to an all-encompassing “principle 
of selection” and epistemological stability. This is also described eloquently in Roxana Bedrule’s 
Inheritance and Archives: Affective Economies in Postcommunism about the surveillance archives of 
the secret service Stasi in East Germany and the Securitate archive in Romania. Bedrule shows how 
the archives engage in (willingly or unwillingly) a radical re-materialisation of the very materials for 
which they exist to store and preserve:
Some of these photos [in the Stasi archive] were ripped up, most likely around mid-January 1990. After 
the Berlin Wall came down, large groups of angry German and civil-right campaigners entered the Stasi-
headquarters in Berlin and found impressive amounts of shredded and ripped paper piled in bags or 
discarded on the floor. The torn pieces were guarded under collective custody until later that year when a 
government agency took charge of the holding in the Stasi archive. The present custodians of the archives 
began sorting in one thousand nine hundred ninety-five millions of pages that were torn into anything from 
four to twenty pieces at the same time.43
Bedrule shows that while full recovery of some of the photographs was made possible other 
photographs “looked like an unfinished puzzle, deteriorated by white lines stretching all across the 
surface, with patches here and there left blank due to missing pieces. Yet others have scratches and dents 
on the surface, most likely due to staplers”44. But this radical rematerialisation of the original archive 
does not end here. With the introduction of digital archival techniques the images were digitised. 
One of Bedrule’s montages shows how, when she ordered the material from the archive, a custodian 
pixelated the face of the person photographed. The archive does this a courtesy to the subject, or as an 
ethical decision to protect the identity of the person, who has already been violated by being under 
surveillance.  But this act of discretising or cutting the person’s face up in pixels creates a violent affect. 
The result is an arresting image, in which the body of the person and its surroundings are intact, but 
41  Ibid., 14. My emphasis.
42  DISSENT ! Eyal Sivan Montage, as the essence of cinema,…
43  Bedrule, “Inheritance and Archives,” 144–145.
44  Ibid., 145.
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the face has morphed into a discrete entity – part human, part pixel, part blur – which annihilates 
the face’s role as “individuating”, “socialising”, “relational and communicating”45. With the best of 
intentions, the digital archival practice comes to imitate the violent deferral and rematerialisation of 
the “poor image”, which I discuss in relation to the pixelated images emerging out of Syria46. But in this 
case the effect or affect is not caused by the violent production mechanisms that produced the image 
alone; rather it is a high resolution, analogue image that has been treated, rematerialised, cut up into 
pixels. And unlike the pixelated images from Syria this is not the perpetrator (the secret service agent/
the army soldier) that has been cut up into squares and pixels, but the civilian. 
Archive and Montage might not be as strange to the aggregator as Joselit envisaged; rather the 
aggregator operates from modus of montage in its French version agencement, in which the assemblage 
gains almost agentic powers of its own. 
Joselit shows how the aggregator operates on the level of asynchrony and uneven development, 
which encompasses different temporalities within the same frame. The asynchronicities are part of the 
same global economy or algorithm. While the aggregator’s temporality caters to those it caters to, the 
aggregator does “nothing to redress the economic disparity, as the victims of a collapsed Bangladeshi 
garment factories producing inexpensive clothes for Western corporations can attest.”47 I want to use 
this idea of the asynchronous common propose what I call the bad time poor image. To do so I will 
aggregate Elizabeth Freeman’s concept of bad timing, Hito Steyerl’s poor image and Deleuze’s time 
image.
☐☐☐ Bad Time Poor Image ☐☐☐
A while ago I met an extremely interesting developer in Holland. He was working on smart phone camera 
technology. A representational mode of thinking photography is: there is something out there and it will 
be represented by means of optical technology ideally via indexical link. But the technology for the phone 
camera is quite different. As the lenses are tiny and basically crap, about half of the data captured by the 
sensor are noise. The trick is to create the algorithm to clean the picture from the noise, or rather to define 
the picture from within noise. But how does the camera know this? Very simple. It scans all other pictures 
stored on the phone or on your social media networks and sifts through your contacts. It looks through the 
pictures you already made, or those that are networked to you and tries to match faces and shapes. In short: 
it creates the picture based on earlier pictures, on your/its memory. It does not only know what you saw 
but also what you might like to see based on your previous choices. In other words, it speculates on your 
preferences and offers an interpretation of data based on affinities to other data. The link to the thing in front 
of the lens is still there, but there are also links to past pictures that help create the picture. You don’t really 
photograph the present, as the past is woven into it. The result might be a picture that never existed in reality, 
but that the phone thinks you might like to see. It is a bet, a gamble, some combination between repeating 
those things you have already seen and coming up with new versions of these, a mixture of conservatism 
and fabulation.48
Hito Steyerl’s anecdote is interesting to consider our capacity for re-imagination or agency within 
45  Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-image, 101.
46  Dirckinck-Holmfeld, “Affect Image Touch Image”; Mroué, The Pixelated Revolution.
47  Joselit, “On Aggregators,” 3. Here it is important to add that the example used was the Danish company 
  Bestseller’s sweatshop in Bangladesh.
48  Jordan, “Hito Steyerl | Politics of Post-Representation.” My emphasis.
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our digital present. What I want to suggest here is that this fabulation is not per se a conservatism, and 
that it is already present in digital cameras that film progressively (including those whose lenses are 
not crap), and secondly that this operation is not external to or fundamentally different from human 
agency but shares similarities with the machinic assemblage we call human perception. 
When we were shooting the three-channel video installation Time: Aalborg | Space: 203349 we were 
filming a close-up of the main character Ludvig driving his car. The three Canon 7Ds were rigged in 
the car and filming progressively and synchronously. Each time the car passed a bump in the road, the 
camera made a small jump, but the memory card continued writing by filling in the blank with its own 
imagination. A blur, a leftover, a noise, a digital artefact entered the image to “make up” the missing 
pixels in Ludvig’s face, with the effect of morphing it50. A similar thing, but in reverse, occurred when 
we shot the train scene in Cairo. Due to a defect in the memory card, the train was moving too fast 
for the memory card to keep up with the movement. The result was a distorted image full of gaps and 
digital artefacts.
Maurizio Lazzarato shows how human perception compresses flows of matter into a poor version 
or a compressed version, since we cannot perceive matter in its totality51. But this operation is not 
only similar to video as Lazzarato proposes; human perception becomes a digital montage in that we 
interweave and aggregate our past experiences with images and superimpose them onto the existing 
matter (half image, half thing) before us. 
In my own encounter with Farocki’s films, I superimposed my childhood memories onto the 
film. Consciousness becomes a digital, temporal [CAM[P]era] technique, where perception, like 
subjectivity or Camp performance burrows backwards and forwards in history’s, or my own mental 
camera’s, repertoire of discarded bits, pixels and visual dust.
If “affection is what occupies the interval, what occupies it without filling it in or filling it up”, the 
visual dust, the noise in the camera that fills the space between the zeroes and ones without “filling 
it in or filling it up”, operates from a similar modus of indetermination: the result is part image, part 
man, part visual dust, part pixel, creating a relationality across time. The dust-man, standing before 
us, comes to resemble the figure of temporal drag. In Freeman’s concept of temporal drag in queer 
performance, it is “a counter-genealogical practice of archiving culture’s throwaway objects, including 
the outmoded masculinities and femininities from which usable pasts may be extracted”52. Temporal 
drag becomes an aggregate or assemblage of different temporalities existing within the same body 
(where body is conceived in its widest possible sense) and reused by those whom they were not meant 
to privilege in the first place. 
Freeman’s concept of bad timing signifies something or someone, who has been proletarianised, 
or who cannot catch up with the etiquette of time; who does not fit or wear time properly. “Failures 
or refusals to inhabit (…) this ‘habitus’ appear untimely, clunky, out of joint.”53 Similarly Steyerl’s 
poor image is “the wretched of the screen”, the low-resolution image which cannot live up to the 
high resolution requirements of audiovisual capitalism54. Freeman’s concept of bad timing allows us 
to consider the poor image’s temporal dimension. The bad time poor image does not have “natural 
control over its body (with body taken in smallest possible unit to include pixels) and its effects affects, 
or the diachronic means of sexual and social machinic reproduction”55. This neither means that it does 
49  Dirckinck-Holmfeld, TIME.
50  I am grateful to Honey Biba Beckerlee who graded the video or directing my attention towards this.
51  Lazzarato, “Machines to Crystallize Time.”
52  Freeman, Time Binds.
53  Ibid., 19. I discuss this at length in ”Affect’s Time”
54  Steyerl, “In Defense of the Poor Image | e-flux.”
55  Free writing after Freeman 19 my overwriting
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not follow the standardised codec of 25 frames per second, nor that it is full of glitches and time code 
breaks. That the bad-time-poor image does not have control over its body would precisely entail that 
its body is made up of heterogeneous parts and components, which are ripped or raised into separate 
entities and come to operate on their own. And each one of them carries its own micro-temporalities 
within itself, while existing in the same frame56. But what does it mean that the bad time poor image has 
lost its own diachronic means of mechanical reproduction?57 What it has lost is the control of its own 
production and reproduction mechanisms, which in turn have become a socio-technical machinic 
assemblage. “Its genealogy is dubious”58; it has been reedited, compressed, uploaded, downloaded, 
ripped, and all these processes have enfolded the different contexts and platforms in its very texture, 
and even this texture is a willed erasure of its own history. The result is a fabulation, untraceable back 
to an original truth. 
Gilles Deleuze’s concept of the time image in its third variation is the power of the false, while his two 
earlier models of time image, the crystals of time and the recollection image, concerned the “order of 
time”. What is central here is the coexistence of relations or the simultaneity of the elements internal to 
time. The third time image, which he names the power of the false59, concerns the “series of time, which 
brings the before and the after in a becoming, instead of separating them; its paradox is to introduce 
an enduring interval in the moment itself.”60 Even thought his concept of the time image, in many ways 
anticipated the digital image, Deleuze was still primarily concerned with the reading of analogue 
film. In the example of Alain Resnais and Alain Robbe-Grillet’s L’Année Dernière à Marienbad61, two 
incompossible worlds62 are able to exist alongside each other in the film, where both scenarios become 
possible. X met A last summer, or she did not. The images intersect and intercut; with flashbacks and 
changes of locations and the baroque architecture of the set, the exquisite use of mirrors and reflection 
images everything is done to revert the temporality of the analogue film medium, but the film is still 
chained to its filmic medium – one image has to follow the other. What I want to propose here with 
the bad time poor image is that, in its plurality of micro-temporalities existing within the same frame, 
it introduces enduring intervals, semi-autonomous movements within the frame itself.
But this poses a third question which is ultimately related to time and to the temporality(ies) of the 
reparative critical practice as image. If the images (that we are made of) are all made up of different 
temporalities, different compressions, different frame rates, different codecs and formats with their 
own internal micro-movements, which operate asynchronously within the same frames: then how 
to encompass all these different temporalities and formats in one? What holds them together? Joselit 
notes that the aggregate is continuously on the verge of falling apart, but if we as a sociality/ community 
gather as an aggregate of images and different temporalities, what holds this community together? 
Returning to Farocki’s robot ejecting glue onto the bricks, constructing a relief in which each brick 
makes up a pixel in a larger image, what happens if each brick is a block of movements/duration?
56  These micro-movements internally in the frame resonate with the affection image as combination of micro   
  movments and reflective plate in the same image (close up of face and the clock).
57  This comes to resonate with Walter Benjamin’s essay, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
  Reproduction.” Unfortunately I am unable to explore this path here.
58  Steyerl, “In Defense of the Poor Image | e-flux”, 32.
59  I continue to discuss the Deleuze’s concept of the Power of the False in the chapter entitled “Reconstitution”.
60  Deleuze, Cinema 2, 150.
61  Resnais, Last Year at Marienbad.
62  I discuss the problem of the incompossible in ”Affect’s Time”
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☐☐☐ Conclusion: multiple contexts enfolded ☐☐☐
Leap into Colour as well as the totality that makes up this PhD project is an attempt to allow different 
registers, temporalities, formats, codecs, compressions, concepts and practices inhabit the same 
page, sentence, screen. The production and post-production of Leap… have been divided between 
different countries and continents. We produced the actual shots in Cairo and Alexandria; I consulted 
the archive and carried out some of the re-enactments in Beirut, Lebanon. And some shots were 
made in Denmark – where Philippe Arzrouni is based. The post-production is also a collaboration 
between Ali Kays, (visual graphic motion designer) based in Beirut, Khaled Yassine (sound design and 
composition) in Doha, Qatar, Maurice Louca (sound design and composition) in Cairo, Egypt, and 
myself in Copenhagen (directing, editing, recording etc.). 
The production and post-production came to reflect both Armand’s photographic practice, and 
the way in which his photographic practice had migrated from first from Armenia to Egypt, to Beirut 
(Arab Image Foundation), to Copenhagen (Philippe’s personal archive) and dispersed to the rest of 
the world, sold to private collectors. 
Our workflow was a constant process of somebody working on a piece of the film and then sending 
it to the others for feedback and comments, or for the others to rework the piece. Each one worked 
with full resolution, but due to the variable Internet connections, when we sent off the material to each 
other we had to compress the material to a lower quality - mp3 or H.264 - which was then uploaded, 
re-packed and rematerialised anew when downloaded in Cairo, Doha, Beirut or Copenhagen. Like 
the man mending the metal fence in Cairo, where the entire context of the metal Souk – the horse 
carriages, tea vendors, flocks of sheep, scooters, etc., which passed over the metal fence, left a trace on 
the final texture of the metal work, is it possible to acknowledge that all these different contexts act on 
the material? And that for each of the different contexts, its route, or line of flight is enfolded into the 
material’s textures? Is it possible to imagine that a snippet of those contexts will be able to unfold in 
the experience of the final image? And that this unfolding creates – at least in theory – a possibility for 
a collaborative, multiplicity of heterogeneous space-times to exist in the same frame at the same time 
in the same moment?
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The glue that used to hold an analogue montage together was replaced with digital compositing, 
which enabled us to amass various materials together in one multi-layered image, with multiple micro-
temporalities within the same frame. It took me X layers, a notebook and archival interface to realise 
what had been available to me from the first image in the file 0043ar: the close-up of Margueritte 
Arzrouni draped in Tulle Assiut – a garment made by incorporating metal and silver into the pixelated 
grid of the tulle, without filling it up. The trick is not so much “to create the algorithm to clean the 
picture from the noise”, but to find that algorithm which shakes the usable affects/dust out and which 
allows us to bind the debris together into new compositions, new fabulations without filling them up: 
that algorithm is HOPE/LOVE.
☐☐☐ Epilogue: A Brick Relief ☐☐☐ 
Back in the Goethe institute in Eskanderia, it was as if watching the two films In Comparison and 
Videograms of a Revolution together left me with a hope, even though a fragile one…
Farocki’s soft-montage offers a way to reimagine how it is possible to reconstruct, or rematerialise what 
has been torn apart; to create a relief and relief even from the lowest possible resolution that we are left 
with63. 
63  I am grateful to Farocki, Ehmann and the assemblage of people that night in October in Eskandaria; the team  
  I worked with on Leap into Colour, the Arab Image Foundation and The Arzrouni family for allowing me to  
  glimpse, even if it was for a second, the possibility of rematerialisation.
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Out of the cinema darkness the blurred contours of a young man emerge. His features, red-blond hair, 
beard and green army jacket come into focus by means of a Canon 5D Mark II, with 50 mm lens. 
Addressing the camera directly, “Nassim, tementash azar alf w teseemieh w arlbaa w sabaiin”, the young 
man tells us his name is Nassim, it is 18 March 1974 and the students have taken over the campus of the 
American University of Beirut. For five months now they have occupied the university to protest the ten 
per cent increase in tuition fees. The security forces have surrounded the campus...
Nassim slips in and out of the cinema’s darkness and is replaced by his fellow student activists:
Sandra
Molotov
Asaad…
The portraits of the young activists hang in a timeless space of the black frame. Denuded of any visual 
support or documentation, my own mental camera begins to project conflicting imagery of present-past 
events onto the screen. Chronology of events falters. The image on the screen flickers between that which 
it documents or represents from 1974 and that which it reconstitutes…: today…2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 
2015…
 ☐☐☐ Reconstitution ☐☐☐ 
on the contingent ecrán [screen] of Rania and Raed Rafei
Dear Rania and Raed
I have been wanting to write to you for some time now, to follow up on the conversations we had 
concerning your film-project on the student movement in Beirut, when you completed Prologue1 in 
2011 and following the screening of 74 (The reconstitution of a struggle)2 in 2013 in Denmark. Since 
then a great many things continue to happen around us, which are the reason why I cannot get the 
films out of my head. 
TC: 20:11:01:01:00:01: An Image
Allow me to begin with an image, a feverish image, of you and me, Rania, at the beach on a deserted 
island in Oman, New Year’s Eve 2010. There was something odd about that location, with our group of 
expats and tourists drifting on a boat in the Strait of Hormuz or Gulf of Oman – the waters that separate 
the Arab Peninsula from Iran, or, indeed, connect them.
I recall of my feverish state (I literally had a 40-degree fever) that we were taking turns. Each one 
of us would state his or her wish for the coming year – 2011. I remember yours. It was revolution. 
You and Raed had started working on the film project Prologue and were researching the student 
movement in Beirut in 1974. You were sitting on the beach calling for revolution, as if you wanted to 
bring that past moment alive again through your research and through the film. 
After that night each one of us returned to our usual destinations. You went back to Beirut. Some 
remained in the United Arab Emirates and we went to London. And then it all happened. Just like that. 
Ben Ali fell in Tunis – Egypt was on fire. We were overwhelmed by Internet and TV news, and endless 
Facebook chats and online discussions. 
Mubarak fell in Egypt – the impossible had again become possible – it was as if the world was 
gripped with a sensation that a thousand lines with a thousand aberrations were opened up anew and 
1  Rafei and Rafei, Prologue.
2  Rafei and Rafei, 74 (la reconstitution d’une lutte).
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could take new possible routes for new possible worlds to emerge… but only for a moment and then 
the initial hope and optimism were replaced by their opposites.
Motivated by my encounter with your films, in this essay-letter I want to draw out some useful 
moments or methods gleaned from the initial optimism and hope that we were gripped with. To do 
so I will construct a scaffold of different theoretical and filmic practices and intersperse those blocks 
with my own experience as an observer of your films; snippets from conversations we have had on 
the work over the years; and the experiences which the audiences have shared in discussions after the 
screenings. 
20:11:18:05:20:05 Introduction
What is really interesting is that back then, when we started the casting (of real activists), there were no 
revolutions in the Arab world3.
74 (The reconstitution of a struggle) [henceforth: 74] opens with a black-and-white photograph 
of the student strike in 1974, with the strikers gathered outside the College Hall of the American 
University of Beirut (AUB). The photograph is the only “real” document of the actual events that we 
get to see for the next 100 minutes. The image bears a resemblance to any student strike of the 1960s 
and 70s. And if it were not for a few details that reveal AUB’s eclectic architecture, the photo could 
have been taken anywhere in the world. 
Zoom in slowly. Fadi Abi Samra’s voiceover provides scant information, as if he is reading the news 
headlines: 
March 19, 1974 Massive student gathering in the American      
   University of Beirut;
March 26  Kissinger in Moscow: Difficult and Important talks  
March 29  25.000 demonstrators demand the nationalisation of bread production 
April 8  Israeli Phantom shot down in South Lebanon & two Pilots taken prisoner… 4
Wittingly or unwittingly, before the film has even begun, we start to project our own imagery of the 
entire context: the student movement, the Cold War, the Arab Nationalist movement, the continuous 
war with Israel on the Southern border…even our imagery and relation to those events might differ 
3  Rafei and Rafei, conversation with Rania and Raed Rafei 2011.
4  Rafei og Rafei, 74 (la reconstitution d’une lutte), 1,40 min.
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radically5. 
Prologue and 74 require an introduction. I will try to focus the description on the method that you 
developed while working on the two films. 
In 1974 the students of the American University of Beirut occupied the university’s campus for 
37 days to protest against rising tuition fees. The protest quickly became entangled with the various 
other struggles in which Lebanon and the wider region were becoming embroiled during that period: 
the Palestinian resistance, the Pan-Arab movement, the workers’ movement, and the communist 
movement (to name but a few). 1974 was a year of cultural, intellectual and political ferment, but the 
initial hope and optimism was followed in 1975 by the outbreak of the Lebanese wars (1975-1991). 
In 2010 when you started researching what, at the outset, was supposed to be a straightforward 
documentary on the student movement of 1974, new student protests erupted at the American 
University of Beirut. You decided to use this momentum to cast real activists to re-enact the events 
which had taken place years before they were born. Prologue became the screen test or rehearsal for 
the later feature length film 74 (The reconstitution of a struggle). In Prologue you filmed your own 
casting process of the student activists, who would later continue improvising in 74.
While shooting Prologue and 74 the events unfolded again on a different scale. The Arab uprisings 
broke out across the region. And as you moved into the post-production of 74, the original hope and 
optimism were being overshadowed by war and disillusionment. 
In 74 we encounter the student activists or what appears to be a central committee, the revolutionary 
spearheads of the struggle, in the heat of the battle, barricaded in the office of the AUB’s president 
Samuel B. Kirkewood. Here they write bulletins, communiqués and hold meetings in what seems like 
an endless rehearsal for a struggle. Prologue is filmed in a black space and each activist is mostly filmed 
alone, interviewed by your voices – off screen – directing the casting of the activists. 74 is shot in one 
room, which is not at AUB, but could be. In neither film is any context revealed, while props and 
historical artefacts from that era are limited, and sometimes rather fake or untruthful6. No real action 
is seen, the events outside and the crowds of students, and the many political factions that the student 
union was divided into, are never seen7.
Images of the actual events are left to our own imagination, apart from what is afforded by either 
the complete darkness of the screen in Prologue or the single room in 74.
When I recently saw 74 again, I was initially irritated by the fact that the “outside” (the windows) 
is somehow burnt or overexposed in many of the scenes. Taking into consideration how hard it is to 
shoot in Lebanon in the summer, mid-day, when the sun is burning outside, and since the whole film 
was shot during a few days of intense experimentation and improvisation, I guess you did not have the 
privilege of halting the shoot just because the sun’s location in the sky was incorrect. But now it occurs 
to me that the burning of the outside in 74 or the obscuring of the outside in Prologue results precisely 
in the “outside” becoming enfolded into the image. Restricting yourself to the use of one location and 
one room, and confining the activists and the film-crew to that location for days while improvising 
allows the “outside” to become more and more enfolded in the semi-claustrophobic atmosphere, 
without directly portraying or representing that outside8: Questions of the Palestinian resistance, the 
workers movement, the communist movement, the general strike etc. get enfolded into the screen, but 
5  This technique of the audience’s auto-projection comes to resemble Felix Gonzalez-Torres Dateline and  
   Billboard over Sheridan Square, which I discuss in “Affect’s Time”.
6  I return to discuss the untruthful truthfulness of 74 later on.
7  The student movement in Lebanon was divided into different political factions including     
   pro-Palestinian, PLO, Fatah, PLFP, Rabita (The Lebanese Student Movement), Pan-Arab Nationalist,   
  Communist, and various religious fractions to name but a few. See Rabah, A CAMPUS AT WAR.
8  See also Salhab and Quilty, “On the ironies of light and tragedy | Arts & Ent , Culture | THE DAILY STAR.”
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without being represented by any direct object. 
In 1974 the American University of Beirut was turned into a microcosm of all the various factions 
and interests at stake in Lebanon and the Middle East, but in your films it is as if the screen itself 
becomes that microcosm of a larger relationality of shared struggles, contexts and temporalities. But 
that outside – the context – is not bound to one location, one geography and one specific space-
time. By means of your method and montage we, the audience, are turned into active participants 
in enfolding different contexts and situations onto the screen and as the film is screened in different 
contexts, other contexts, other struggles and other contexts are enfolded too. 
TC: 20:11:19:74 Re-enactment vs. Reconstitution
At first, I was puzzled as to why you chose to call the film 74 (Reconstitution of a struggle) and not 
re-enactment, restaging or reconstruction of a struggle. I believed it was a French expression that had 
slipped in9. What I want to discuss here is precisely how your film differs from pure re-enactment, and 
becomes a reconstitution of a struggle and of a past moment in the present.
Re-enactment
In the 1990s, the art scene as well as the entertainment, tourism and memory industries saw a boom 
in artistic10, corporate or historical re-enactments, attempting to bring past events back to life. Re-
enactment is often described as a repetition or theatrical enactment of an historical event carried out 
by hobbyists, artists or professional role-players. The work of performance studies scholars Rebecca 
Schneider, with Performing Remains, and Mathias Danbolt, with Touching History,11 testify to the 
difficulty of arriving at a clear-cut definition of re-enactment. If Schneider approaches something like 
a definition of re-enactment “it would be that the experience of re-enactment (whether in replayed art 
or in replayed war) is an intense, embodied inquiry into temporal repetition, temporal recurrence. As 
such, an exploration of affect as inquiry…”12 
According to Schneider, re-enactment becomes an intense embodied inquiry into temporal 
9  The Arabic title is 74 (Istiaadat Li Nidal), the French title is 74 (Reconstitution d’une lute). French, which   
  became the official language in Lebanon during the French Mandate is still primarily the language of   
  instruction in the educational system, depending on the university or school. 
10  With some of the most interesting examples being Jeremy Deller’s Battle of Orgreave, the work of Sharon   
  Hayes, Watkins, Peter, La Commune (Paris, 1871), to name but a few.
11  Danbolt, Touching History, 177–179.
12  Schneider, Performing Remains, 2011, 15 (digital e-version).
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repetition, temporal recurrence, but she leaves the notion of affect as inquiry hanging, without fully 
developing what she means by it13. How can we further understand re-enactment as an exploration 
of or experimentation with affect as inquiry? While I will not be able to cover the vast conceptual 
framework that re-enactment and repetition opens up to14, I want to pay more careful attention to how 
concepts of affect and repetition can be understood in regard to your films and the film-medium they 
deploy, which in itself is bound to a logic/mechanism of repetition (one frame after the other). This will 
allow us to consider temporal recurrence beyond a purely theatrical and performative understanding 
of re-enactment to include the film’s material condition and to open the concept of affect as inquiry up 
to the materiality of affect and affect’s temporality.15 
Affect as Critical Inquiry
In the discourse on repetition/re-enactment, a common concern seems to be the “good” vs. “bad” 
re-enactment/repetition, where a conservative, restorative repetition would be a “bad” one and a 
radical, critical one would be a “good” one16. But how to know that the repetition/re-enactment or 
reparative practice intended is necessarily a good one?17 Or rather, how to attune to the practice to the 
complexities that re-enactment/repetition opens up to? To refrain Gille Deleuze’s question: 
To reach a repetition which saves, or which changes life, beyond good and evil, would it not be necessary to 
break with the order of impulses, to undo the cycles of time, reach an element which would be like a true 
‘desire’, or like a choice capable of constantly beginning again (…)?18
I want to propose here that a difference is inserted between a sort of classical or corporate historical 
re-enactment and your films in the way in which in your film enfolds the materiality of the past sensation 
/ experience. This opens up to a what I call affect’s time – when affect collides with matter and opens up to 
a possibility of experiencing time directly – as heterogeneity of times existing in the same moment, frame 
or screen. This process works back on the initial materiality that the affect carried with it and opens up 
to a process of rematerialisation through which the past is no longer pure past but becomes reconstituted 
in the present.
To further develop this argument, I will depart from a passage in Schneider’s book where, in 
reference to an American Civil War reenactor named Hodge, she asks, “If it cannot pass, what kind of 
claim to authenticity can such a faulty corpse demand?”19 And she continues to note,
Here the body – Hodge’s bloated one – becomes a kind of archive and host to a collective memory that we 
might situate with Freud as symptomatic, with Cathy Caruth with Freud as the compulsory repetitions of 
a collective trauma, with Foucault with Nietzsche as ‘counter-memory’, or with Fred Moten with Baraka, 
Minh-Ha, and Derrida as transmutation. The bodily, read through genealogies of impact and ricochet, is 
arguably always interactive.20 
13  Schneider does discuss it later as a kind of affective labour. Ibid., 183.
14  For a discussion this see Lütticken, “An Arena in Which to Reenact”, 45. Danbolt, Touching History, 174–  
  175. 
15  I explore affect as critical inquiry at length in the chapter of the same title. 
16  For a discussion on this, see Danbolt, Touching History, 175; Lütticken, “An Arena in Which to Reenact.”
17  Here I refrain Berlant’s question: “how would we know when the ‘repair’ we intended is not another form of   
  narcissism or smothering will? Just because we sense it to be?”Berlant, Cruel Optimism, 124.
18  Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-image, 137.
19  Schneider, “Performing Remains”, 2012, 142.
20  Ibid., 142–143 my emphasis.
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Affect as material repetition
In the chapter “Affect’s Materiality”, I discuss how affect as a pre-personal intensity enfolds a 
materiality which in itself is able to affect and be affected. In so doing affect carries with it a materiality 
and an entire context, which is able to unfold in the present sensations. In the passage from Marcel 
Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu that you read to me, Rania, on another beach in Sour (Tyr, 
Lebanon), the narrator takes a morsel of a madeleine-cake dipped in linden tea. This sensation is 
not the past sensation represented in the present sensation, but it is that very materiality, of itself, 
reconstituted in the present and this sensation enfolds the entire context of his childhood village. Affect 
opens up to a possibility of rematerialisation, in which the past sensation becomes rematerialised in 
the present, and that new entity reconstitutes a “qualitative difference”: 
The taste possesses a power only because it envelops something = x, something which can no longer be 
defined by an identity: it envelops Combray (the childhood city of Proust’s narrator) as it is in itself, as a 
fragment of the pure past, in its double irreducibility to the present that it has been (perception) and to the 
present present in which it might reappear or be reconstituted (voluntary memory). This Combray in itself is 
defined by its own essential difference, that ‘qualitative difference’ which, according to Proust, does not exist ‘on 
the surface of the earth’, but only at a particular depth. It is this difference which, by enveloping itself, produces 
the identity of the quality which constitutes the resemblance between the series. Identity and resemblance are 
therefore once again the result of a differenciator.21
The filmic image of Prologue and 74 shares this Maggi cube-like character, where a crumb is able to 
enfold an entire context of a past sensation. In your films, this sensation is not exclusive to the “body”, 
re-enacting the past experience (the student-activists) or the person who underwent this experience in 
her childhood or youth (Proust’s narrator/ the real student activists from 1974). While I was watching 
Prologue the past event became reconstituted in the present, but this past did not belong to me (alone) 
but to a community: the students of 1974, the student activists on the screen and the x number of 
audiences in the cinema that day (in May 2011) and later other audiences in other locations of the 
world. In this act of reconstitution this repetition is not the same but a qualitative difference creating 
relationships across generations, across temporalities, across contexts, across bodies (in the widest 
possible sense of the word) and geographies. 
Affect’s incongruous archive/temporal repetition
Affect’s rematerialisation in a new entity also complicates the question of temporal recurrence. 
This is not a past moment repeated in the present but various different temporalities existing at the 
same time. What I want to foreground in relation to Schneider’s quote above is that the “faulty corpse” 
of the American Civil War re-enactor Hodge creates a relation that cuts across time, generations and 
territories and becomes an archive or host to a collective memory. If an archive is not a compound that 
follows an overall compositional logic, “inclusive with regard to theme, institution, period or event”22, 
but as an agencement or aggregate of various heterogeneous elements, which act on each other and 
operate on their own, then the embodied inquiry into temporal recurrence is not exclusive to bodies-
as-organism, but bodies in the widest possible sense. In your films those bodies include snippets of 
various student factions, fragments of world politics, a photo of Ché Guevara, a megaphone, a camera, 
elements of scattered historical research, interviews with real activists, the current activists etc. 
It is not only the bodies of the young activists on the screen – which become host to an incongruent 
archive – but the screen itself. The screen extends itself backwards and forwards and borrows from the 
21  Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 149.
22  I develop this in relation to David Joselit’s concept of the aggregator, in the chapter on Rematerialisation. 
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half-forgotten memories and experiences of the audience as we are watching the screen. In so doing, 
the temporal recurrence does not happen on a neatly-organised timeline in which a follows b but – 
qua affect as inquiry – precisely entails a temporality in which a heterogeneity of times exists within 
the same moment, frame and screen. It is not a past event fixed and locatable to a specific point in 
time, which is repeated – but it is the heterogeneity of times reconstituted in an enduring moment and 
movement: “Meanwhile and & at the same time”23.
Militant Image – ciné-cartography
To further envisage how an image ceases to be a representation or document of a struggle but 
reconstitutes or becomes that struggle, I will return to reflect on the question which I raised but was 
unable to answer in my essay documentation of the video installation movement: how is the movement 
image not only a machinic movement image but also a social and collective movement? I discussed 
this question in relation to Jean-Luc Godard & Anne Marie Mieville’s Ici et Ailleurs. Ici et Ailleurs is a 
cinematographic reflection on the original film Until Victory which the Dziga Vertov Group shot in 
Jordan about and with the Palestinian Resistance, who were either killed or expelled from Jordan after 
the film was shot. With its montage technique of mixing video and analogue-film Ici et Ailleurs tears 
the movement image from its enslavement to the Fordist chain of production in which one frame 
has to replace the other24, and opens up to a possibility of creating new allegiances across various 
different mediums and formats. However, Miéville’s montage left me unable to envisage how this 
machinic assemblage was able in turn to reassemble the struggle, which they were to reflect upon – the 
Palestinian resistance.25 To further envisage how this is made possible through your films I will briefly 
outline some initial thoughts and practices on the Militant Image and what we might call a relational 
ciné-cartography/ciné-geography with the work of Kodwo Eshun, Ros Gray, Gilles Deleuze, Irit Rogoff 
and Mohamed Soueid.26
In the 1960s and 1970s, alongside the independence movements of colonised countries– the world 
23  Ward, Imaginary Movie.
24  Deleuze, Cinema 2, 174.
25  Another excellent example of how it is possible to stitch fragments of a movement together is 
  Mohamed Soueid’s My Heart Beats Only for Her – which, through a poetic montage, assembles fragments of  
  the Palestinian resistance from various locations Hanoi, Dubai and Beirut where each location and the struggle  
  becomes interwoven in the film. See Soueid, My Heart Beats Only For Her.  
26  See also Solanas og Getino, Cine, cultura y descolonización; Eshun og Gray, “The Militant Image”; Mosireen
  Collective; Pontecorvo, La battaglia di Algeri (The Battle of Algiers); Enwezor, The Short Century. To name  
  but a few.
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saw the dawn of a new global cinematographic practice. Dedicated to the liberation struggles and 
revolutions, filmmakers left the studio and became part of the struggle. Like the militant or activist, 
the militant image is no longer a representation or documentation of a movement, but becomes that 
movement in itself. 
According to Kodwo Eshun and Ros Gray this created a ciné-geography27, in which various 
disparate places and locations became connected through a process of solidarity and decolonisation: 
Argentina, Lebanon, Vietnam, Angola, France, Algeria, Mozambique, Palestine, Jordan, Cuba… to 
name but a few: 
Ciné-geography designates situated cinecultural practices in an expanded sense, and the connections 
– individual, institutional, aesthetic and political – that link them transnationally to other situations of 
urgent struggle. It refers not just to individual films but also to the new modes of production, exhibition, 
distribution, pedagogy and training made possible by forms of political organisation and affiliation.28
One of such practices of militant cinema could be to organise a “film-event”, which is not just a 
screening, but “a screening with discussion situated within the context of a political event”29. The film 
event or “cine-acción” liberates the screening space from the neutrality and passivity of the cinema, 
creating an encounter capable of catalysing the passive spectator into an active participant reflecting 
on his or her own situation within the political event30.
Gray and Eshun’s notion of ciné-geography is informed by Rogoff ’s notion of Relational Geographies 
– a practice of mapping, which does not “operate from a single principle that maps everything in an 
outward-bound motion with itself at the centre”. Instead, Rogoff proposes a practice of mapping that 
is composed of “aggregates of intensities, of insurgencies that link and empathise and spark off each 
other, of generational loyalties that cross boundaries, histories and languages”.31 
[Relational geography] is cumulative, it lurches sideways, it is constructed out of chance meetings in cafés, of 
shared reading groups at universities, of childhood deprivations that could speak to one another, of snatches 
of music on transistor radios, of intense rages, of glimmers of hope offered by ideas that enabled imagining 
a better world.32
What I want to suggest in relation to your films is precisely that a relational ciné-cartography 
occurs, but through various different urgent and contingent factors. You did not decide to go and 
join the struggle or to organise a film event within a political event, but the film event happened 
contingently, behind your back, without you having to go out and look for it. The screening of Prologue 
at the Metropolis Cinema, Empire Sofil correlated with the demonstrations which were taking place, 
if not directly outside the cinema then outside the borders of Lebanon.33 This involuntarily placed the 
screening-situation within a political event, which draws in the spectator. But rather than seeking “to 
27  Eshun and Gray, “The Militant Image.”
28  Ibid., 1.
29  Ibid., 5 quoting Getino.
30  I return to discuss this in relation to the screening events of your films that I have participated in until  
  now. Prologue; Beirut May 2011, 74 Beirut 2012, 74 Aalborg and Copenhagen 2013, and 74 2015   
  (during the student’s occupation of University of Copenhagen)
31  Rogoff, “Engendering Terror”; Eshun and Gray, “The Militant Image”, 2. My emphasis
32  Eshun and Gray, “The Militant Image”, 2; Rogoff, “Engendering Terror.”
33  In March-April 2011 there were a series of demonstrations in Beirut, demanding the abolition of 
  the confessional system in Lebanon. Since The Independence in 1943, power was divided between the  
  different religious confessions as an unwritten pact. This was made constitutional with the Taif agreement in 
  1991. The demonstrations demanded to change this system. The demonstrations abated during the spring. 
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capture the contingencies set in motion by the volatile presence of a revolutionary movement”34, your 
film became co-developed with the contingencies of the situation. Contingent and urgent factors, or 
the material itself interfered with the direction. For instance your choice of using real activists not 
actors, was not as a choice determined in advance, but determined by the unfolding of contingent 
events. 
If we conceive of relational ciné-cartography and re-enactment, taken together, as constituting 
a form of affect as inquiry then a method of transversal, transnational, trans-current relational 
cartography becomes possible in your films. Affect as inquiry becomes a collective practice of digging 
through multiple layers of affect. Or, rather the material affect of a past sensation becomes enfolded 
in the present, but this does not have a prexisting format which it can be fitted into – or take host in 
a consisten archive – rather it opens the filmmaking process up to contingency. Your film exceeds 
its original purpose of creating a re-enactment of a past event, and involuntarily, the film becomes 
that very event, or reconstitutes that event in the present. It draws a map of interconnected points in 
history and the present in a shared geography across time and space. 
TC: 20:13:01:09:19:45: (Para)Parrhesia and the Power of Fabulation35
Halfway through the film, 11 days into the occupation, the group is gathered around the table, 
trying to decide how to move on from here. They have started to lose their initial support from some 
of the other students. Al-Rabita36 and some of the parents of the students want to agree a deal with 
university’s president. The camera is handheld, shifting vividly between the protestors, filmed close-
up. The use of close-up and the activists’ incessant cigarette smoking combine to make the room 
extremely claustrophobic. Like the activists, we, the audience, cannot simply distance ourselves from 
the discussion, but are inserted into the discussion. There is no escape but to leave the cinema or to 
place oneself at the back. 
In the Q&A with you that followed the screening of 74 in Copenhagen in 201337 I remember a 
woman in the audience who thought that the discussions in the film did not portray the struggle of the 
1970s truthfully. She had wasted, she said, most of her youth as part of the left-wing movement in Iran 
34  Eshun and Gray, “The Militant Image”, 6.
35  I am grateful to Mikkel Frantzen for bringing up fabulation in the reading group.
36  Rabita al-Toulab al-Loubnaniyya (The Lebanese Students League) was a student organisation which was  
  opposed to the more PLO- Nasserist and Communist- affiliated student factions.
37  “Touch Image Dream”, curated by Abbas Mroueh and I with events in various different locations in Aalborg  
  and Copenhagen, Denmark 2013.
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that led to the fall of the Shah. And her recollection was that the different Marxists factions wasted 
all their revolutionary energy arguing over ideological details in the spectrum between Trotskyist, 
Leninist, Maoist, Stalinist etc. But since the activists in 74 are from a different era – most of them 
born after the fall of the Soviet Union – their re-enactment bore little resemblance to the “authentic” 
rhetoric of the 1970s. 
As she spoke, she could not help but give an account of what she had just seen. And it became 
apparent that the film she had seen differed from that I had seen. It seemed she had spent the 
approximately 100-minute duration of the film re-projecting all those discussions she had had in her 
youth onto the screen of Grand Theatre, in central Copenhagen, miles away from her actual memories 
of events in Iran and miles away from the actual events which the film portrays in Lebanon. 
For my own part, the involuntary memories that the films reactivated in me were from a completely 
different context. The first time I saw Prologue was in 2011, and the so-called Arab Spring was unfolding 
outside the Metropolis Cinema in Ashrafieh, Beirut, and outside the borders of Lebanon. I had this 
sensation of already arriving too late. We had been in the UK for the entire spring and now it was 
May and I came with the same belatedness to my own contemporary revolution as to that of 1974, 
since I was born in 1981. In the absence of any direct documents of the past event I was projecting 
news-clippings and YouTube videos from the current uprisings onto the screen. When I re-saw 74 in 
Copenhagen later, my auto-projectionist had changed the spool. Now I was projecting involuntary 
memories from my own affiliation with the so-called “autonomous movement” and various feminist 
groupings in Denmark in the 1990s. I guess it was the character / real person “Alia”, who tricked this 
in me. A scene unfolds between the only two women in the group. “Alia” is advocating that the group 
support the demand for elections, as a result of which she is being pushed out or excluded by the more 
militant members, especially the other woman “Rima”. 
In the Q&A Arne Bro, the director of the Danish film school’s documentary department said that 
this was the film’s gestalt therapy. It offered the audience the space-time to reflect on its own position 
in history. It was truth; not the actual event, but truthful to the event…
I realise how this “gestalt therapy” is made possible in the film. The vivid discussions are intercut 
with more intimate discussions were each student is facing the camera. Off-screen your voices ask 
them a number of often intimate questions concerning their role in the group and their relationships 
with the others. Because a certain time is allowed for the student to answer your questions, the latter 
appear to be directed equally towards us, the viewers – we cannot help but to reflect on our own 
situation38. 
Returning to Rebecca Schneider’s American Civil War re-enactor, she asks:  “if it cannot pass, 
what kind of claim to authenticity can such a faulty corpse demand?” I want to suggest that in your 
films the faulty bodies of the activists is not actually a faulty one, but truthful in their “power of being 
false”. Counter to American Civil War re-enactors and other forms of historical re-enactment that 
aim to remain true to the event by having, if not precisely the same uniforms, then 1:1 copies, original 
antiques, weapons, rhetoric, boots, even using original cameras and expired film etc. 39, your films are 
carefully orchestrated with only a limited range of historical artefacts, pomp and props. The activists 
are wearing their own normal clothes. 
The activists might not be the same as the student activists of the 1970s that they are to enact – but 
38  The may be similarities to the Brechtian dramaturgy here, but perhaps the difference is that it does not offer 
  any solutions.
39  In Time: Aalborg | Space: 2033 I worked with reenactment group «Regimentet - Dansk reenactment gruppe.”, 
  who specialise in playing German soldiers from WWII, who have a strong sense for minute detail and 
  historical accuracy.
150
they are activists, not actors. And as such they share the same urgency and contingency as the past 
event that they re-enact. Their truthfulness does not “claim authenticity”; rather it becomes the truth 
– even this truth is eventually one that is difficult to establish under the epistemic and conventional 
rubrics of “truth”. Prologue and 74 open up to a possible space for “truth-telling” or parrhesia – fearless 
speech. According to Michel Foucault, parrhesia is “a verbal activity in which the speaker expresses 
his personal relation to truth, and risks his life because he recognizes truth-telling as a duty to improve 
or help other people (as well as himself)”40. In parrhesia, the speaker uses her freedom and “chooses 
frankness instead of persuasion, truth instead of falsehood or silence, the risk of death instead of life 
and security, criticism instead of flattery and moral duty instead of self-interest and moral apathy.”41 
In 74 and Prologue, truth is chosen not instead of “falsehood”, but through what we could call 
the “power of the false”. Deleuze develops the concept of the “power of the false” in relation to the 
crystalline image or the time image. The power of the false does not follow the conventional film 
techniques of Hollywood narrative structure and continuity editing. The image is no longer a neutral 
or organic given brought about by an objective or subjective camera. The image obstruct the object it 
is to portray by calling attention to itself, by erasing and replacing the object, only to contradict itself 
and displace or modify the preceding one: “it is now the description itself which constitutes the sole 
decomposed and multiplied object”42. Elements of the power-of-the-false are found in Neo-Realist 
and New Wave cinema and “cinema vérité” pioneered by Jean Rouch or “direct cinema” (Cassavetes 
and Shirley Clarke43) and “cinema of the lived” (Pierre Perrault). What those directors had in common 
was that they improvised, using “real” people not actors; the presence of the camera which reveals the 
director; only filming on location (without a set) etc. By using such techniques, direct cinema sought 
to detach fiction from its model as “pre-established truth, which necessarily expresses the dominant 
ideas or the point of view of the colonizer, even when it is forged by the film’s author.”44
When Perrault is addressing his real characters of Quebec, it is not simply to eliminate fiction but 
to free it from its model of truth which penetrates it, and on the contrary to rediscover the pure and 
simple story-telling function which is opposed to this model – what is opposed to fiction is not the real; 
it is not the truth which is always that of the masters or colonizers; it is the story-telling function of the 
poor, in so far as it gives the false the power which makes it into a memory, a legend, a monster.’ (…) 
‘It is the becoming of the real character when he himself start to ‘make fiction’, when he enters into ‘the 
flagrant offence of making up legends’ and so contributes to the invention of his people. The character 
us inseparable from a before and an after, but he reunites these in the passage from one state to the 
other. He himself becomes another, when he begins to tell stories without ever being fictional. And the 
film-maker becomes another when there are ‘interposed’, in this way, real characters, who wholly replace 
his own fictions by their own story-telling.45
The power of the false establishes a truth by freeing it from its pre-conceived model of truth, which 
seems to establish some sort of (para)parrhesia image. Here the act of fearless speech is no longer 
limited to speech but an agencement or assemblage of asignifying and signifying semiotics. As such, 
40  Foucault and Pearson, Fearless Speech, 19–20.
41  Foucault and Pearson, Fearless Speech.
42  Deleuze, Cinema 2, 122.
43  There are many ways in which the images of 74 and Prologue resemble Shirley Clarke’s “Portrait of 
  Jason”, which unfortunately I will not have the time to delve into here, but both films are shot in one room, with  
   extensive use of close-up, and a great deal of smoking. In Prologue the characters come into focus in a dark 
  space, through the support of the 50 mm lens of the Canon camera. In Clarke’s Portrait of Jason this effect was 
  simply a result of a fault in the camera/ or the change of the film spool.  
44  Deleuze, Cinema 2, 145.
45  Ibid.
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the film image frees itself from the pre-established truth of conventional cinema. What I want to 
foreground in the quote above is how the “real” actors enter into a state of becoming, the student 
activists enter into a state of becoming, or, as you said, “devenir revolutionaires”. But that passage 
of becoming, not only belongs to the activists on the screen (a before or an after), but belongs to a 
multiplicity of interconnected and relational becomings across space and time:
This (cinema vérité of Perrault) is (…) the constitution or reconstitution of a people, where the film-maker 
and his characters become others together and the one through the other, a collectivity which gradually wins 
from place to place from person to person, from intercessor to intercessor. I am a caribou, an original… ‘I 
is another’ is the formation of a story of simulation, which deposes the form of the truthful story. Poetry is 
what Pasolini held up against prose, but which can be found in the place that he did not look for it – in the 
domain of a cinema presented as direct.46  
This is the relational aesthetic or ciné-cartography of Prologue and 74, in which the reconstitution 
of a people and of a struggle is not exclusive to the real characters on the screen, the camera and you 
the filmmakers. In Prologue and 74 this assemblage of subject-object, which makes up a collectivity in 
which “I [the character on screen] is another [a caribou]”, extends into the cinema to encompass we 
the audience, who project ourselves and interpose our involuntary memory with the memory of the 
screen. It is no longer sufficient to disrupt the “subjective vs. the objective camera”47, the memory of 
the screen extends itself into the cinema and creates a relationality across various layers and states of 
becoming. But it is not only the character that must first of all be real to affirm fiction as a power – it is 
the audience, which “is no longer separable from this becoming which merges with a people”48. 
This is when we can say that 74 is a reconstitution of a struggle – but a struggle composed of 
heterogeneous parts: “I [the screen] is part camera, part pixel, part activist, part audience, part activist, 
part from the 1970s part from today, part from the future”. And rather than reiterating one particular 
ideology in the present – it it’s an agencement of the many – it is pluralism in the widest possible sense. 
And when one is trying to stiffen or exclude the other, this is when Ghassan cuts in: 
Excuse me, all of you! Stop your machismo, and you, your feminism, and you your patronization. And 
don’t hurl words at me like subjugation, colonialism etc. and here the complex of persecution and there the 
existential fear…give me a break with all your indoctrinated and preconceived ideas!49 
TC: 01:01:01:01 The third-third time image
46  Ibid., 148. My emphasis.
47  Conventional film theory tends to distinguish between what the camera sees, which is the ’objective’ and what 
  the character sees (or when the camera ‘pretends’ that what we are seeing is the field of vision of the character) 
  which is the ‘subjective’ camera. 
48  Deleuze, Cinema 2, 147.
49  Rafei and Rafei, 74 (la reconstitution d’une lutte), 44.40 min.
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[A] diagram is a map, or rather several superimposed maps. And from one diagram to the next, new maps 
are drawn. Thus there is no diagram that does not also include, besides the points which it connects up, 
certain relatively or unbound points, points of creativity, change and resistance, and it is perhaps with these 
that we ought to begin in order to understand the whole picture. It is on the basis of the ’struggles’ of each 
age, and the styles of these struggles, that we can understand the succession of diagrams or the way in 
which they becomes linked up again above and beyond the discontinuities. For each diagram testifies to 
the twisting line of the outside spoken of by Melville, without beginning or end, an oceanic line that passes 
through all points of resistance, pitches diagrams against one another, and operates always as the most 
recent. And what a strange twist of the line was 1968, the line with a thousand aberrations! From this we can 
get the triple definition of writing [and making cinema/visual art]: to write [make cinema / visual art] is to 
struggle and resist; to write [make cinema/ visual art] is to become [devenir revolutionaire]; to write [make 
cinema / visual art] is to draw a map: ‘I am a [ciné]-cartographer’.50
74 prompted me to draw a diagram in which the various multiplicities become interconnected in 
their very particularity and all are added onto the screen: 
The diagram that I have drawn51 is the screen from which inverted cones reach out: 
a) cone of the image; 
b) cone of subjectivity; 
c) cone of collectivity. 
The cones burrow forwards and backwards; one part launches into all that which pre-exists the 
screen (the production of the film), and the other part goes into all that which is before the screen (the 
audience and the different contexts in which the screenings take place). 
The image cone could be said to be all those machinic assemblages that went into the production 
of the image: the camera, the lens, the dolly, the pixels, the montage, the sound, the actors, the re-
enactment, the VO, the sound, the props, archive material, the historical events. But that image also 
extends itself into the cinema and borrows from our mental cameras – projecting our images onto 
the screen; those images include images of present struggles, images of other struggles, subjective 
experiences etc. All these image or snippets and fragments do not exist on a neat chronological line, 
but, rather, “meanwhile and & at the same time”. So when they become activated they activate the 
whole past in the present (S’’’’). And that is when the image cone extends itself and spills into the two 
other cones – that of subjectivity and that of collectivity.
The subjectivity cone is both that of the “real” students on the screen, but also that of the virtual 
students or activists whose parts they are to re-enact. But as we are placed before them on the screen, 
our subjectivities become included in the process of becoming that the screen subjects undergo. This 
production of subjectivity as a constant state of becoming takes place particularly in the interviews 
with the activists, where your off-screen voice questions the students about their roles in the group. We 
cannot help but ask ourselves these questions. But as we ask ourselves these questions we also burrow 
backwards and forward through our own repertoire of multiple selves and project them onto the 
screen. Or, rather it becomes impossible to establish a stable figure between the image on the screen 
and the mental image – like the “Rubin’s vase” image, where perception keeps shifting between seeing 
a vase and two faces in profile.52 And that is when the cone of subjectivity spills over and becomes the 
50  Deleuze, Foucault, 44. My highlights and inserted brackets.
51 The diagram I have drawn is an inverted version of Deleuze/Bergson’s cone of MM (matter and memory): ”the 
S point is the actual present; but this is not strictly speaking a point, since it already includes the past of this 
present, the virtual image which doubles the actual image. As for the AB, A’B’… sections of the cone they are 
not psychological circuits to which recollection-images would correspond; they are purely virtual circuits, each 
of which contains all our past as this is preserved in itself (pure recollection). Bergson is quite unequivocal in 
this respect. Psychological circuits of recollection-images or dream-images are produced only when we ’leap’ 
from S to one of these sections, to actualize some virtuality of it which must then move down into a new present 
S’”Deleuze, Cinema 2, 285.
52  Andrews and O’Sullivan, Visual Cultures as Objects and Affects, 64.
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cone of collectivity – because in so doing we bring our own contexts to the screen – and all those 
particularities forge a larger collectivity, while each part keep their singularity.
That is the relational ciné-cartography of 74 in which “I is another (Alia), is a pixel, is a screen, is a 
reconstitution of a people and of a struggle”. This reconstitution image is made possible through various 
factors, which one cannot anticipate, plan or design, but which become a practice of affect-as-inquiry 
of attuning to the heartbeat of contingency and urgency.
The four lines that the screen is strung out between are contingency, urgency, context and 
temporality. The temporal dimension is present in that the screen burrows backwards and forwards 
in past, present and future. Time is not neatly organised on a timeline but exists “meanwhile and at 
the same time”. But that temporal recurrence can only occur insofar as the different elements that 
makes up the film shares the same contingency and urgency as the event which they reconstitutes53. 
By “contingency” I mean that it cannot foresee, predict, or anticipate the film and production period. 
Rather than closing off a future outcome or form which is given in advance through the script, your 
method of improvisation keeps the film contingently open to any unforeseen events54. By ‘urgency’ I 
mean the tethering of practices, struggles, situations and affects which interpellate us, demand on us 
to change – here it is important to stress that this is not something which one chooses through free 
will or something which one can sit around and wait for, but something which takes us by surprise 
and strikes us violently. 
Returning to Deleuze’s notion of the time image, he splits the time image in three. While the two 
previous examples concerned the order of time – the coexistence of relations of simultaneity of the 
elements internal to time, the third time image, what he calls “the power of the false”, “concerns the 
series of time, which brings together the before and the after in a becoming, instead of separating 
them; its paradox is to introduce the enduring interval in the moment itself.”55
If we consider this third time image in relation to the third image or the militant image as described 
above, then this comes to form a “third-third” time image, which we can characterise as an image 
which is not a documentation, re-enactment or representation of a struggle, but it becomes all those 
struggles; it creates a relational ciné-cartography which cuts across temporal, generational and 
territorial boundaries; it is not true to an event but true in its very power of being false; it is not one 
ideology, as in the unity of ideology, image and sound, but a multiplicity of singularities, able to exist 
within the same frame; it is self-reflective; it is the reconstitution of a an enduring interval in the 
moment and movement itself. The Third-Third Time Image is an image in 6D or nD56. 
53  I would suggest that this is where 74 differs from other historical re-enactments (where people do not share the 
  same urgency and contingency with the battle or struggle they enact).  There are, however, other examples,  
  such as Jeremy Deller’s re-enactment of Battle of Orgreave, in which the battle between miners and police in the 
  village of Orgreave, is re-enacted with some of the miners and police who had actually participated alongside 
  younger re-enactors who did not necessarily share the exact experience but had it passed on to them; Sharon 
  Hayes repeats the slogans of Act Up (Lorenz, Not Now! Now! Chronopolitics, Art & Research.); and in Ferguson, 
  young activists repeat the slogans of The Black Panther Movement and the Civil Rights Movement in the US.
54  I discuss this at length in “Affect’s Time”.
55  Deleuze, Cinema 2, 151.
56 In ”Art and Occupation” Hito Steyerl describes occupation as a 6D/nD image: ”It [occupation] is a space 
governed not only by 3D sovereignty, but 4D sovereignty because it occupies time, a 5D sovereignty because 
it governs from the virtual, and an n-D sovereignty from above, beyond, across—in Dolby Surround. Time 
asynchronously crashes into space; accumulating by spasms of capital, despair, and desire running wild.” Steyerl, 
“Art as Occupation.” 
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TC: 13:04:19:75:22:08:20:15
The last image of 74 shows the set, a single room, the president’s office after it has supposedly 
been raided by 800 members of the security forces, the students beaten and 61 of them expelled from 
the university. The last words of the voice over are: “April 13 – 1975”. The screen fades to darkness. 
On April 13 1975, one year after the student-occupation of AUB, 40 years ago today (at the time of 
writing), the Lebanese (Civil) Wars erupted. 
As a closing remark, I would like to talk to you about the moment, the moment which 74 marks and 
the moment, which we could be said to be in – now. I remember you said that you wanted to revisit the 
year 1974, since 74 was the year before the Civil War broke out in Lebanon, and as such it was often 
referred to as a “golden era” where cultural, intellectual and revolutionary dreams were a possibility. 
Then 1975 came and with it hope and optimism were transformed into their complete opposite, a 
state of warfare. Perhaps I am being melodramatic, but I cannot help thinking how this became, to a 
certain extent, a self-fulfilling prophecy with your film. In 2010, when you started the project, the idea 
of revolution seemed like an impossible relic of a previous century. Then came 2011 and the world was 
gripped anew with revolutionary ferment. But as you started the post-production of the 74 – the initial 
hope and optimism was overturned by its complete opposite – a continuation of war.
Returning to Deleuze’s diagram or the dispositif, as an assemblage of several superimposed maps, 
in which these maps both seal off or describe a certain hegemonic power, but at the same time are able 
through urgency, contingency and creativity to open up to change and resistance in which all those 
lines of flight are set free. Such a moment is ’68, such a moment is ’74 and such a moment is 2011... 
2015…
The dispositif, or the diagram, reverberates and after forty years or so it opens itself up to new 
possible formations, only to conceal itself anew in a new set of hegemonic power formations.  
As testified to by the opening sequence and the VO reading “Kissinger in Moscow”, 1974 was closely 
connected with the Cold War between bi-polar superpowers US and USSR. Today the VO of my 
imaginary movie reads: “Kerry in Lausanne, nuclear talks with Iran”. But what seems to have shifted 
in today’s struggles and today’s diagrams is that the complexity of the points making up the larger 
diagram has become even more multifaceted. Where the 1974 landscape constituted a bi-polar, Cold 
War situation, the current Hot Cold War is strung out among multiple actors and interests (Russia, 
Iran, US, Europe, Saudi Arabia, to name but a few). The map is constantly shifting with new lines 
being drawn and redrawn. I will leave the discussion of the complexities of international relations to 
others, but want only to show that the intricacies of international relations are as relational as their 
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aesthetic and creative counterparts57.
In 1974 AUB and the city of Beirut became a microcosm, which reflected and enfolded the “outside”; 
in your films the screen itself draws a map of the particularity of the “struggles of each age, and the 
style of these struggles,” and the context of each struggle. It allows us “to understand the succession of 
diagrams or the way in which they becomes linked up again above and beyond the discontinuities.” 
The screen itself becomes an aggregate, which allows multiple and heterogeneous actors, interests, 
narratives and temporalities to exist within the same frame and to draw a new ciné-cartography of all 
those multiple struggles, which still exist across the globe.
As such the film cannot be reduced to a documentation, representation, or re-enactment of a past 
movement, but rather reconstitutes that movement in the present, by intermingling, interweaving the 
complexities of the various heterogeneous strands and points in the same movement and moment – 
the screen. And this is precisely Ghassan’s multiplicity when he shouts: 
Excuse me, all of you!  Stop your machismo, and you, your feminism, and you your patronization. And 
don’t hurl words at me like subjugation, colonialism etc. and here the complex of persecution and there the 
existential fear…give me a break with all your indoctrinated and preconceived ideas!58 
Rather than striving for consensus, or replacing the diagram with a new hegemonic force, 74 
leaves us with a challenge: how to enable all those different viewpoints, ideologies, agents, activists, 
feminisms, memories, struggles, images, pixels…to exist within the same frame?*
As I finalise the last corrections for this chapter, Ghassan’s… or Assad’s face appears on the screen again 
– but this time it is the screen of the television. It is the 22nd of August 2015 and he is the co-organiser of 
the demonstrations “You Stink”, in response to the garbage crisis in Lebanon (summer 2015). The struggle 
continues to be reconstituted in and enduring moment and movement…
57  I am echoing here Chantal Mouffe’s work on agonistic pluralism. See Mouffe, Agonistics.
58  Rafei and Rafei, 74 (la Reconstitution D’une Lutte), 44.40 min.
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Collectivities of the Disco Stretch
Or Propositions for a Future Practice
Choir: Madad, madad, madad, madad [Mister, Mister]
Lead: Decency is from Faith, and Fitna [temptation] is from Satan
Choir: Decency is from Faith, and Fitna [temptation] is from Satan
Lead: I swear to God if I were a cow I would be wearing a bra
Choir: Madad, Madad ya sisi, Al Baghdadi [O’ master Abu Bakr al Baghdadi]
You who rule by God’s rules
You, the triumpher of God’s laws
You will lead God’s servants
To an abyss like no other…1
I am two floors underground in the crammed, velvety cabaret Metro Al Madina in Hamra, Beirut…
No I am not… I am sitting at my desk in a neon-lit office at the University of Copenhagen, trying to 
write up the conclusion for this thesis while listening to the YouTube version of The Great Departed’s 
new song. Following their last concert, “La Bombe”, their song which mocks ISIS and its self-proclaimed 
Caliph Abou Bakr al Baghdadi has gone viral and created a huge “explosion” on social media and in 
the press, attracting more than 30,000 Likes on Facebook and putting the cultural venue Metro al 
Madina on the international map.2 
Metro al Madina is as young or old as this PhD project, if we take into consideration the fact 
that we were both pregnant for nine months. The first ideas for Metro were drawn in the sand by 
its shareholders, headed by the artistic director Hisham Jaber on a deserted beach in Oman on New 
Year’s Eve 2010. Since then it has grown rapidly into a cultural hub for experimentation with different 
art forms in the converted theatre space, formerly known as the small stage of the theatre Masrah al 
Madina.
Alongside Metro’s creative expansion, the surrounding area – the Middle East – has gone through 
extreme reconfigurations. In the context of this situation, Metro al Madina forges communities of 
experimentation, affects and textures in which historical cultural material is put to renewed use. 
Metro has produced a series of cabaret shows, with Hishik Bishik running for more than two years. The 
multiplicity of events and shows that Metro has managed to create and host help to foster relations and 
collaboration across generations, class, sectarian strives, regional, gender and sexual divides, creating 
collectivities – artistic assemblages between people from various backgrounds in Beirut’s Hamra 
District3. The tethering of those practices emanate a hope, or to quote one of Adel Nassar’s poems, it 
makes me “sick with hope”4 that despite or because of the volatility of this hope it is possible to create 
collective assemblages of enunciation as an affective response to the dire situations we are witnessing 
above ground: But what type of assemblage, what kind of collectivity?
Collectivities of the 3ayp el shoum
Firstly, I wanted to name these collectivities the collectivities of the 3ayp el shoum 3alaykeh.5 
1  The Great Departed, Madad Baghdadi.
2  Mackey, «Mocking ISIS in Beirut.»
3  Metro is not the only example, and similar sensibilities are at play in the films of Rania and Raed Rafei, in 
Maurice Louca’s album “Salute the parrot”; and various other projects by young as well as established artists in 
the region. The infrastructure has been prepared through a multiplicity of practices and initiatives developed 
over the years including The Lebanese Association for Plastic Arts, Ashkal Alwan, Metropolis Cinema, 98 weeks, 
Arab Image Foundation, Soukak, Beirut Art Center, and various other projects.
4  Nassar, ressentiment: Poems by Adel Nassar selected and translated by Walid Sadek.
5  I have translated Douglas Crimp’s ”collectivities of the shamed” into collectivities of the aip-shum, which in  
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I did so as a way to translate or refrain what Doughlas Crimp has termed the collectivities of shame 
in relation to drag and queer practices, which suggests that shame has “the capacity for articulating 
collectivities of the shamed”6. By reading Andy Warhol’s shaming of the drag queen Mario Montez in 
the film Screen Test #2, together with Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s work on shame, Crimp proposes that 
since shame is an affect which is both individualising and relational at the same time, it affectively binds 
together those who are marginalised by societal moral conduct. By displacing the Anglo-American 
word for shame with my poor Arabic translation 3ayp el shoum 3laykeh, which means “shame on you” 
in its feminine gender7, I thought it could be a ‘hip’ way to name a community of practices which are 
somehow resisting the moral constraints imposed by various different stratifying mechanisms.  
Crimp notes how shame “is what makes us queer, both in the sense of having a queer identity and 
in the sense that queerness is in a volatile relation to identity, destabilizing it even as it makes it.”8 
Queer – a term used to shame homosexuals and people who were marginalised by society – becomes 
a potent term which rather than “detaching itself from the childhood scene of shame…cleaves to that 
scene as a near inexhaustible source of transformational energy”9. Since shame is individuating and 
relational, singular and plural, Crimp proposes a sort of Levinasian ethico-political project based on 
shame: 
In the act of taking on the shame that is properly someone else’s, I simultaneously feel my utter separateness 
from even that person whose shame it initially was. I feel alone with my shame, singular in my susceptibility 
to being shamed for this stigma that has now become mine and mine alone. Thus my shame is taken on in 
the lieu of the other’s shame. In taking on the shame, I do not share the other’s identity. I simply adopt the 
other’s vulnerability to being shamed. In claimed as my own. In taking on or taking up his or her shame, 
I am not attempting to vanquish his or her otherness. I put myself in the place of the other only insofar as I 
recognize that I too am prone to shame.10 
“Shame on you!”, as a performative speech act, works both “linguistically and performatively” it 
casts shame on the person which it shames.11 But this performative speech act, is not purely linguistic 
and performative, but involves a material dimension. As I show in “Affect’s Materiality, Or, Not Tonight 
Dears, I Have a Headache!” shame is an example of how materiality is enfolded in the affect. The act of 
shaming or being shamed enfolds texture, which is then involuntary projected by the person shaming 
and interiorised by the person being shamed. This passing of affect becomes visible in the blushing of 
a face, eyes being cast down etc. As such, shame enfolds some of the same textural qualities as having 
a crush, as described by Elizabeth Freeman:
‘For me having a “crush” is about texture, like crushed velvet or crushed foil. My surface gets all uneven, my 
underneath shows through, things shine up suddenly. It’s like “being” crushed material, but also like wearing 
it, alternately slithery and itchy.’12 
The absence of an explicit verb from ‘Shame on you’ records the place in which an I, in conferring shame, 
has effaced itself and its own agency. Of course the desire for self-effacement is the defining trait of – what 
else? – shame. So the very grammatical truncation of ‘Shame on you’ marks it as the product of a history out 
of which an I, now withdrawn, is projecting shame – toward another I, an I deferred, that has yet and with 
  Arabic could refer to people and practices which are outside moral conduct including “haram”, “infidel”,  “Kuffar”. 
6  Crimp, “Mario Montez, For Shame.”
7  Ibid.
8  Ibid., 64.
9  Ibid., 65 quoting Sedgwick.
10  Ibid.
11  Ibid., 64.
12  Bora, “Outing Texture”, 94 quoting Elizabeth Freeman.
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difficulty to come into being, if at all, in the place of the shamed second person.13 
In the absence of a verb, the affect gains agentic powers of its own. Shame in this case enfolds the 
object – which it cannot renounce – and at the same time that object somehow brings about a change 
in the outer appearance or texture of the body it has been inserted into. This enfoldment constitutes 
a form of individuation, in-between subject and object which can have a transformational force that 
opens up to a potentiality of radical resignification and rematerialisation.14 Quoting Michael Warner, 
Crimp notes how “Queer scenes are the true salon des refusés, where the most heterogeneous people 
are brought into great intimacy by their common experience of being despised and rejected in a world 
of norms that they now recognize as false morality.” 
But why would I want to attach such an affect or name to Metro al Madina? Metro al Madina 
does not have an apparent queer profile, if one can indeed have such a profile… Metro could be 
seen as a salon of the “refused” where all those subjects who for various reasons do not fit in with 
religious, sectarian, sexual, gender norms etc. are brought together into great intimacy. Metro takes 
cultural productions from the past, even a past before the performers were born and rework those 
productions with great transformational energy and intensity, but then again the performances might 
not necessarily have anything to do with prohibition or repression. But then it occurs to me that 
what Sedgwick describes as the proto-affect shame is indeed not necessarily tied to prohibition and 
repression, but rather is a “disruptive moment, in a circuit of identity constituting indentificatory 
communication.” The embodied affect of shame has a double function of on the one hand being alert 
to trouble and at the same time “a desire to reconstitute the interpersonal bridge.” 15
By naming the collectivities Metro is fostering “the collectivities of the ayp el shoum”, I wanted 
to widen Crimp’s queer collectivities of shame, to extend the collectivities beyond apparent sexual or 
gendered stratifications to include a multiplicity of stratifications which are currently being shamed by 
various power regimes. Collectivities of the shoum was an attempt to keep the “queer moment” alive 
and to include other moments, temporalities and textures within the same moment.16 
The neon light in my office flickers 
      Did I sleep? 
I open the velvety black curtains 
      Damp hot air blocks my air-channels
The refrain increase in volume:
Choir: Madad madad madad madad
Lead: Decency is from Faith, and Fitna [temptation] is from Satan
Choir: Decency is from Faith, and Fitna [temptation] is from Satan
Lead: I swear to God if I were a cow I would be wearing a bra
Choir: Madad, Madad Ya Sisi, Al Baghdadi (o master Abu Bakr al Baghdadi)
You who rule by God’s rules
You, the triumpher of God’s laws
You will lead God’s servants
To an abyss like no other…
13 Crimp, “Mario Montez, For Shame”, 66 quoting Sedgwick “Queer performativity: Henry James’s The Art of the 
Novel” 1993.
14  For discussions on shame in Danish see also Bissenbakker, “Skammerens Datter”.
15 Shame according to Sedgwick is similar to her notions of paranoia and the depressive, as developmental positions 
that every infant undergoes – not necessarily as a result of prohibition or repression but when the child is not 
met with the desired facial response or recognition from its caregiver. See Sedgwick, Touching feeling, 36.
16 I discuss Sedgwick’s use of queer moment as pluralities of moments and movements existing in the same 
moment in “Affect’s Time”. See also Stüttgen, IN A QU*A*RE TIME AND PLACE Post-Slavery Temporalities, 
Blaxploitation, and Sun Ra’s Afrofuturism between Intersectionality and Heterogeneity; Guattari et al., Recherches. .
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I am no longer staring at the YouTube version of the song, but am face to face with the live 
performance by The Great Departed for Metro Al Madina’s third anniversary17. Crammed in the 
small theatre, I am sharing the sweat, tears and laughter of my co-audience, which has today politely 
“exploded” the theatre’s usual capacity of some 110 to something like 350 people.18 
The Great Departed’s act is followed by Roberto Kobrosli, (Hisham Jaber), a returning stand-up-
act-cum-Toastmaster. Wearing a full evening dress, the sweat trickles from his forehead as his act 
punctuates the atmosphere created by The Great Departed’s humorous lyrics. Instead of expressing 
an immense gratitude to the audience, the artists and the staff for their continuous efforts in making 
Metro the success it is today, Kobrosli’s jokes sound far from reparative to a sensitive ear and are 
more humiliating than pleasing. Kobrosli’s act dismantles the comfort zone that the velvety theatre has 
turned into and makes me recall Lauren Berlant’s question: “How would we know when the ‘repair’ 
we intended is not another form of narcissism or smothering will? Just because we sense it to be?”19 
But here I want to suggest that the reparative critical practice is not a “better” or “good” affective 
practice but, as Warner also shows, can equally be vile, abusive and insulting within the community, 
but because “this abjection is understood to be the shared condition they [the drag queens in Warner’s 
case] also know how to communicate through such comradery a moving and unexpected form of 
generosity.”20
Then I feel shame blushing up my face, amplified by my own sudden awareness of having tried to 
project my own desire for a collectivity onto a collectivity that maybe even does not want to be one. 
In the attempt to name this collectivity from afar, had I enacted the same stratifying structures which 
I wanted to claim the collectivity in opposition to, by naming it using a poor translation of concepts 
that do not necessarily translate or travel? The collectivities of the ayp shoum seem less to name the 
collectivities that Metro is fostering and more about the collectivities which I am in dire need of in 
response to the current Danish political climate. Up to and following the parliamentary elections on 
June 18 2015 the political landscape has heralded public shaming, cuts and closures of practices and 
subjects who do not share the same view-point, belief, colour, race, sexual orientation as those in 
power. 
Maybe because I miss you. 
Maybe because I miss being part of a collective, being born and raised in a commune in the 1980s, it 
seems today that even to conceive or dream of a collectivity is shameful in itself.
Transported from my desk in Copenhagen, to being enmeshed in the moving crowd of dancing 
people in the crammed Metro – I am no longer so sure that I had attached the proper affect, or 
adjective to the collectivity. Maybe the collectivity itself does not even want to become one? 
Collectivities of Texxture | Texture
The pale olive green velour stage curtain opens again for a new act.
The shiny, purple, disco-stretch polyester corsage belting up Wissam Dhalati’s soft curves are set in 
motion with the brown wide-chequered trumpet trousers and a seventies blouse. Dahlati and his co-
performer Roy Deep dance on the stage in a reinterpretation Lebanese popular song “Habibi beheb el 
tesh” (“Darling I like to go out”) from the 1970s. 
17  3rd of January 2015
18 The Great Daparted act is called “La Bombe” in which the car-bomber politely asks: ”Où puis j’implentais ma 
bombe madame?”, which is French for “Where can I put my bomb Madame?”
19  Berlant, Cruel Optimism, 124.
20  Warner, The Trouble with Normal, 3.; Crimp, «Mario Montez, For Shame», 66 For an excellent example of such 
practices see also David Hoyle which I analyse in «We Shall Overcum: Notes for a Reparative Critical Practice».
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It is Bar Farouk time. Metro al Madina’s new cabaret show named after Théatre Farouk an old 
theatre cabaret in Downtown, Beirut, in the 1940s which later took on different names, and functions 
and served as an theatrical venue cum brothel. The enchanting baladi-dancer Randa Makhoul has 
changed her usual attire with its tulle and golden sequins – and is now wearing a pink jumpsuit made 
out of the similar 70s disco-stretch. She is no longer a voiceless dancing body21, as she has been in the 
previous cabaret shows, but as part of the women’s liberation movement of the 1960s she has gained 
a voice, singing, while kicking her long slender legs and twin-tower-plateau heels in the face of the 
front-row audience. 
The collectivities are transported and enfolded in the texxtures and textures of people, velvet, nylon, 
tulle and polyester in a saturated colour cabaret. The vapour produced by the bodies crammed in the 
theatre adds a Technicolor movie-filter to the live show unfolding in front of me, as if Nadim Saoma, 
the show’s VJ, has colour-graded the whole event, frame by frame, pixel by pixel. 
Returning to Renu Bora and Sedgwick’s differentiation between Texxture | Texture which I discuss 
in “Affect Image Touch” disco-stretch is an interesting fabric to consider since it is industrially 
fabricated and as such it could appear to block or refuse to convey the information of its making. 
Its texture is glossy, positively tacky, and as such “signifies the willed erasure of its history”22. But the 
way in which it is employed in Bar Farouk it becomes slightly more complex. According to Sedgwick, 
textural perceptuon brings with it the ability to operate on different scales: there is “no one physical 
scale that intrinsically is the scale of texture”23. As my fingers brush over the costumes in the backstage 
area, what appeared flat, glossy shiny from a distance becomes nubby, rough, itchy and stretchy.  
There is something interesting in that Elizabeth Freeman mentions that having a crush is like 
“being” and “wearing” a texture at the same time. Our skin becomes that which we both are and 
are wearing at the same time, but also that which makes us susceptible to other bodies or that which 
demarcates our liminal intersection with others. As I have shown throughout this thesis, affect, as a 
prepersonal intensity, enfolds the materiality of the pure past (the that which has been). This opens up 
to a what I call affect’s time, when affect collides with through which time is experienced directly – as 
heterogeneity of times existing in the same moment. This process works back on the initial materiality 
that the affect carried with it – and creates a process of rematerialisation through which the past is no 
longer pure past but becomes reconstituted in the present. In the case of Bar Farouk it is literally a 
process of rematerialisation – where old textures of different fabrics, music and images, collide, rub 
up against each other and create new conjunctions, new assemblages. The textures are undergoing a 
process of rematerialisation both in terms of the old songs, which are reinterpreted eloquently by Ziad 
el-Ahmaddieh, but also the costumes, the sequins, the tulles, the disco stretch, velvet and corduroy. 
Bar Farouk is not trying to return to an “original” or to be authentic, the original burned down in 
1970s, and the name itself is lent from various localities, cabarets, bars and brothels that together 
makes up Bar Faruok. But it is precisely through this strong sensibility for textures, and the textures’ 
power of being false, that enables a textural sensation from the past, well up in the present and which 
carries with it the entire context. This is not a nostalgic or melancholic return to a past as “that which 
was”, but rather an over-the-top setting free the past – making the past subject to experimentation and 
rematerialisation in the present. It is this great sensibility to textures that enables the audience to draw 
in our own imagination, our own memories, making those and superimpose those memories onto 
the stage in front of us. It becomes impossible to establish a stable figure between the image on the 
21 Only is a wrong word to use here, since Randa’s dance is everything but only and precisely opens up to other ways 
to consider language beyond the apparent discursive ones.
22  Sedgwick, Touching feeling, 15.
23  Ibid., 16.
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screen (Saoma’s projections) the live acts unfolding on stage, and the totality of mental image, which 
the audience project onto the stage.
After the show, Dhalati and I sit in the dark theatre, looking at the stage now taken over by the 
audience, who are dancing the night away. Back in his usual attire, Dhalati tells me that with his costume 
design his objective was to create characters where each character reflects the different epochs from the 
1930s Charleston to the 1970s hippie & disco, but subtly challenge the fashion codes of concealing the 
‘too much’, the ‘too fat’, ‘too tall’ or ‘too short’ and ‘too skinny’ and so forth. By juxtaposing conflicting 
fabrics, revealing without revealing, showing the curves and shapes of the performers, without trying 
to conform to a certain image, Dhalati’s costumes recall the famous remarks of Oscar Wilde “One 
must either be a work of art or wear a work of art” and Aron Payne in A Portrait of Jason: “You might 
not be an oil painting but you are a fascinating monster”. But here it is no longer an “either/or”: Hishik 
Bishik, Bar Farouk and the many Metro productions create the possibility of being and wearing a work 
of art, of being an oil painting and a monstrous production “meanwhile and & at the same time”. As 
Hisham Jaber says, “I have created a monster.” 
Collectivities of Criticality
But is it political? is a question people in Denmark and elsewhere often ask, when I try to explain 
Metro’s work. Here the very form in which the question is fashioned already seem to assume a certain 
form of politics that “political art” is said to be, without saying what this form might look like. Hisham 
Jaber and the other shareholders of Metro always respond to this question with a simple “No!” We can 
take this ‘no’ at face value and say, “No, Metro al Madina is not political”. But here I find it interesting 
to consider the way in which Hisham declares this confident ‘no’ and how this precisely reveals Metro’s 
politics, or criticality.
Returning to Foucault’s tease or performative speech-act, which I discuss in “Affect as Critical 
Inquiry”, in which Foucault approaches something like an “originary freedom” only to say “I did not 
say this”, the speech-act itself opens up to a contingency or possibility in which freedom becomes 
possible, but without securing its grounds or governing what this act of freedom might be24. Here, I 
want to suggest that Metro al Madina is critical or political precisely in the sense that the practices, 
Metro creates and presents, all to a certain extent has run up against an impasse in society, or in the 
production of culture and “popular culture”, and in response to this impasse a new forms of practices 
emerges. These styles does not try to seize or govern the field or practice in question – but instead it is 
left open to contingency, to the audience, to the ensemble on stage to determine the outcome. Without 
going into detail about Lebanese politics, I want to consider the ways in which this criticality becomes 
possible, not through intellectual discourse, but by being enfolded in the texture. The political situation 
is not something that needs to be spoken explicitly about but becomes, so to speak, the “interiority in 
which we are in, in which we move, live and change”25. 
Criticality, as we have seen with Irit Rogoff, requires “living out a situation” which requires a double 
inquiry of both an analytical mode and a demand to produce new subjectivities in response to this 
situation. As such there is no need to hammer the audience in the head with what they already know 
– that the world above ground is fucked up – nor to side with one fraction or the other, when all 
fractions are corrupt. Rather, Metro creates an affective community that counters ISIS’s terror with 
humour (for example, Great Departed Songs); that counter the sense of defeat many people felt in 
24 In this it is similar to queer as a non-identitarian identity, as Sedgwick & Crimp show, in which it is destabilised 
even as it makes it. 
25 Here I am refraining Deleuze’s notion of the time image, and time as the interiority in which we are in, which I 
develop in ”Affect’s Time”.
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response to the Arab Spring’s meltdown by staging practices that come together across geographical 
boundaries (for example, Alif Ensemble, and the many other collaborations between various bands 
and performers from Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Egypt); recycling discarded materials from a rich 
repertoire of popular Arab cultural production (from 1920s-1970s) for renewed use and energy (when 
the country is not itself able to recycle its own waste – hence the garbage crisis of summer 2015).
In Foucault words, one does not have to be sad to be a militant, and to provide a space for 
entertainment, fun and laughter can actually be extremely serious; that is “the tracking down of 
all varieties of fascism, from the enormous ones that surround and crush us to the petty ones that 
constitute the tyrannical bitterness of our everyday life.”26
Collectivities of Fitna [temptation] or desire 
As we are dancing around the pole that night, slipping in an out of each 
other’s textures, I am no longer sure who is ‘I’ and who is ‘another’ – 
I is another [J’est un autre] – or I is not just another, but one, two, 
many. I are a proliferation and conjunction of desires set free, given 
to each other in each other’s textures. And as the clock moves from 4 
to 6 am, the pole detaches itself from the ceiling and people start to 
exchange more than just phone numbers.
That night in Metro 
everything seemed possible 
2015 
would be the year 
where the wars on the borders would cease 
sectarian divide would be “overcum” 
civil and gay rights established 
and we would all go for a collective detox.
The day after I woke up, hungover, sick with hope that the future might 
be different from the present, while at the same time feeling self-
reflexively sick that I still insist on this hope. 
Collectivities of the self-sustained
What fascinates me most about the Metro, and what also most distinguishes it from most other 
cultural spaces, here and elsewhere, is that in less than three years the space has succeeded in becoming 
self-financing, employs a great number of staff, self-finances relatively high-budget productions and 
provides honorariums for the performing artists and guest performers. It manages all of this without 
any public or private funding, but solely from selling tickets, bar-sales and renting out the venue. Such 
a business model requires an audience who are willing to come again. It requires a proliferation of 
events which can attract different people from different walks of life, and the creation of an atmosphere, 
in which people feel comfortable, even though this comfort zone is always being challenged.  This is 
to reinvent the pop – or the popular – without having to compromise on quality, content or criticality. 
Of course one could object that Metro’s success requires a relatively high consumption of alcohol and 
the cost in the long term could be the possible burnout of the people behind. 
For a while I insisted that it was important to insist on working with the institutions (in Denmark 
where there still are public institutions) but I am no longer so sure. What becomes more pertinent is 
how to create our own collective self-sustainable spaces that cater for the community it create. 
26  Here I am deliberately refraining Foucault’s introduction to Anti-Oedipus. 
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Collectivities of ensembles & assemblages
Hishik Bishik and Bar Farouk are assemblages or ensembles: they are collective in that they are 
literally made up of heterogeneous components – not only the actors, singers, musicians on stage but 
also of different art forms. Hishik Bishik and Bar Farouk are somewhat in-between image, music and 
performance, creating a shallow depth which is facilitated by Nadim Saoma, who creates the visuals 
that serve as the split-screen backdrop for Metro al Madina’s stage27. 
While the director Hisham Jaber heads the show, there is a certain communitarian workflow at 
work, which does not proceed as in a usual theatrical production, in which there is a script which can 
be executed, or interpreted in various ways but where the final production will be recognisable as the 
original script. Similarly, it does not follow the usual division of labour between dramaturge, stage-
manager, composer, musician, actor, costume design, art direction, visuals, light design, producer 
etc., but it is an ensemble where everyone brings his or her style to the show. As such, the outcome is 
not necessarily possible to anticipate in advance, but operates with considerable contingency. It is a 
workflow comparable to Jean-Luc Godard’s ethos for making film politically which is “to edit a film 
before shooting it, to make it during filming and to make it after the filming”28 – a workflow of the 
“meanwhile and & at the same time”. In that sense collectivities of assemblages or ensembles require 
a mode of collaboration where each collaborator or contributor is somehow free to do his or her 
own work in his or her own style, but in close collaboration with the other practitioners. And it is 
bringing all these components and practices together that make up the work. It was a similar work 
ethos I used when working on Leap into Colour. While each contributor, Ali Kays, Maurice Louca 
and Khaled Yassine brought their own work and style to the video, it was the assemblage of all those 
elements that made up the project. All those different elements are then able to split again and form 
new assemblages and new collaborations, which are different in nature, but might still take some 
aspects of the previous collaborations and assemblages with them into the new assemblage.29 Here 
a fear could be that the success created with the cabaret shows might taint and take the place of less 
profitable productions; that the high number of productions might eventually exhaust ideas and the 
reworking of past cultural productions might be deployed as a default, rather than a radical form of 
rematerialisation. But at the same time one can argue that it is precisely the success of some shows that 
gives space for the emergence of less popular productions. 
As we were dancing the night away in Metro, I could no longer discern who was audience, who 
was producer, who was artist and who was consumer… whatever else we know, we know that it is 
in the making. It is not easy to ascribe a proper affect or a name to these collectivities, but they style 
collectivities to come.
As I write up this conclusion, Metro al Madina has been commissioned to launch the new version of Bar 
Farouk at the Beiteddine Festival on August 20, 2015. In a few weeks the Metro will leave its two-floor 
underground theatre and climb up the mountain to the 19th century Druze palace where the festival is 
scenically located. The Metro is expanding its line and being transported from the underground and up 
into the thin air. Whether the same tethering of practices, textures, affects and temporalities will be able 
to operate on a larger scale only the future will tell…
27  Metro Al Madina’s stage is designed in such a way that there is one main stage in front and then two smaller  
  stages in the back which can be separated. The two small stages are separated by a big golden tapestry column, 
  which separates the two stages and or indeed connects them.
28  Godard, “What is to be done?”
29  Hence Louca and Yassine are part of Alif Ensemble, and now they are working together in new projects with 
  other people; Hishik Bishik has morphed into new assemblages, i.e. Bar Farouk, the performance Aghene  
  Servicet but also elements and performers have leaped into Alexandre Paulikevitch’s new performance show; to 
  name but a few.
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Propositions for a Future Practice
I started out this PhD project by suggesting that I wanted to take a sidestep away from reading 
apparently non-linguistic practices in linguistic and discursive ways. I wanted to displace the reparative 
practice from a reading or hermeneutics to artistic practices and an image in itself. I wanted to attune to 
the materiality and texture of the images. But as I bundle up the material gathered over the course of 
this research project it occurs to me that I have done so by enacting a paranoid hermeneutic impulse. 
I want to suggest that theorising through such incoherence and contradiction precisely opens up 
to a constructive pragmatism and an assemblage of practices and enunciations. Rather than radically 
divorcing myself from post-structuralist theory, I have reconciled the materialist and textured 
impulses of the reparative critical practice with its inheritances from post-structuralist and critical 
theory suggesting that it is a double practice that requires at the same time both an analytical mode 
and a demand to produce new subjectivities. 
The practices that Time in the Making gathers assist a notion of the reparative critical practice as 
an additive, accumulative, historically dense, communal exploration of different fragments, which 
are styled into assemblages. And it is through these mutable practices, that the reparative critical 
practice emerges as an “art of existence” (Foucault) or “new aesthetic paradigm” (Guattari) to style 
new versions of the self and the communities of which we are a part.
Time in the Making suggests that reparative critical practices enfold the materiality of the pure past 
(the that which has been). This opens up to a what I call affect’s time – when affect collides with matter 
and opens up to a possibility of experiencing time directly – as heterogeneity of times existing in the same 
moment. This process works back on the initial materiality that the affect carried with it and creates a 
process of rematerialisation through which the past is no longer pure past but becomes reconstituted 
in the present. As such, reparative critical practices involves a complex relationality to temporality 
which operates on four or more different levels: the past experience itself; the rematerialisation or 
restylisation of that past experience; which creates a third temporality – the reconstitution of the past 
in the present – which hovers in between past and present and cannot settle on either or. But together 
all these different temporal processes constitutes a fourth dimension, which is the collectivities of 
practices which points to a future practice to come. 
On a closing remark I will knock out – [k]not a conclusion from this research project – but some 
useful methods or lines, which can be braided together. These propositions for a future practice, 
one which we might call reparative, is not an attempt to govern or police what the reparative critical 
practice is, but to create focal points and emergences from where new subjectivities and collectivities 
can emerge:
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001: Film on one location; one room; let the outside enfold the inside (and vice-versa). Let the real  
location become fabulous through the effect of its being real. (For instructions see Rania & Raed Rafei 74) 
002: To do 001 is to use real people, and let the real people share the same urgency as the people they are to re-enact; 
contribute to the constitution or reconstitution of people, where the film maker and her characters become others 
together and the one through the other. (For instructions see Rania & Raed Rafei 74 & Leap into Colour) 
003: To do 002 is to allow for “a certain time for the character to seize hold of your expectations”. 
 (For instructions see Shirley Clark & Rania & Raed Rafei)
004: To do 003 is to use truthful narration that claims to be true, even in fiction. (For instructions 
see The Atlas Group, Shirley Clark, Rania & Raed Rafei, Bar Farouk, Leap into Colour)
005:  To do 004 is to let documents come to constitute themselves in the present, through the  
absence of actual documents or the excessive fabrication of documents. (For instructions 
 see The Atlas Group; Rania & Raed Rafei)
006:  To do 005 is to become an image in itself through the juxtaposition of images and blocks of 
movements/duration. (For instructions see Harun Farocki, Pasolini, Deleuze)
007:  To do 006 is to project on black and let the audience themselves 
create and project their own imagery suported by subtitles or a 
dateline. (For instructions see Felix Gonzalez-Torres; Rania & 
 Raed Rafei)
008:  To do 007 is to gather as much material as possible and let the 
materials act on each other with little if any commentary. (For 
instructions see Julie Ault)
009:  To do 008 is to theorise through incoherence and non-dualistic contradiction.   
(For instructionssee Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick)
010: To do 009 is to collaborate, to let everyone bring his or her own work or style to the 
collaboration. (For instructions see Metro al Madina, Leap into Colour)
011: To do 010 is to create assemblages and ensembles and let the ensemble disperse 
again and form new collaborations. (For instructions see Metro al Madina, Alif 
Ensemble, Leap into Colour and more)
012: To do 010 and 011 is to work alongside oneself in a constructive pragmatism.  
(For instructions see Deleuze)
013:  To do 012 is to becomes a poor cartographer, in a triple definition of writing and making cinema/visual art: “to 
write and make cinema/visual art is to struggle and resist; to write and make cinema/visual art is to become 
(become revolutionary); to write and make cinema/visual art is to draw a map: ‘I am a poor cartographer’”. 
(For instructions see Deleuze; Rania & Raed Rafei; Nahia Hassan; Irit Rogoff; Mohamad Soueid; Leap into 
Colour) 
014:  To do 013 is not to speak in the language of the coloniser, but to use as many languages as possible at the same 
time (For instructions see Leap into Colour)
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015:        To do 14 is to become a poor image – compress, upload and share yourself; rip yourself from the history,  
context and spatio-temporal coordinates and reassemble yourself in others’ resolutions. (For instructions 
see Hito Steyerl)
016:  To do 15 is to become a bad time poor image: That is to let all the different temporalities, different compressions, 
different frame rates, different codecs and formats (that we are made of) with their own internal micro-movements, 
operate asynchronously within the same frame. To become a bad time poor image is to let the plurality of micro-
temporalities exist within the same frame, it is to introduce enduring intervals, semi-autonomous movements 
within the frame.
017:  To do 016 is to become a third-third time image which is not a documentation, re-
enactment or representation of a struggle, but it becomes all those struggles. To 
become a third-third time image is to create a relational ciné-cartography which 
cuts across temporal, generational and territorial boundaries; it is not true to an 
event but true in its very power of being false; it is not one ideology, as in the 
unity of ideology, image and sound, but a multiplicity of singularities, able to exist 
within the same frame; it is self-reflective; it is the reconstitution of a an enduring 
interval in the moment and movement itself. To become a Third-Third Time 
Image is to become an image in 6D or nD. (For instructions see Rania & Raed 
Rafei; Hito Steyerl; The Otolith Group; Mohamed Soueid; Leap into Colour…)
018  To do 017 is to create collectivities of Texture | Texxtures: That is to have a 
strong sensibility for textures, which can enable a textural sensation from the 
past, well up in the present and which carries with it the entire context. To create 
collectivities of texxtures is not a nostalgic or melancholic return to a past as “that 
which was”, but rather an over-the-top setting free the past – making the past 
subject to experimentation and rematerialisation in the present. (For instructions 
see Bar Farouk, Hishik Bishik, the costume design of Wissam Dhalati, the musical 
compositions of Ziad El Ahmadieye, Maurice Louca’s album Salute the Parrot)
019  To do 018 is to create an infrastructure for cultural production beyond 
state or corporate interests and funding that caters to the community 
it creates. These collectivities are not easily ascribed a proper affect 
or name but name themselves in the making. (For instructions see 
Metro al Madina; Della Pollock)
020  To do 019 is to not to think that “one has to be sad in order to be a militant, even though the thing 
one is fighting is abominable. It is the connection of desire to reality (and not its retreat into the 
forms of representation) that possesses revolutionary force” (For instructions see Foucault, Sandra/
Alia in Prologue & 74; & Metro al Madina)
021 To do 20 is to “either be a work of art or wear a work of art” (For instructions see. Oscar Wilde; 
Wissam Dhalati’s costume-design)
     022       To do 22 is to do 23. (For instructions see ________________) 1
And if you think this is all fun and games, when something essential is taking place, something of extreme seriousness: 
the tracking down of all varieties of fascism, from the enormous one that surround and crush us to the petty ones that 
constitutes the tyrannical bitterness of our everyday life”2 but that is also when which we might call reparative critical 
practices take place.
Without further ado, I will not leave it to you in your own time, but go out and do it together with you “meanwhile, and 
& at the same time”.
 Katrine Dirckinck-Holmfeld, 2015
1  The style of this manifesto deliberately mimics Godard, “What is to be done?”
2  Here I am deliberately refraining Foucault’s introduction to Anti-Oedipus. See Foucault, “Introduction.” 
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Not Tonight Dears, Sedgwick, Guattari & Deleuze, based on cover of the book After Sex?: On Writing Since Queer Theory, 
Katrine Dirckinck-Holmfeld 2014
Affect Image Touch p. 40-47
Still from 3-channel video installation TIME: AALBORG | SPACE 2033, Katrine Dirckinck-Holmfeld 2010
Still from The Scarlet Empress, Josef Von Sternberg 1934
Still from YouTube video – Syrian protesters capture own death on camera, 2011 https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=QnqiQICRD8w
A movement image is being written p. 49-69
Stills from video installation movement, Katrine Dirckinck-Holmfeld & Nadim Saoma 2012
Affect’s Time p. 65-83
Mixed-media collage based on Julie Ault’s reinstallation of Félix Gonzalez-Torres optimistic clocks, 
Material: Time Frames, Julie Ault and Andrea Rosen, inspired by Félix Gonzalez-Torres’ date-line and billboard on Sheri-
dan Square 1989, OPP Notebook, Katrine Dirckinck-Holmfeld 2011-2015
Affect as Critical Inquiry p. 95-117
Screen-grab from Facebook after the Tayyone car bomb 2014. Names blotted out by Katrine Dirckinck-Holmfeld.
Leap Into Colour p. 119-123
Installation view of video installation, Leap into Colour, Katrine Dirckinck-Holmfeld 2015. Photo: Anders Sune Berg
Stills from video Leap into Colour, Katrine Dirckinck-Holmfeld 2015
Rematerialisation p. 124-138
Still from video Leap into Colour, Katrine Dirckinck-Holmfeld 2015
Still from video produced during workshop “Labour in a Single Shot” (Farocki and Ehmann): Katrine Dirckinck-Holm-
feld, 2012
Still from video Leap into Colour, Katrine Dirckinck-Holmfeld 2015
Still from video-installation TIME: AALBORG | SPACE: 2033, Katrine Dirckinck-Holmfeld, 2010
Screen–grab from work with Leap into Colour: showing the layers active in the compositing of the shots. Each layer 
equally entails internal layers. Katrine Dirckinck-Holmfeld and Ali Kays 2015
Reconstitution p. 140-155
Stills from Rania & Raed Rafei 74 (The reconstitution of a struggle)
1  Halley og Parker, After Sex?
2  Klein, Krümmel, og Documenta (Exhibition), Melanie Klein.
3  Libbrecht, “Guide to Snowflakes.”
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p. 151: notebook draft of diagram Katrine Dirckinck-Holmfeld 2015
Collectivities of The Disco-Stretch p. 157-171
Leap into Colour, Reenactment photo with filmmaker Rania Rafei posing as Madiha Yusri (Egyptian actress) after origi-
nal photograph taken Armand ca. 1940s, Katrine Dirckinck-Holmfeld & Nadim Saoma, Metro Al Madina, Beirut, 2012
Leap into Colour, Reenactment photo with singer Yasmina Fayed, Katrine Dirckinck-Holmfeld & Nadim Saoma, Metro 
Al Madina, Beirut, 2012
Leap into Colour, Reenactment photo with Roberto Kobrosli aka. Hisham Jaber  (actor, stand-up and theatre director) 
posing as Unknown after original photograph taken by Armand ca. 1940s, Katrine Dirckinck-Holmfeld & Nadim Saoma, 
Metro Al Madina, Beirut, 2012
Leap into Colour, Reenactment photo with artist Malak Helmy posing as Madiha Yusri (Egyptian actress) after original 
photograph taken by Armand ca. 1940s, Katrine Dirckinck-Holmfeld, Islam Kamal & Nadim Saoma: Studio Viennoise, 
Cairo, 2012
Leap into Colour, Reenactment photo with artist Sama Waly posing as Lola Sidki (Egyptian actress, dancer & singer) 
after original photograph taken by Armand ca. 1940s, Katrine Dirckinck-Holmfeld & Nadim Saoma: Studio Viennoise, 
Cairo, 2012
Leap into Colour, Reenactment photo with rapper Zak aka. Assasi from Bilad El-Sham – posing as Abdel Wahab (Egyp-
tian singer and actor) after original photograph taken by Armand ca. 1940s, Katrine Dirckinck-Holmfeld & Nadim 
Saoma: Metro Al Madina, Beirut, 2012
Leap into Colour, Reenactment photo with pianist Marc Ernest posing as Italian pianist as original photographed by Ar-
mand ca. 1940s, Katrine Dirckinck-Holmfeld & Nadim Saoma: Metro Al Madina, Beirut, 2012
Credits Videos
Leap into Colour, 27 minutes, Katrine Dirckinck-Holmfeld 2015 
DOP: Nadim Saoma (Lebanon), Islam Kamal (Egypt),  Talib Rasmussen (Denmark)
Cast: Philippe Arzrouni, Armand Arzrouni, Mustafa, Am Abdo, Vartan Avakian, Malak Helmy & Fatiha Bouzidi
Sound composition: Khaled Yassine & Maurice Louca
Sound design: Khaled Yassine & Ziad Fayed
Editing & Compositing: Katrine Dirckinck-Holmfeld, Ali Kays & The Council, Beirut
movement, 30 minutes (four channels), Katrine Dirckinck-Holmfeld, 2012
DOP, edit & compositing: Nadim Saoma
Assistant producer: Ghrenwa Mroueh
Projectionist: Sune Petersen & Nadim Saoma.
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I’m not on the side of the family, I side with the pack. Packs, bands, are groups of the rhizome type, as 
opposed to the arborescent type that centers around organs of power.1 
To undertake a PhD project can at times feel as a lonely venture, but as I recall with immense 
gratitude all those beautiful people who have made this project possible, it occurs to me that it has 
not been so lonely after all, but an extremely rich period of collaboration, inspiration and exchange, 
between various people, institutions, frameworks, contexts and practices.
Frederik Tygstrup, I am grateful for your generous, open-minded and permissive supervision, 
which often turned out to be sessions of conceptual origami. Gerard Byrne has co-supervised this 
project and has been a generous interlocutor since my MFA at The Royal Academy of Fine Arts; I 
cherish the discussions we have had over the years and for inspiring me to go back an rework, reedit 
& resist the flatness. 
I  am thankful to University of Copenhagen, Department of Arts and Cultural Studies, Head of 
Department Mette Sandbye for hosting this PhD project. I express my gratitude to the former head of 
department Marianne Ping Huang, who initially approved the project. I thank the former and current 
director of The Royal Danish Academy of Fine Art Mikkel Bogh and Sanne Kofod Olsen for hosting me 
as a visiting researcher. 
There are certain people and milieus that pre-exist the actual thesis work and without whom there 
would have been no thesis in the first place. Gavin Butt, my MA supervisor at Goldsmiths College 
University of London, who first introduced me to Sedgwick’s work, and allowed me to find a way to 
combine my interests in theoretical and artistic practices in fun and stimulating ways. I want to express 
my gratitude to the rest of the Department of Visual Cultures: Kodwo Eshun, Simon O’Sullivan, Jorella 
Andrews, Brendan Pendeville & Irit Rogoff, whose teaching has travelled with me ever since. Group 
Five: Mirene Arsanios, Sidsel Nelund and Rafael Pulido for the good times, inspiring conversations and 
continuous friendship.
 I am grateful to Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick for writing the essay that has caused me so many headaches 
and joy that I have returned to it over the past nine years, each time with renewed energy and 
inspiration. I am grateful for the two chances I had to meet you in person and if I had realised that our 
days were numbered, I would have stalked you a little more. 
Rabih Mroué and David Hoyle originally allowed me to glimpse the lineaments of the reparative 
critical practice. I thank you for the talks we had and the material you shared. The Lebanese Association 
for Plastic Arts, Ashkal Alwan & Christine Tohme: you taught me a lot and have provided useful resource 
and archival material for this thesis.
I am grateful to Julie Ault, your teaching at the Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts paved the way 
for this research project in many ways and your PhD defence and exhibition in Malmö allowed me the 
opportunity to reconnect with your work, which became a massive inspiration for this thesis. 
Rania & Raed Rafei: I cherish your friendship, the talks we had over the years and your work has 
been a great resource for this PhD project.
The first year of the PhD was spent in London between Hackney, Goldsmiths College and Kingston 
University. I am thankful to Peter Osborne for letting me sit in at CRMEP activities.
The friends and colleagues I met in London: Ida Marie Hede, Kasper Opstrup, Aggi & Edgar, Ursula 
Dimitri, Sidsel Meineche, Dana Trometer, Tania el Khoury, Muzna Maasri and many more for providing 
me with a community for exchange of ideas.
1  Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 358.
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Back in Copenhagen at the Department of Arts and Cultural Studies I want to thank Trine Friis 
Sørensen, Devika Sharma, Mathias Danbolt & James Day who have been invaluable interlocutors to 
my writing in different stages of the project. The Memory Pack & Valby office Roxana Bedrule, Frauke 
Wiegand, Kristian Handberg, Martin Baake, Maud Guichard-Marneur for the good times we spent 
together and the exchange of ideas, frustrations and joys.
My artistic research pack at the Art Academy: Jane Jin Kaisen and Tamar Guimaraes for valuable 
feedback, conversations & for co-organising the creative writing symposiums. 
My Practice Pack at the Department of Arts & Cultural Studies: Trine, Rhea Dall, Kristine Siegel, 
Sofie Volquartz Lebech, Stina Hasse and Runa Johannesen.
The Theory Reading Group: Mikkel Frantzen, Torsten Caleb Andreasen, Nanna Thylstrup, Nan 
Gerdes, Michael Kjær, Martin Glaz-Serup, Peer Illner, Jens Bjerring, Gregers Andersen, Sabine Nielsen & 
Annette Thorsen. I want to thank Kristin Veel for coordinating the PhD programme at the department 
and valuable discussions. 
THE PACK: Honey Biba Beckerlee, Sidsel Nelund, Anne Mikél, Stefan Andreas Pedersen, Mathias 
Kryger, Arendse Krabbe, Nina Wengel; Gerry’s Chicks: Agnete Bertam, Jette Ellegaard, Marie Kølbæk 
Iversen, Ninka & Honey; The Felix Guattari Reading Circle organised by Mathias & Arendse; and Jane, 
Guston Sondin-Kung  & Theo. You have all provided great support, friendship and valuable feedback 
to this project. 
Two persons who have been extremely valuable to this project are Philippe & Elsina Arzrouni; it has 
been a long journey and I am grateful for your immense participation and involvement in the project 
Leap into Colour. 
In Beirut Metro Al Madina generously provided me with a test-site to rehearse my ideas and projects 
and provided me with a community of inspiration. It has been a great learning process to see you grow. 
I want to thank Hisham Jaber, Sara Norah, Bassem Breche, Sahar Malek, Lara Nasser, Jawad Chaaban, 
Ahmed Mekkawi, Aude Malkoun, Wassim Mawad, Donald Choubassi, The stars of Hishink Bishik & Bar 
Farouk: Yasmina Fayed, Lina Sahab, Ziad Al Ahmadiye, Roy Deep, Wissam Dhalati, Randa Makhoul, 
Chantal Bitar, Ziad Itani, Ahmed el-Khatib, Ziad Jaafar, Bashar Farran and many more.
Leap into Colour & movement would never have been realised without the great cinematography 
& post-production work of Nadim Saoma. 
I thank The Council: Ali Kays, Nadim Shartouny, for excellent post-production on Leap into Colour: 
Ali & Azza Hussein you are the trip. Khaled Yassine & Maurice Louca – your sound work is amazing 
and you are great inspiration to work with.
I thank the community of artists around Metro who posed in the photographs Zak aka. Assasi non 
Fuse, Yasmina Faed, Marc Ernest, Rania Rafei, Kobrosli.
The Arab Image Foundation for letting me work in the archive and for providing me with material: 
Zeina Arida, Rima Mokaiesh, Ralph Nashawaty & Charbel Saad.
98 weeks: Mirene & Marwa Arsanios and the rest of the city, which has been so extremely generous 
to me. 
In Cairo I thank Townhouse Gallery for providing me with a residency to create Leap into Colour. 
Beirut (Cairo): Sarah Rifky, Antonia Alampi & Jens Meier-Rothe for providing me with a place to stay 
and work. Harun Farocki & Antje Ehmann for organising the workshop Labour in a Single Shot, I am 
grateful that I had the chance to meet you and your work provided thoughts and images to this thesis. 
I am thankful to Studio Viennoise: Hiba Fareed & Paul Geday for letting me work and participate in 
your inspirational project. The people who participated in the making of Leap: Armand Arzrouni (Jr.), 
Malak Helmy, Vartan Avakian, Sama Waly, Fatiha Bouzidi, Omar Negati, Am Abdo, Mustafa, Diaa 
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Reds, Maymouni, Karim Francis, Islam Kamal, Islam Dakahny, Aly & Toufeh, Abou Nour, Shahira Issa, 
Nermine El Ensari, Huda Lufti, Bahaa Talis, Anu Ramdas, Christian Danlielewitz and Charlotte HC.
I am grateful to the artists who took part in artistic program Touch Image Dream curated by Abbas 
Mroueh and I in Copenhagen and Aalborg 2013: Rania & Raed Rafei, Mounzer Baalbaki, Ragda, 
Rayess Bek, Kaya Behkalam, Alif Ensemble: Khaled Yassine, Maurice Louca, Khyam Allami, Tamer Abou 
Ghazaleh & Bashar Ferran. Your work and ideas, the conversations we had have been an immense 
inspiration to this project. I want to thank Aalborg University, CKU, Café Theatre S/H & The Danish 
Arts Council for providing funding and infrastructure for Touch Image Dream.
Kunsthal Charlotteborg: Henriette Breton Meier & Jacob Fabricius for hosting the exhibition Leap 
into Colour and the wonderful team Anne Mikél, Katarina Stenbeck, Helen Nishijo Andersen, Mia Flindt 
Clausen  &  KarenVestergaard Andersen. Immense gratitude goes to my excellent crew Lars Mathisen, 
Abed Orabi, Abbas Mroueh & Sune Petersen for pulling the show together. I thank dnp denmark as & 
Jens-Jørgen Sumborg for sponsoring the fabulous screen, B&O Play for providing the speakers, AV-
Concept for the projectors, Nørrebro Teater & Tomas Bjørnkjær for providing the curtains and great 
help, The Danish Arts Council & CKU for funding the project. 
I am grateful to all those who have given valuable feedback on the project when presented in various 
symposiums & conferences. In particular, I want to acknowledge the collaboration of Goldsmiths, Freie 
Universität Berlin, University of Strathclyde, Université Paris X Nanterre, for creating a stimulating 
research milieu and valuable feedback on my project at its various stages, especially Catherine Perret, 
Erica Fischer-Lichte, Suely Rolnik, Eliza Steinbock, Laura U. Marks, Alexander Galloway, Simon O’ 
Sullivan, Helen Carr & the doctoral students.
I thankful to the core group of The Master in ICT & Learning especially Janni Nielsen & Birgitte 
Holm Sørensen, for inviting me to teach and share my work in an inspiring group of academic peers.
I thank the students and my co-teachers Sidsel & Jamie Hodge in Aural Cultures, University of 
Copenhagen and the students from Et Andet Universitet; IT-Media and especially Morten Bolvig for 
providing post-production facilities and sound recording studio; The librarian Mads Nybro Risum and 
Publicom’s Boris for great service. 
I am grateful to Erica Fischer-Lichte and InterArt Graduiertenkolleg at Freie Universität, Regine 
Strätling, Sarah Dornhof, Anna Maier, Sarah Ralfs & Frauke Surmann for providing me with a 
scholarship and a stimulating work environment to write up this PhD project. 
Eller med a, for taking part in the development of the layout of the project. 
Dale Pyatt for meticulous proof reading & great patience.
I thank Anka Holm Sørensen, Ditte Munch Hansen, Sofie Pedersen, Neli Sharifi & Josefine Elle for 
your long lasting friendships & support. Lene & Gitte Harbo, Pardis Kimia & the community around 
Blågårdsgade for providing the coffee and a community that gives me hope that there is still a reason 
to stay and work in Copenhagen.
Trine Mee Sok & Louise Tim for letting me breathe and stretch in times of labour and labour.
To my family in Lebanon, Ghana, UAE: Malakeh, Nadine, Mazen, Jalal, Ghada, Mohamad, Fatme, 
Ghinwa, Bisounash & the beautiful kids, Um Kais, Amto Fatme, the 9 Khaltos, Khalo Talal & Teta – your 
generosity, warmth and love are abundant. 
I am grateful to my family in Denmark, who have provided great support and inspiration throughout: 
Lillian, Karen, Maibritt, Mahdi, Annette, Anders, Kim & Annemette, Line, Lars & the kids. My brother 
Kasper, Janne, Elva & Asta for sharing the PhD’s ups and downs throughout the entire period & taking 
good care of the family. To my commune family Randi, Ludvig, Ida, Simon, Karin, and many more: you 
are a true inspiration and support. To my parents Lone Dirckinck-Holmfeld & Arne Remmen for your 
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tremendous love and support. The snowflake diagram has been my way to combine your interest in 
and contribution to the fields of ICT, learning, ecology & cleaner technology.
Much love goes to Abbas Mroueh, who has been a travel companion throughout the entire process 
and filled it with love, 7ob and challenging thoughts. I dedicate this thesis to our son Baher, the most 
beautiful and funny creation that came out of this period, with all my love. 
Gratitude is a complex emotion, and together you all form complex cartographies of intersecting 
lives, practices and friendships that give me reason to work and look forward to being in this world. 
Katrine Dirckinck-Holmfeld 2015
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Time in the Making
Rehearsing Reparative Critical Practices
Summary
I fear that we might reach a stage of bankruptcy as humans
… a stage where we are unable to create a new prophet
or if for some reason there are no more prophets, create a new philosopher…
or create a new idea…
to improve our lives.1
Towards the end of the film 74 (The reconstitution of a struggle) by the Lebanese film directors Rania 
& Raed Rafei, “Ghassan” – a young student activist – delivers the above confession directly to the 
camera. When I screened the film during the students’ occupation of the Rector’s office of University 
of Copenhagen (May 2015), I noticed that the discussion which followed the screening, was replete 
with references to philosophers and thinkers, but devoid of references to other practices, other forms 
of resistance and other forms of living. The Rafeis’ film, which re-enacts the student uprising in Beirut 
in 1974 using current activists, is densely packed with references to other practices and revolutionary 
struggles from the 1970s. In 2015, are our discussions devoid of other examples? Is all we are left with 
snippets of theories, images and ideas unable to find a practice adequate to the task of bringing them 
together and into effect? Is the bankruptcy that Ghassan anticipated in 1974 – or was it today, 2015, 
or 2011? – the bankruptcy that we are witnessing today (the financial crisis, the Arab Spring, the wars 
in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, the crisis in Greece, the refugee disaster in the Mediterranean Sea, racial 
and homophobic violence and the adoption of extreme right wing policies into centre-right discourse 
etc.)? Events have not left us devoid of philosophers and prophets, but have they left us unable to 
imagine other practices to improve our lives?
Weak, minor and affect-driven, this research project ventures into practices which do not claim to 
salvage the world, but which offer other affective modes of operating and living in the world –despite 
all the odds. Thus, the main research questions which have guided this research project are:
How to create reparative critical practices? Is there any desirability for such practices? What is the 
ontology of reparative critical practices as an image in itself?
Since the aim of Time in the Making is to develop what it sets out to rehearse namely a reparative 
critical practice, the research question has a mirror question: How to style the (critical) inquiry in such 
a way that allows for the practical and theoretical endeavours to develop concomitantly while at the same 
1  Rafei and Rafei, 74 (la Reconstitution d’une Lutte), 01:01:45.
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time keeping it open to contingency?
Conceptually, Time in the Making expands on American literary scholar and queer-feminist Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick’s notion of the reparative reading, understood as a dense communal exploration of 
fragments into new assemblages. Sedgwick developed the reparative in response to the AIDS crisis in the 
US in the 1990s and her own terminal cancer diagnosis. Faced with such contingencies and urgencies, 
Sedgwick ponder on her own scholarly work as well as the practice of critical theory in general to 
envisage other ways of doing critical inquiry. Rather than trying to conform what the reparative is, I 
draw on disparate theorists and artists whose work have pushed my conceptual framework of what the 
reparative might be. In so doing my main inquiry is to shift the reparative critical practice understood 
primarily as a performative and literary reading practice, towards visual arts practices and the digital 
image in itself.
Time in the Making suggests that the reparative critical practice enfolds the materiality of the pure 
past (that which has been). This process opens up to what I call affect’s time – when affect collides with 
matter causing a direct experience of time – as heterogeneity of times existing in the same moment. This 
process works back on the initial materiality that the affect carried with it and creates a process of 
rematerialisation in which the past is no longer pure past but becomes reconstituted in the present. 
The reparative critical practice involves a complex relationality to temporality, which operates on four 
or more different levels: The past experience in itself; the rematerialisation of that past experience; the 
reconstitution of the past in the present. Together these different temporalities unite a fourth one – the 
collectivities of practices that they constitute. 
Time in the Making assembles an eclectic pile of research material, which ranges from close-readings 
of artists’ work, conceptual and analytical readings to the production of two video installations. Each 
part has been styled in accordance with its matter of inquiry.
In the first chapter “Affect’s Materiality, Or, Not tonight Dears, I have a Headache!” I think through 
the concepts of affect and materiality, to construct a conception of affect between somatic, performative 
and technical assemblage. Unfolding the way in which affect enfolds materiality and how matter is 
enfolded in the affect, I bring together Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari and Sedgwick for an involuntary 
threesome. The three are often seen as exponents of two different strands of affect theory. By bringing 
them alongside one another I attempt to open the concept of reparative practices to the technicity and 
texture of affect as an assemblage of heterogeneous elements.
In the subsequent two chapters I situate the discussion on the materiality of affect in relation to 
digital image production through two different modes of inquiry. The article “Affect Image Touch” is a 
close reading of the affect and touch of the digital image propelled by my encounter with the pixelated 
images which emerged during the early stages of the uprising in Syria, which the Lebanese performance 
artist Rabih Mroué has worked extensively on in his performance The Pixelated Revolution (2013) 
and the close-up of Malene Dietrich’s face, in Josef von Sternberg’s film The Scarlet Empress (1934). 
Radically different in their materiality, texture and context, the two snippets allow me to discuss the 
affect and materiality of the digital image, in which the pixel rips itself from the totality of which it 
should form part and are raised into a state of entity. 
“A movement image is being written” is an essay-documentation of the video installation movement, 
which I made in the cabaret, performance and club venue Metro al Madina in Beirut in 2012. Here I 
explore how the movement image can move, not only technically and mechanically but also spatially 
and socially: What happens to the movement image during progressive filming and in multichannel 
video installations?
Inspired by my encounter with American artist Julie Ault’s reinstallation of Felix Gonzalez-Torres’ 
Optimistic Clocks in the essay “Affect’s Time: On the Temporality of the Reparative Critical Practice”, 
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I discuss the reparative critical practice’s complex relationship to temporality. Gonzalez-Torres 
collected the clocks, designed by George Nelson, shortly before his premature death in 1996 and in 
2011 Ault reassembled about a dozen of the clocks, which had been dispersed to the community 
around Gonzalez-Torres.
Sedgwick’s call for the reparative practice has often been criticised for undermining critical theory’s 
ability to reveal power structures in society in favour of more affect-oriented and ameliorative practices. 
In “Affect as Critical Inquiry” I discuss how the reparative is not anti-critical, but is critical by enacting 
the very same paranoia it sets out to criticise. Sedgwick’s call for the reparative is not advocating 
good affects vs. bad ones, but opening up for other ways of doing and enacting critique. To further 
develop this claim, I draw on Judith Butler’s essay “What is Critique: An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue” 
and Irit Rogoff ’s concept of criticality. Inviting Butler and Rogoff into the ménage à trois is an attempt 
to reconcile the reparative critical practice with Butler’s work to consider how affect impinges on us, 
leading us to think of affect as “not just the basis but the very stuff of ideation and critique”2 and how 
affect not only forces a response but also eventually styles this response in new forms. 
In the subsequent intermezzo I develop affect as critical inquiry through a case-study in (para)
paranoia. Here, I update paranoia, from an analogue, Cold-War paranoia in Sedgwick to a digital 
(para)paranoia of (late)late capitalism through a reading of Sianne Ngai’s version of paranoia in Ugly 
Feelings and the piece My Neck is Thinner Than a Hair by the Atlas Group.
Through the production of the video installation Leap into Colour (Cairo, Beirut, Copenhagen 
2012-2015) I have explored the reparative in relation to memory as a process of migrations and 
rematerialisation, which enables different space-times and geographies to exist within the same frame. 
1930-1950: Cairo is a vibrant cosmopolitan centre for art, cinema, music, cabarets and political 
ferment. The Armenian-Egyptian photographer Armand (Armenak Arzrouni 1901 Erzurum – 1963 
Cairo) captures the artists and politicians frequenting his studio in Downtown Cairo. 
2012: Philippe Arzrouni, the son of Armand who has lived in Denmark since the 1960s, returns 
to Cairo for the first time in 30 years to find out what has happened to his father’s photographs. 
Memories from the past interfere with the present and fragments of archival material interweave in 
the current and become inextricable.
The work with Leap into Colour led to a reflection on the reparative critical practice as a process 
of “rematerialisation”, which I discuss in the following essay. Here I weave my experience of watching 
Harun Farocki’s films during a workshop with Farocki and Antje Ehmann in Cairo and Alexandria, 
Egypt, in 2012, together with my own work with Leap into Colour.
In dialogue with Lebanese filmmakers Rania and Raed Rafei’s films Prologue (2011) and 74 (The 
reconstitution of a struggle) (2012) on the student uprisings in Lebanon in 1974, the essay-letter 
“Reconstitution” explores the reparative critical practice not as a re-enactment of the past in the 
present, but as the past being reconstituted in the present through urgency and contingency. 
The heterogeneous parts that make up the entire research project are brought together in the final 
part “Collectivities of the Disco-Stretch, Or, Propersitions for a Future Practice”. Here I discuss what 
kind of collectivity the reparative critical practice fosters by taking my point of departure in the texture 
and collectivies that Metro al Madina is forging in Beirut and beyond. I keep the reparative practice 
open-ended with 23 non-prescriptive, propositions for a future practice.
2  Butler, Frames of War, 34.
192
Time in the Making
Rehearsing Reparative Critical Practices
Resumé 
Jeg frygter, at vi vil nå til et stadie, hvor menneskeheden vil gå bankerot 
et stadie, hvor vi ikke længere er i stand til at skabe en ny profet
eller hvis der ikke er flere profeter – en ny filosof…
eller en ny ide…
til at forbedre vores liv.1
I slutningen af 74 (The reconstituion of a struggle) udtaler den unge studenteraktivist Ghassan (Assad 
Thebian), der i filmen re-enacter studenteroprøret fra Beirut i 1974, det ovenfornævnte citat direkte 
til kameraet. I foråret 2015 viste jeg 74, af de libanesiske filminstruktører Rania & Raed Rafei, under 
studenterbevægelsen Et andet universitets besættelse af rektors kontor på Københavns Universitet. 
Den efterfølgende diskussion var fyldt med referencer til filosoffer og teoretikere, men referencer til 
andre praksisser, modstandsformer og andre måder at leve på, var fraværende.
Er den tilstand som Ghassan forestillede sig i 1974 – eller var det i 2011 eller 2015? – en tilstand 
vi har nået i dag (finanskrisen, krigene i Syren, Irak, Afghanistan, Yemen…, flygtningekatastrofen, 
racistiske og homofobiske overgreb, samt udbredelsen af populistisk og fremmedfjendsk politik…)? 
Begivenhederne har ikke ført til færre filosoffer, eksperter og profeter, men har de efterladt os ude 
afstand til at forestille os nye praksisformer og mulighedsbetingelser for at forbedre vores liv? Er vi 
overladt til brudstykker af billeder og teorier uden at være i stand til at bringe dem sammen og sætte 
dem i værk? 
Time in the Making undersøger kunstneriske praksisser, som ikke foregiver at redde verden, men 
som fremstiller andre affektive måder at opererer og leve på i verden. Derved undersøger jeg følgende 
forskningsspørgsmål: 
Hvordan skaber man reparative critical practices – eller reparerende kritiske praksisser? Hvad er den 
reparerende kritiske praksis’ ”ontologi”, som en kunstnerisk praksis eller et billede i sig selv?
Da formålet med Time in the Making er at udvikle, hvad projektet sætter sig for at udøve nemlig 
en reparerende kritisk praksis, er forskningsspørgsmålet refleksivt: Hvordan kan man style kritiske 
undersøgelser, så at de praktiske og teoretiske bestræbelser kan udvikle sig samtidig med at de holdes åbne 
for det uforudsete? 
Time in the Making bygger på den amerikanske litterat og queer-feminist Eve Kosofsky Sedgwicks 
1  Rafei og Rafei, 74 (La reconstitution d’une lutte) min oversættelse fra engelsk.
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begreb om den reparerende læsning. AIDS-krisen i USA i 1990erne samt da hun selv blev diagnosticeret 
med brystkræft er begivenheder, som får Sedgwick til at stoppe op og reflektere over sin egen teoretiske 
praksis, kritisk teori generelt og hvordan kritisk teori kan antage andre affektive former. Sedgwick 
foreslår, at den reparerende praksis eller læsning er en kollektiv udforskning af fragmenter, som 
sammensættes til nye montager/assemblager. 
Ved at udforske den reparerende kritiske praksis som et trefoldigt engagement med affekt, 
materialitet og tid, bidrager Time in the Making ved at udvide begrebet til også at kunne omfatte 
billedkunstneriske praksisser og det digitale billede i sig selv. Snarere end at forsøge at svare på, hvad 
den reparerende kritiske praksis er, trækker jeg på forskellige kunstnere og teoretikere, hvis arbejde 
har udfordret min forståelse af, hvad en reparerende praksis kan være. 
Time in the Making foreslår, at den reparerende kritiske praksis søger tilbage til forgangne 
begivenheder, hvorved materiale fra fortiden foldes ind i affekten. Denne proces åbner op for det, 
jeg kalder affektens tid – når affekt kolliderer med stoflighed og derved skaber en mulighed for at 
opleve tiden direkte; som en heterogenitet af tider der eksisterer i samme øjeblik. Denne proces virker 
tilbage på materialitet og skaber derved en form for rematerialisering, hvor fragmenter fra fortiden 
rekonstitueres i nuet. 
Denne praksis indebærer et komplekst forhold til tid, som opererer på fire forskellige niveauer: 
Fortiden oplevet i sig selv; rematerialiseringen af det tidligere erfarede; og konstitueringen af fortiden 
i nutiden. Tilsammen udgør disse forskellige temporaliteter én fjerde dimension i form af de kollektive 
praksisser som de tilsammen udgør.
I det første kapitel ”Affect’s Materiality, Or, Not tonight Dears, I have a Headache!” bringer jeg Gilles 
Deleuze, Félix Guattari og Sedgwick sammen i en ufrivillig trekant. De tre ses ofte som eksponenter 
for to forskellige retninger inden for affektteori. Ved hjælp af deres forskellige forståelser af affekt og 
materialitet, konstruerer jeg en forståelse af affekt mellem somatisk, performativ og teknisk assemblage. 
I de efterfølgende to kapitler placerer jeg diskussionen om affektens materialitet i forhold til digital 
billedbehandling. Kapitlet ”Affect Image Touch” er en nærlæsning af det digitale billedes affekt og evne 
til at berøre, frembragt dels af mit eget møde med de pixelerede billeder, der opstod i de tidlige stadier 
af den syriske opstand (2011) og som den libanesiske performancekunstner Rabih Mroué har arbejdet 
med i performancen The Pixelated Revolution (2013), og dels et close-up af Malene Dietrichs ansigt i 
Josef von Sternbergs film The Scarlet Empress (1934). På trods af deres radikalt forskellige stofligheder, 
teksturer og kontekster folder billederne affekten ind i sig og løsriver sig derved fra den helhed, som 
de skulle være en del af.
”A movement image is being written” er en essay-dokumentation af videoinstallationen movement, 
som jeg skabte til Metro Al Madina, en kabaret/teater i Beirut, i 2012. Her undersøger jeg, hvordan 
bevægelsesbilledet kan bevæge sig ikke kun teknisk og mekanisk men også rumligt og socialt: Hvad 
sker der med bevægelsesbilledet i digital billedbehandling og flerskærms videoinstallation?
Inspireret af mit møde med amerikanske kunstner Julie Aults reinstallering af Felix Gonzalez-Torres 
optimistiske urer undersøger jeg i essayet ”Affect’s Time: On the Temporality of the Reparative Critical 
Practice”, den reparerende kritiske praksis’ komplekse forhold til tid. Gonzalez-Torres samlede urene 
kort tid før sin tidlige død i 1996. I 2011 samlede Ault igen urene, der havde været spredt ud blandt 
Gonzalez-Torres’ venner og kollegaer.
Sedgwicks essay, hvori hun introducerer begrebet om den reparerende praksis, er ofte blevet 
kritiseret for at tilsidesætte vigtigheden af kritisk teori og den stadige nødvendighed i at afsløre 
magtstrukturer og undertrykkelsesmekanismer i samfundet. I ”Affect as Critical Inquiry” diskuterer 
jeg, hvordan den reparerende praksis ikke er anti-kritisk men er kritisk ved at gøre brug af de samme 
paranoide metoder, som Sedgwick kritiserer kritisk teori for at bruge. Jeg ser derfor Sedgwicks 
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opfordring til at udvikle reparerende kritiske praksisser som et forsøg på at skabe andre måder at gøre 
kritik på. Jeg videreudvikler denne tese ved at trække på Judith Butlers essay ”What is Critique? An 
Essay on Foucault’s Virtue” (2003), og Irit Rogoff ’s begreb om criticality. Ved at indlemme Butler og 
Rogoff i den konceptuelle trekant forsøger jeg at forene den reparerende kritiske praksis med Butlers 
arbejde og derved overveje, hvordan affekt kan tænkes ikke bare som “grundlaget for, men selve det 
stof, som tankevirksomhed og kritik er gjort af.”2 Affekten aftvinger os til at reagere, men tvinger os til 
at style denne respons i nye former.
I det efterfølgende intermezzo udvikler jeg ideen om affekt som en kritisk undersøgelse gennem 
et studie af det, jeg kalder (para)paranoia. Gennem en læsning af Sianne Ngai’s begreb om paranoia i 
Ugly Feelings (2005) og værket My Neck is Thinner than a Hair af the Atlas Group (2004), opdaterer jeg 
Sedgwicks forståelse af paranoia, fra en analog, koldkrigs paranioa til en digital, (sen)senkapitalistisk 
(para)paranoia, eller selvrefleksiv paranoia. 
Gennem produktionen af videoinstallationen Leap into Colour (Cairo, Beirut, København 2012-
2015) udforsker jeg den reparerende kritiske praksis i forhold til erindring, som en migrerende proces, 
hvor materialer fra fortiden rematerialiseres i nutiden og derved muliggør at forskellige temporaliteter 
eksisterer side om side.
1930-1950: Cairo er et kosmopolitisk center for kunst, film, musik, kabareter og politiske 
omvæltninger. Den armenske-egyptiske fotograf Armenak (Armand) Arzrouni (f. 1901 Erzurum – d. 
1963 Cairo) fotograferer kunstnere og politikere, som frekventerer hans atelier i det centrale Cairo.
2012: Philippe Arzrouni, søn af Armand der har boet i Danmark siden 1960erne, vender tilbage 
til Cairo for første gang i 30 år at finde ud af, hvad der er sket med hans fars fotografier. Minder fra 
fortiden blandes med nutiden og fragmenter af arkivmateriale sammenflettes med geniscenesættelser 
og bliver uadskillelige.
Mit arbejde med Leap into Colour affødte en refleksion over den reparerende kritiske praksis som 
en ”rematerialiseringsproces”, som jeg diskuterer i det følgende essay. Her væver jeg min oplevelse fra 
Harun Farockis film, In Comparison og Videograms of a Revolution, som han viste under workshoppen 
Labour in a single shot i Cairo og Alexandria i 2012, sammen med mit eget arbejde med Leap into 
Colour.
I dialog med de libanesiske filmskabere Rania og Raed Rafeis film Prologue (2011) og 74 (The 
reconstitution of a struggle) (2012) undersøger jeg rekonstitueringsbilledet, og i forlængelse heraf forstår 
jeg den reparerende kritiske praksis som en måde hvorpå fortiden ikke re-enactes  i nutiden, men hele 
tiden rekonstitueres i et blivende nu. 
De heterogene dele, der udgør hele forskningsprojektet, er bragt sammen i det sidste afsnit 
”Collectivities of the Disco-Stretch, Or, Propositions for a Future Practice”. Her diskuterer jeg hvilken 
form for kollektivitet som den reparerende kritiske praksis fremmer ved at tage udgangspunkt i de 
kollektivistiske praksisformer som Metro Al Madina skaber i Beirut. Jeg afrunder med at holde den 
reparerende kritiske praksis åben med 23 ikke-normative forslag for en fremtidig praksis.
2  Butler, Frames of War, 34. Jeg takker Mikkel Frantzen for denne oversættelse.
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